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 In a previous study exploring the lived worlds of a small group of Black people  
detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (amended in 2007) for the assessment and 
treatment of schizophrenia, I found that perceived race-related academic and 
socioeconomic failure and defeat were prominent features in the disorganised 
narratives of the participants interviewed (De Maynard, 2005, 2008). Although their 
autobiographies were rational given their circumstances, it was impossible to 
distinguish their presenting symptoms – disrupted integration of thought, self-
perception and identity – from depersonalisation/derealisation clinicians might expect 
in dissociative identity disorder (DSM-V, 2013). The impact of stress those 
interviewed believed to be race-related should not be surprising, given their systematic 
experience of social disadvantage and discrimination (Berthoud, 1999, 2000; 
Chakraborty & Bhui, 2002). The symptomology of schizophrenia and dissociative 
disorders are difficult to differentiate (Moskowitz & Heim, 2011; Moskowitz, Schafer 
& Dorahy, 2008), and Western cultural ideas about these disorders have historically 
been imposed on communities in which emotional distress is understood differently 
(Dein, Williams & Dein, 2007).  
Racism is a common experience for Black people in the UK from an early age 
(DCLG, 2007; Home Office, 2012). Black people detained under the Mental Health 
Act 1983/2007 for the treatment of schizophrenia often attribute their health and 
financial difficulties to racism (Gilvarry, Walsh, Samelle, Hutchinson, Mallett, Rabe-
Hesketh, Fahy, van Os & Murray, 1999). The stress of real and anticipated 
socioeconomic failure and defeat is associated with dopamine dysregulation, which is 
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correlated with schizophrenia (Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005). In this chapter, I will 
outline the concepts of schizophrenia and dissociation and argue that diagnosing and 
treating schizophrenia in Black people is unsafe due to this difficulty in differentiating 
between the symptomology of schizophrenia and dissociative disorders. I will then go 
on to conceptualise racism as it a function of the Black body, devise tools to measure 
it which can then be validated, and derive and tested a hypothetical theory that 
accumulative and chronic perception of racism could so sensitise the Mesolimbic 
Dopamine System that dissociative experiences, indistinguishable from those that 
might be indicative for schizophrenia, ensue. 
 
1.1 Schizophrenia 
 Schizophrenia is a debilitating mental disorder of unknown aetiology, 
characterised by positive symptoms, negative symptoms, interpersonal difficulties, 
deterioration in self-care and social dysfunction (Moskowitz, Schafer & Dorahy, 
2008). Positive symptoms include unusual perceptual, cognitive, affective, sensory 
and behavioural experiences, such as paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, and 
disorganised thought. Negative symptoms include flat affect, avolition or loss of 
motivation, and speech peculiarities. Interpersonal difficulties often take the form of 
withdrawal and a reluctance to participate socially, or other forms of social 
dysfunction, such as social anhedonia, ambivalence and social anxiety. There may be 
an unusual deterioration in personal hygiene and self-care. Age of at onset can vary 
according to gender: onset in males is typically in late adolescence, while women 
characteristically develop the disorder in their early twenties. 
The prevalence of schizophrenia in the UK and culturally related countries is 
between 0.7 and 2%, similar to that in the Caribbean (Coid Kirkbride, Barker, 
Cowden, Stamps, Yang & Jones, 2008; Perala, Suvisaari, Saarni, Kuoppasalmi, 
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Isometsa, Sami Pirkola, Partonen, Tuulio-Henriksson, Hintikka, Kieseppa, Harkanen, 
Koskinen, Lonnqvist, 2007). Black people accounted for approximately 2.9% of the 
UK population in 2008 and 3.4% in 2011 (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2001, 
2011). However, they accounted for 11.24% in 2008, and in in 2010, 10.9% of all 
psychiatric inpatients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 ( as amended in 
2007) for the assessment and/or treatment of schizophrenia (Community and Mental 
Health Team, Health and Social Care Information Centre UK, 2011, 2013; Health and 
Social Care Information Centre, 2008, 2009). Black men are more likely to be 
detained under the Mental Health Act for longer than Black women (Aleman, Kahn & 
Selten, 2003). Black women are more likely to be detained for the assessment and 
treatment of schizophrenia than their female counterparts of any other ethnicity 
(Lawlor, Johnson, Cole & Howard, 2012).  
Although Black people are no more prone to suffer from mental disorders in 
general, or to use mental health services any more prolifically, than other ethnic 
groups in the UK (Health and Social Care Information Centre UK, 2013), they are 3.3 
times more likely than their ethnic counterparts to be:  
1) Diagnosed with schizophrenia (Commission for Healthcare, Audit & 
Inspection, 2005; Community and Mental Health Team, Health and Social Care 
Information Centre UK, 2010, 2011, 2013; Quality Care Commission, 2010); 
2) Detained under the Mental Health Act and subjected to community 
treatment orders (Bhui, 2003; Morgan, Mallett, Hutchinson, Bagalkote, Fearon, 
Dazzan, Boydell, McKenzie, Harrison, Murray, Jones, Craig & Leff, 2005; Quality 
Care Commission, 2010); 
3) Evaluated as violent and aggressive, and controlled, restrained and held in 
isolation by health and social care professionals (Coid, Kirkbridge, Barker, Cowden, 
16 
 
Stamps, Yan & Jones, 2008; Jarvis, Kirmayer, Jarvis & Whitley, 2005; Littlewood & 
Lipsedge, 1987); 
4) Administered antipsychotic medication as opposed to talking therapies 
(Callan & Littlewood, 1998); and, 
5) Brought to the hospital by the police and administered emergency injections 
(Jarvis, 2008; King, Nazroo, Weich, McKenzie, Bhui, Karlsen, Stansfeld, Tyrer, 
Blanchard, Lloyd, McManus, Sproston & Erens, 2005).  
The Present State Examination (PSE; Wing, Cooper & Sartorius, 1974), 
originally used to diagnose schizophrenia, was based on the First Rank Symptoms 
(FRS) proposed by Schneider (1951). The Schedule for Clinical Assessment in 
Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; Wing, Babor, Brugha, Burke, Cooper, Giel, Jablenski, 
Regier & Sartorius, 1990) evolved from the older (PSE). SCAN is a set of four 
instruments aimed to assess and classify psychopathology in adults, including PSE−10 
(the 10th edition of the Present State Examination). Symptoms are defined in the 
SCAN glossary. The Item Group Checklist (IGC) is used to identify symptoms that 
can be rated directly (for example, from case notes) and the Clinical History Schedule 
(CHS). In the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-
10) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition 
(DSM-V, 2013), the presence of one of Schneider FRS is symptomatically sufficient 
for to diagnose schizophrenia. 
Although these standardised, diagnostic, clinicians developed semi-structured 
interview schedules to meet the ICD and DSM diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, 
they are based on dissociated thinking in schizophrenia. Bleuler (1911/1950) derived 
the term schizophrenia from dementia praecox and included dissociated thinking in his 
list of presenting symptoms, defined as ‘the disconnecting of ordinarily associated 
threads in thought and language... [In which] all the association threads fail, and the 
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thought chain is entirely interrupted’ (Bleuler, 1911/1950, pp. 21-22). Schneider 
(1939) proposed the following FRS for schizophrenia:  
 
‘Audible thoughts; voices heard arguing; voices heard commenting on one’s 
actions; the experience of influences playing on the body (somatic passivity 
experiences);  thought withdrawal and other interferences with thought; 
delusional perceptions and all feelings, impulses (or inner drives), and 
volitional acts that are experienced by the patient as the work or influence of 
others. When any of these modes of experience is undeniably present, and no 
underlying somatic illness can be found, we may make the decisive clinical 
diagnosis of Schizophrenia.’ (pp. 133-134) 
 
Since dopamine dysregulation explains many of the positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia, the Royal College of Psychiatrists (2012) recommend a Dopamine-2-
antagonist, such as ‘Thorazine’ or ‘Haloperidol’ in addition to psychological therapy 
in all cases of schizophrenia. In treatment-resistant cases, however, clinicians 
recommend an atypical antipsychotic such as ‘Clozapine’. Dopamine-2-
antagonists/antipsychotics have numerous side effects, including hypertension, tardive 
dyskinesia, obesity, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidaemia, sexual dysfunction and 
sedation, which are often poorly monitored and rarely treated (National Collaborating 
Centre for Mental Health (NCCMH), 2010). Despite improving cultural competence 
and pathways to care (Sass, Moffatt, Bhui & McKenzie, 2009) and the prevalence of 
hypertension in the Black community (Krieger & Sidney, 1996; Merritt, Bennett, 
Bennett, Jr., Williams, Edwards, & Sollers, 2006), clinicians may still prescribe 
‘Clozapine in Black treatment-resistant cases. Clozapine is contraindicated in those 
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with concomitant pathological hypertension. The financial and health implications for 
individuals, families and communities are considerable (Bhui, 2002; Harrell, Hall & 
Taliaferro, 2003; McKenzie, 2006). Andrews, Knapp, McCrone, Parsonage and 
Trachtenberg (2012) estimate the cost of treating schizophrenia in England and Wales 
at £11.8 billion per annum. 
According to Nordgaard, Arnfred, Handest and Parnas (2008), the ‘DSM and 
ICD emphasise FRS to the degree that is not supported by empirical evidence’ (p. 
137). FRS may be found in non-schizophrenic conditions and are thus not necessarily 
specific to schizophrenia. The absence of a phenomenological approach to ascertain 
the essence of observed behaviour during the interview prohibits adequate eliciting 
and description of the psychopathological phenomena, resulting in doubtful FRS 
ratings (Nordgaard et al., 2008). For schizophrenia to be diagnosed, affective disorder 
should arguably be absent and psychotic symptoms should not be comorbid with any 
other disorder (Nordgaard et al., 2008). Many studies report comorbid diagnoses of 
affective disorders in Black people (Frisher, Crome, Martino & Croft, 2009; Wright, 
Gournay, Glorney & Thornicroft, 2000). Interestingly, many FRS of schizophrenia are 
also relevant to trauma-related mental illnesses, such as Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(Courtois, Gold & Howell, 2005; Fink & Golinkoff, 1990; Moskowitz, 2011; Ross & 
Keyes, 2004). For instance, significant positive correlations between dissociative 
experiences and psychotic symptoms have been demonstrated (Ross, Miller, Reagor, 
Bjornson, Fraser, Anderson, and Novotny 1990; Ross & Keyes, 2004). Yet Black 
people are 3.3 times more likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983/2007 for the assessment and treatment of schizophrenia than their White 
counterparts are (Care Quality Commission, 2010; The Information Centre for Health 
and Social Care (UK), 2011). 
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The reasons why Black people continue to be over-represented in the mental 
healthcare system in the UK remain elusive (Cantor-Graae, 2007). Pregnancy and birth 
complications are significantly associated with schizophrenia (Thomas, Harrison, 
Zammit, Lewis, Horwood, Heron, Hollis, Wolke, Thompson & Gunnel, 2009), as are 
migrant status and migration (Cantor-Graae, 2007; Jetten & Wohl (2012); childhood 
abuse, psychological distress and trauma (Galletly, van Hooff & McFarlane, 2011; 
Spauwen, Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen & van Os, 2006); cannabis use (Frisher, 
Crome, Martino & Croft, 2009); urbanicity, low socioeconomic status, low 
educational achievement, extended periods of unemployment and other psychosocial 
factors (Broome, Woolley, Tabraham, Johns, Bramon, Murray, Pariante, McGuire & 
Murray, 2005; Cooper, Morgan, Hutchinson, Doody, Harrison, Leff, Jones, Ismail and 
Murray, 2008; Saha, Scott, Varghese & McGrath, 2011); and dopamine dysregulation 
(Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005). Possible risk factors for schizophrenia also include 
institutional racism and different explanatory models of illness (Dein et al., 2007). 
Independently, however, none of these risk factors demonstrably large effect on 
schizophrenia in Black people (Cantor-Graae, 2007).  
The PSE (Cooper, Sartorius & Wing, 1974) based on FRS is still used to 
diagnose schizophrenia today. The presence of Schneideran FRS in cases in which 
dissociative disorder is equally likely significantly confounds diagnosis (Ross et al., 
1991; Ross & Keyes, 2004; Stickley & Nickleas, 1991). According to the DSM-V 
(2013), however, FRS must persist for more than six months, accompanied by 
impaired social and occupational functioning, to diagnose schizophrenia. Nordgaard et 
al. (2008) argue that FRS are outdated and should no longer be used as diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia. Where a diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder is 
equally likely, the confluence between dissociative experiences and schizophrenia may 
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make the diagnosis of schizophrenia in Black people unsafe (Ross & Joshi, 1992; 
Spitzer, Haug & Freybeyer, 1997; van Os et al., 2008). 
Dissociative disorders may be confused with schizophrenia (DSM-V, 2013; 
Moskowitz & Heim, 2011). For instance, persecutory and inner voices heard 
criticising an individual for not sending money home to family in another country 
might be mistaken for psychotic auditory hallucinations (Dein et al., 2007; DSM-V, 
2013, p. 295). Perceived loss of control over thoughts could be confused with signs of 
thought disorder. The preponderance of dissociative symptoms distinguishes 
dissociative disorders from schizophrenia where the duration of schizophrenia 
spectrum symptoms is brief (Bhui, 2002; McKenzie, 2006). In the literature, risk 
factors associated with schizophrenia are also associated with dissociative disorders 




In the DSM–V (2013), dissociation is defined as a ‘disruption or discontinuity 
in the ordinary integration of memory, identity, consciousness, memory, perception, 
motor control and behaviour’ (p. 291). Putnam (1989) defined dissociation as ‘a 
typical mental process that is initially used defensively by an individual to handle 
traumatic experiences [that] evolves into a maladaptive or pathological process’ (p. 9). 
Such definitions depend upon the assumption of unity or integrated wholeness of the 
self. This unity is supposedly threatened in situations of perceived danger (Moskowitz 
et al., 2008). Dissociative symptoms are experienced as unwanted intrusions into 
awareness and behaviour are usually accessible and controllable, resulting in 
detachment from surroundings and difficulty recalling autobiographical information 
for time, whole or specific events, identity or life history (DSM-V, 2013). An 
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individual might have mild dissociative experiences, such as, (e.g. daydreaming or 
losing oneself in a book or film (Edge, 2004). However, it is not until these 
dissociative experiences begin to interfere with the way an individual behaves within 
that these initially adaptive ways of experiencing the world become "pathological" 
(van der Kolk & van der Hart, 1998). Some Black people may have learned how to 
dissociate their thoughts and feelings in response to perceived threat or danger, 
assuming a second identity that is more “passive” in response to perceived threat 
(Carter, 2007; Sue, 1981). There is a debate in the literature about how dissociation is 
conceptualised.  
According to Janet (1925), dissociative disorders should be considered a 
categorical construct and people who dissociate ("dissociators") differ qualitatively 
from those who do not (Irwin, 1999). This view is based on the assumption that 
dissociation is not an everyday experience and that only certain people are prone to 
dissociating. Others argue that dissociative experiences typically follow a traumatic 
event and experienced in a mild form by a significant proportion of the general 
population (Johns, Cannon, Singleton, Murray, Farrell, Brugha, Bebbington, Jenkins 
& Meltzer, 2004; Reininghaus, Craig, Fisher, Hutchinson, Fearon, Morgan Dazzan, 
Doody, Jones, Murray & Morgan, 2010). At one end of the dissociation continuum are 
those with a propensity to daydream, and who perform well-learnt tasks without 
conscious awareness. At the other end are those who tend to forget significant events 
in their lives or to complain about feeling detached from themselves or their 
surroundings (Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). The failure to 
integrate explicit mental representations (or schemas) may be evident in how 
individuals recount everyday experiences; however, an absence of connectedness not 
necessarily indicate a dissociative disorder (Ruiz, Pincus & Ray, 1999). Some people 
remain functional even with high levels of dissociative symptoms (Edge, 2004). 
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Disruptive and benign dissociative symptoms might differ qualitatively; however, the 
dissolution of usually integrated schematic mental representations of episodic, 
autobiographical and procedural memories remain the same regardless of severity (van 
de Hart & Nijenhuis, 2001). 
Five types of dissociative disorders are listed in the DSM-V (2013): 
a) Dissociative Identity Disorder – this disorder is characterised by an 
individual appearing to have more than one distinct identity or personality state that 
surfaces in the person on a recurring basis, complete with its set of memories and 
abilities. 
b) Dissociative depersonalisation – this disorder is characterised by recurrent 
feelings of detachment or distance from one's experience of the body, self or the world 
around. The person is aware that their feelings of disconnectedness do not reflect a real 
physical detachment. 
c) Dissociative Fugue – this disorder is characterised by an individual suddenly 
leaving familiar surroundings for hours or longer, having lost his or her certainty about 
his identity or having assumed a new identity, unrelated to the one by which she or he 
has been known in the past. 
d) Dissociative amnesia – this disorder is characterised by a blocking out of 
critical personal information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature. Four subtypes 
of dissociative amnesia have been identified according to the extent of the amnesia: 
localised, selective, generalised and systematised. The disorder result of other medical 
trauma, such as a blow to the head (DSM-V, 2013). 
e) Dissociative disorder, unspecified – this refers to situations in which 
dissociative symptoms are present, but the criteria for a particular dissociative disorder 
have not been met. 
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Dissociative symptoms are often the result of traumatising experiences, such as 
assault, abuse or neglect, which may arise from conflict between an individual and 
salient social situations (work, school, family or society). Identity fragmentation, 
amnesia, depersonalisation, derealisation, reduced awareness of the surrounding and 
blunted emotional response often follow traumatic experiences (Ross & Keyes, 2004; 
Moskowitz et al., 2008). The prevalence of dissociative experiences is similar to that 
of schizophrenia in the general population, 1.5 to 2% (DSM-V, 2013). The 
reinforcement and conditioning of dissociative behaviour, however, prohibits the 
development of alternative, effective, more creative ways of dealing with trauma. The 
individual might appear to be activating dissociative mechanisms to facilitate healthier 
functioning in areas of his or her life, but dissociation in times of stress appears 
automatic (Moskowitz & Hein, 2011). 
Since there is considerable overlap between schizophrenic and dissociative 
symptoms, schizophrenia might best be placed on continuum of dissociative 
experiences with commonly reported, transient, non-disruptive dissociative 
experiences at one end and more disruptive dissociative experiences at the other 
(Merckelbach & Giesbrecht, 2006; Moskowitz et al., 2008; Startup, 1999; van Os, 
Linscott, Myin-Gemeys, Delespaul & Krabbendam, 2009). In this thesis, dissociation 
is defined as the psychological processes whereby the usually integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, identity or perception are disconnected, characterised by 
distinct changes in a person's culture-bound sense of identity, memory or 
consciousness (Cardeña, Van Duijl, Weiner & Terhune, 2009). Psychotic symptoms 
such as distorted thinking, delusional perceptions and feelings, hallucinations and 
paranoia are often comorbid with schizotypal disorder, dissociative disorders and other 
anxiety and trauma-related disorders, although to a less dysfunctional degree than 
those with schizophrenia (Hamner, Frueh & Arcana, 1999; Rosh & Joshi, 1992; Ross 
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& Keyes, 2004). The dissociative symptoms often evident in the narratives of 
schizophrenics may reflect a sense of depersonalisation, derealisation, imaginative 
involvement, identity confusion and identity alteration, long associated with 
psychological stress and trauma (Castillo, 2003; Kilcommons & Morrison, 2005; 
Spauwen et al., 2006; Ross & Keyes, 2004). Therefore, in the next section, I will 
explore the conflation of dissociative experiences with schizophrenia and their relation 
to trauma. 
 
1.3 Schizophrenia, dissociative experiences and trauma 
The relationship between trauma and dissociative experiences is a recurrent 
theme in the literature (Frischholz, Braun, Sachs, Hopkins, Shaeffer, Lewis, Leavitt, 
Pasquotto, & Schwartz, 1990). Race-related trauma could give rise to dissociative 
experiences in Black people (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005). Schizophrenia may 
originate from the stress of high levels of childhood physical and sexual abuse (Read, 
van Os, Morrison & Ross, 2001). Some Black people may find racism and the fear of 
racism so physically and emotionally traumatic that dissociative experiences, 
indistinguishable from schizophrenia spectrum disorder ensue (Butts, 2002; Bryant-
Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Carter, 2007; Sanchez-Huclés, 1998). Racism is a common 
everyday experience for Black people from a very early age in the UK (DCLG, 2007; 
HORDSD, 2007; Home Office, 2012), and is positively correlated with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders in the UK and the Netherlands (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2002; Janssen 
et al., 2003). Not everyone exposed to trauma experiences schizophrenia (Briere, 
2006). In susceptible Black people, however, racism may be “traumatic enough” to 
explain the psychotic symptomatology of schizophrenia (Carter, 2007; Spauwen, 
Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen & van Os, 2006). There is little evidence in the literature 
for how dissociative experiences might mediate race-related trauma in the wider Black 
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community in the UK. Studies have shown that moderate to severe dissociative 
experiences, observed in Black people over and above those reported by other 
ethnicities, are likely to be directly related to race-related stress (Bryant-Davis & 
Ocampo, 2005; Carter, 2007, Dunn et al. 1994; Essed, 1991; Ross, Joshi & Currie, 
2001; Sanchez-Huclés, 1998). It is unclear from these studies whether the excess of 
dissociative experiences the White, population is due to race-related trauma.  
The comorbidity of dissociative symptoms in posttraumatic stress disorders, 
affective disorders such as depression, and psychoses have been demonstrated (Vogel, 
Spitzer, Barnow & Freyberger, 2006; Ross, 2001; Putnam, 1989; Norton, Ross & 
Novotny, 1990; Kluft, 1987). The Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DESII; Bernstein 
& Putnam, 1986) was developed to determine whether dissociative experiences vary 
across different clinical groups. The 28-item scale was administered to 31 non-clinical 
adults, 31 college students, 14 people living with alcoholics, 29 agoraphobics, 24 
patients with a phobic-anxious disorder, 20 persons living with post-traumatic stress 
disorder, 20 people with schizophrenia and 20 with multiple personality disorder in the 
USA. All participants were at least 18 years old and volunteered to participate. There 
was no indication whether this tool applies equally well to a different gender, ethnic or 
racial groups. The findings revealed a significant difference in dissociative experiences 
between those with and without mental illness or personality disorder.  
Frischholz et al. (1990) conducted a study under laboratory conditions on the 
validity and reliability of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), in both clinical 
and nonclinical groups. Two hundred and fifty-nine medical students, 33 patients with 
multiple personality disorder (MPD) and 29 with dissociative disorder not specified 
(DDNOS) were asked to complete the DES under laboratory conditions. Their scores 
were subjected to a reliability analysis of internal consistency. Individuals diagnosed 
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with MPD and DDNOS scored significantly higher on the DES than did medical 
students (mean DES score = 23.8). 
Dunn, Paolo, Ryan, Dunn and Fleet (1994) conducted a study on the impact of 
race on the dissociative experiences of a group of 48 White and 48 Black veterans 
undergoing treatment for alcohol and polysubstance abuse in a VA Medical Center in 
the USA. Comorbid psychiatric disorders were excluded. When age, education and 
number of previous therapies, IQ, employment status, marital status, childhood abuse 
and psychological discomfort were controlled for, Black participants scored on 
average five points higher. Their scores did not reflect more severe psychopathology. 
Although the reported frequency of dissociative experience in Black participants was 
significantly higher than in their White counterparts, the authors argued for a cautious 
interpretation of the results, as the sample size was small. A higher reported frequency 
of dissociative experiences may not, however, necessarily indicate increased 
psychological discomfort or psychopathology.  
In a study looking on the comorbidity of psychotic symptoms with combat-
related PTSD in different ethnic groups, David et al. (1999) found that Hispanic and 
African American veterans in the USA were more likely to exhibit psychotic 
symptoms, such as delusions, auditory hallucinations than were their White 
counterparts. No significant relationship between psychotic symptoms, combat-related 
PTSD and dissociative symptomology was observed. Monnier, Elhai, Freuh, 
Sauvageot and Magruder (2002) compared self-report measures and structured 
interview measures of PTSD, depression, dissociation and general psychopathology in 
White and Black veterans, finding no significant differences in symptomology. Black 
veterans were, however, more likely to be diagnosed with a psychotic disorder than 
were their White counterparts. 
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Douglas (2009) examined dissociative experiences in 317 undergraduates at a 
large university in the USA. The sample consisted of 190 Whites and 127 racial/ethnic 
minorities. African and Asian American undergraduates reported significantly higher 
frequencies of dissociative experiences than did their White counterparts. There was 
no significant association between anxiety, depression, trauma symptomology and 
reported dissociative experiences. Race/ethnicity moderated the relationship between 
dissociative experiences and depression, anxiety and trauma symptomology. The 
author concluded that, and 'higher levels of dissociation may serve as protective 
mechanisms against psychological distress’ (p. 33). The proportion of variance in 
frequency of dissociative experiences attributed to psychological adjustments was 
unclear. 
Anglin, Polanco-Roman and Lui (2015) studied the relationship between 
traumatic life events and positive psychotic symptoms in a nonclinical sample of 549 
ethnic minority young adults. The sample included 224 Black, 168 Asian and 157 
Hispanic undergraduates. Psychotic and dissociative symptoms were highly correlated 
(r = .62, p < .01). Although no gender difference in reported trauma history was found, 
Black participants reported significantly higher frequencies of trauma than did either 
Hispanic or Asian participants. Whereas dissociative experiences mediated the 
relationship between traumatic life events and psychotic symptoms, dissociative 
experiences did not appear to mediate this relationship in Hispanic and Asian 
participants to the same extent that it did in Black participants. The significant 
correlation between reported trauma history and psychotic symptoms was weaker, but 
remained significant, in Hispanic participants. This reduction might be because 
Hispanics reported less trauma than did Black participants, or because Black people 
are culturally predisposed to dissociation as a means of dealing with trauma than 
Hispanics or Asian participants were.   
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Dissociative experiences are a common direct response to traumatic 
experiences (Vermetten, Dorahy & Speigel, 2007; Campbell & Robinson, 2005) or an 
indirect response to disorganised attachment styles (Ijzendorm, Scheuengel & 
Bakermanans-Kranenburg, 1999). Whether race-related trauma gives rise to 
dissociative experiences in Black people in the absence of disorganised attachment 
styles remains uncertain. Dissociative experiences arguably exist along a continuum, 
with nonclinical dissociative experiences at one end (e.g., daydreaming) and clinical 
dissociative experiences (e.g., psychogenic amnesia) at the other (Edge, 2004). 
Paranoia might exist along a continuum, with nonclinical paranoia at one end (e.g., 
cultural paranoia) and clinical paranoia at the other (e.g., persecutory delusions and 
thought disorder) (Combs, Penn, Cassisi, Michael, Wood, Wanner & Adams, 2006). 
Hallucinations are also a common experience in clinical populations. Perhaps 
hallucinatory experiences, too, should be conceived of as existing along a continuum, 
with clinical hallucinatory experiences at one end and nonclinical hallucinatory 
experiences at the other (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992). Black people may be 2.5 times 
more likely to report hallucinatory experiences than their White counterparts are 
(Johns, Nazroo, Bebbington & Kuipers, 2002). However, Black people might not 
perceive hallucinations as evidence of mental illness in the same way as do their 
counterparts in other ethnic groups (Al-Issa, 1995; Dein et al., 2007).  
Dissociation may be a means of “setting aside” traumatic psychic material until 
the individual can accept, digest and ultimately assimilate the intolerable. The 
potentially accumulative nature of racism might ensure that seemingly harmless or 
minor race-related events could trigger a stress reaction (Carter, 2007). Other 
psychological defence mechanisms might be brought to bear on the trauma of the 
subjective experience of racism (Cramer, 1987; Ellenberger, 1970). However, these 
other defence mechanisms would not give rise to the observed dissociative symptoms 
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often found in people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. McWilliams (1994) 
defined psychological defence mechanisms as the mental and behavioural processes 
that protect the individual by helping to avoid or manage threats to the psychodynamic 
system. Andrews, Pollock and Stewart (1989) designed the Defense Style 
Questionnaire to measure 17 different psychological defence mechanisms and 
categorised them into three main groups: mature, ‘neurotic and immature. Mature 
psychological defence mechanisms include suppression and sublimation. Neurotic 
defences include reaction formation and undoing, and immature defences include 
splitting, isolating (dissociating), and autistic fantasy. Dissociation is associated with 
high levels of anxiety and repression with low levels. Both involve the “turning away” 
of unwanted psychic material – known or unknown to the person (Brewin & Andrews, 
2000).  
Ashley and Holtgraves (2003) suggested that maintaining a façade of calm 
collectedness in the face of adversity indicates lower levels of anxiety and the 
repression of emotionally distressing content. If Black people repress their subjective 
experiences of racism, however, they might not necessarily be consciously aware of 
this unwanted psychic material and thus the reasons for their high levels of emotion 
and anxiety as observed in and associated with schizophrenia. Wegner and Zanakos 
(1994) defined ‘suppression’ as a psychological defence mechanism whereby the 
individual actively suppresses intolerable psychic material. They designed the White 
Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) to measure the tendency to suppress unwanted 
experiences. Holtgraves and Stockdale (1996) have shown that people who dissociate 
are fundamentally different from those who repress emotionally distressing 
experiences. Using the WBSI to examine the relationship between dissociation and 
suppression, Muris and Merckelbach (1997) found that dissociation was significantly 
and positively correlated with suppression, indicating that both immature and mature 
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defence mechanisms may be invoked to defend against unwanted thoughts and 
feelings. Black people who dissociate appear similar to those who suppress 
emotionally distressing experiences. Unlike those who suppress unwanted and 
distressing material, however, those who isolate unwanted thoughts and feelings seem 
to exert no conscious control over the process. Suppression may occur, whereby 
unwanted thoughts and feelings are isolated, but then the unwanted thoughts and 
feelings would not be visible to the individual or those assessing Black people for 
evidence of mental illness. 
Dissociators may well be similar to suppressors, but Black people who find it 
difficult to suppress such unwanted thoughts might be more likely to become arrested 
at the dissociative phase of the cognitive process. Determining to what extent 
dissociative experiences enable Black people in the UK to control unwanted thoughts 
and feelings associated with the subjective experience of racism may, therefore, be 
useful in devising an appropriate treatment for those Black people who appear to be 
unable to deal constructively with the trauma of racism. Black people may consciously 
or unconsciously suppress their hurt feelings in response to the subjective experience 
of racism, and suppression may become automatised with anticipated racist experience 
(Steinberg, 1994). Since Black people are more likely to attribute their health and 
financial difficulties to racism than their counterparts from other ethnic groups 
(Gilvarry et al., 1999; Cooper et al., 2008), perhaps dissociative experiences are 
invoked to help manage race-related distress. Dissociative experiences may continue 
until Black people can better assimilate and accommodate the unwanted thoughts and 
feelings associated with perceived racism (Pinderhughes, 1973; Ross & Keyes, 2004).  
A marked discontinuity may ‘characterise dissociative experiences in the sense 
of self, agency, cognition, affect and behaviour, causing clinically significant distress 
and impaired social, educational and occupational functioning not attributable to 
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substance abuse or another medical condition’ (DSM-V, 2013, p. 292). Unwanted 
intrusions into awareness and behaviour reflected in the fragmentation of identity, 
depersonalisation and derealisation, and the ability to access information or control 
mental functions normally readily accessible or controlled, could be as indicative of 
schizophrenia as of dissociative disorders. The symptomology of dissociative 
disorders and schizophrenia are both associated with cumulative and chronic stress 
(Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005), and Black people often give the stress of perceived 
racism as the cause of their health and financial difficulties (Gilvarry et al., 1999). In 
broader society, the majority of Black people may actively suppress race-related 
cognitions, giving observers the impression of coping (Carter, 2007; Douglas, 2009; 
Sue, 1981). When Black people are unable to suppress race-related schemas, however 
symptoms of dissociative disorders and schizophrenia not readily distinguishable from 
each other may ensue (Moskowitz & Heim, 2011; DSM-V, 2013). In the next section, 
Western explanations of health and illness are critically evaluated. 
 
1.4 Problems with Western explanations for Black emotional distress  
 Black people are often treated as one homogenous ethnic grouping or 
‘community whose heritage offers important characteristics in common between its 
members which make it distinct from other communities’ (Berthoud, Modood & 
Parkin,  (1997, p. 13). However, significant ‘within-group’ variation often ignored in 
the scientific literature (Babujani, Magani, Minch & Cavalli-Sforva, 1997). This 
within-group variation not only reflects a diversity of phenotype, religion, history and 
culture, but also a diversity of genetic background resulting from interactions with 
climate, migration and miscegenation over time (Risch, Burchard, Ziv & Tang 2002; 
Smedley & Smedley, 2005; Templeton, 1998). Although slave traders bought and sold 
Black African people in the UK from 1550 until the abolition of slavery in 1833 
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(Fanon, 1963), mass Black Caribbean economic migration did not begin until the 
1950s, and mass Black African political migration until the 1970s (Gilroy, 1992). As 
economic migrants, the vast majority of Black people in the UK tend to live in the 
major conurbations such as London, Manchester, Leeds and Birmingham (Harrison, 
2002). Over 78% of Black people of African descent and 61% of Black people of 
African Caribbean descent in the UK live in London (ONS, 2001, 2011). Although 
residing in the main conurbations or inner cities may provide the best means of finding 
and keeping paid work, it is also a major source of stress, social disadvantage and 
racial discrimination, all of which correlate significantly with schizophrenia (Cantor-
Graae, 2007).  
The social status of Black people in the UK is typically unrelated to their Black 
African cultural heritage, in the way it is in Brazil or France, for instance (Fanon, 
1963. 1967; Hall, 1992, 1995). A silent animosity persists between Black people of 
African Caribbean origin and Black African people, that is rarely if ever expressed in 
the scientific literature (Cross, 1991; Harvey, Labeach, Pridgen & Gocial, 2005; 
Phinney, 1990; Reynolds, 2004). Whether this ‘within-group’ animosity is related to 
the historiography of Black people of Caribbean and African descent remains unclear. 
Some ethnic Black people go to great lengths to create a collective identity of their 
own, to define what is and is not ‘Black culture’ (Durkheim & Dixon, 2005). Those 
who fail to conform to such definitions often present as a ‘problem or enigma’ (Hall, 
1995), risking isolation in and alienation from their ethnic group (Nobles, 1973). Some 
differences in the experience of being Black in the UK are evident in the social trends 
observed in UK national statistics. These indicate that all Black people do not 
experience discrimination and disadvantage equally. For instance, Black African 
students are more likely to outperform their Black Caribbean counterparts 
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academically and less likely to leave school without any qualifications than are their 
Black Caribbean counterparts are (ONS, 2011).  
Even when differences in educational achievement are controlled for, Black 
people do not seem to reap the rewards in the workplace (Alleyne, 2004; Carmichael 
& Woods, 2000). For instance, although Black African and African Caribbean people 
occupy similar managerial or professional occupations and routine or semi-routine 
occupations to White British people, Black African people are 2.7 times as likely to be 
unemployed than their Black African Caribbean counterparts are (ONS, 2011). The 
‘Home Office Citizenship Survey (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate (HORDSD (2004, 2004, 2006) and Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG), 2007, 2008) have consistently shown that up to 35% of 
Black people believed they had been denied employment because of their race. 
Unemployed Black people with low educational achievement and those who are 
poorly paid are likely to live in the poorest neighbourhoods and to experience overt 
and covert racial discrimination (Cantor-Graae, 2007; Campbell, 2011; Kirkbride, 
Morgan, Fearon, Dazzan, Murray & Jones, 2007). Such socioeconomic factors limit 
life chances and undermine Black families intergenerationally (Allen, 2009; Reynolds, 
2004), putting them at risk of social defeat and failure in the wider society (Selten & 
Cantor-Graae, 2005). To speak of Black people as though their experience of being 
Black in the UK is homogeneous can, therefore, lead to serious errors in government 
policy and consequent disparities in their intergenerational effect (Black-Hawkins, 
2010; Campbell, 2013; Gillian, 2009; Reynolds 2004; Sashidharan, 2003, 1993, 1990).  
Within-group differences in the sense of belonging and intragroup 
marginalisation affect how Black people feel about themselves as individuals and as 
an ethnic group (Brown, 2008; Franklin, 2004; Greer, 2007; Ogbu, 1999; Ojala & 
Nesdale, 2004). Ethnic density may appear to protect health in Black African UK 
34 
 
citizens, but may not be as protective of Black Caribbean people in the UK as some 
researchers suggest. For instance, Bécares, Nazroo and Stafford (2009) found that 
ethnic minority people living in areas in which they believed the majority of people 
shared their ethnic identity reported less racism and psychotic symptomology and 
better health outcomes than their ethnic counterparts in areas of low ethnic density. 
This disparity, however, was not significant in areas in which Black Caribbean people 
perceived that the majority of people shared their ethnicity (Bosqui, Hoy & Shannon, 
2014; Whitley, Prince, McKenzie & Stewart, 2007). Most studies to date suggest that 
Black people, living in areas where they are a majority, experience social and 
economic difficulties disproportionately to their counterparts living in areas where 
they are in the minority (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2008). The reasons why this should be 
the case remains unclear. Whereas ethnic density provides some protection against 
from perceived racism for some minority ethnic groups, this does not appear to be the 
case for Black Caribbean people (Bécares, Nazroo, Jackson & Huevelman, 2012). 
 Black people using mental healthcare services in the UK often complain that 
too many health and social care professionals do not share their understanding of 
being-in-the-world as Black people, or are unable to understand the difficulty some 
Black people face in dealing with the problem of racism (Keating, Robertson, Francis 
& McCulloch, 2002; Newbigging & McKeown, 2007). Black people may construct 
and cognitively appraise aspects of their lived worlds differently from those evaluating 
them (Dein et al., 2007; Kareem & Littlewood, 1992; Rose, 1997). Mental health 
professionals who are unable to understand the significance of this difference in 
construing everyday experience are more likely to derive different interpretations of 
recounted experience. Difficulties will more likely be attributed to disposition rather 
than rather the situation (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2002; 
Jadhav, 1995; Littlewood, 1996). A ‘fundamental attribution error’ may arise, 
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confounding corresponding explanations for health or illness (Allisson & Mellick, 
1985; Bentall et al., 2001, 2002). Furthermore, Black people who may not share 
Western conceptual explanations for everyday experiences are more likely to disagree 
with a diagnosis of mental illness and to refuse to comply with any treatment offered 
(Littlewood, 2002).  
 Differentiating between criteria indicating a dissociative disorder and 
psychosis remains difficult. Each presents with an array of symptoms and must cause 
significant distress to the sufferer to invoke professional concern. In Figure 1, Escobar 
(2004) shows how in different parts of the world dissociative states appear to be valid 
forms of expressing psychological distress. These presentations are not considered 
evidence of mental disorder requiring treatment, in the same way as they might be in 
Western societies. On the one hand, reported dissociative experiences might suggest 
that slight deviation from the norm is a meaningful way of separating aspects of 
everyday experience from loss of memory or interrupted flow of consciousness 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1992; Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). When 
observed in some Black people, this kind of dissociation is a pervasive response to the 
experience of racism, but not maladaptive (Douglas, 2009). On the other hand, some 
Black people may be unable to deal constructively with the threat to the integrity of 
their own racial/ethnic identity in relation to inferences others make about their 




















 Jarvis (2007) draws attention to the vivid descriptions of Black people in 
distress over time. Such descriptions have not changed since the 1840s. For instance, 
the idea that ‘freed’ Black people were ‘inherently more susceptible to psychotic 
symptoms than their White counterparts, and unless constrained physically or 
medicinally, they will become victims of their excesses’ (Jarvis, 2008, p. 231). In the 
past, such views were expressed to maintain the prevailing social order, (i.e., slavery).  
 
‘Emancipation, according to White physicians, freed the slaves to a condition of 
deteriorating physical and mental health by their inability to exercise restraint 
and proper self-care. In the perception of health professionals, the natural 
tendencies of blacks to suspicion, superstition, excitement and lack of 
emotional control predisposed them to psychosis. In general, blacks were felt to 
have lower rates of psychosis in what were understood by whites to be less 
demanding environments such as slavery compared to freedom and, later, living 
in the traditional South versus the industrial North.' 
 (Jarvis, 2008, p. 232) 
 
 
 Western explanations for the expression of emotional distress in Black people 
often conflict with the explanations that Black people themselves provide. Often, 
Black people may appear to lack insight into or awareness of their mental health state, 
simply because their explanation differs from that of clinicians and others in positions 
of authority (Kilshaw, Ndegwa & Curran, 2002). Mental health professionals unable to 
understand the significance of this difference in construing everyday experience are 
more likely to derive different interpretations of recounted experience. These 
differences may reflect a predisposition to diagnose schizophrenia in Black people or 
serve as evidence of an attributional error. Nonetheless, racism and the potential effect 
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of racism on future social interaction may be sufficiently traumatic to induce 
dissociative experiences in Black people (Bryant & Ocampo, 2005; Sanchez-Huclés, 
1998). In the next section, I will explore dissociation as a function of health or illness. 
 
1.5 Dissociation in Black people: health or illness 
 Dissociation may be delineated along a continuum of dissociation, from 
pathological non-pathological dissociation (Moskowitz, 2011). Individuals who isolate 
distracting or threatening aspects of their lived worlds from waking consciousness 
may not necessarily be mentally ill. Edge (2004) points out that some people, such as 
Shamans, purposefully seek to dissociate from everyday experience and enter a ‘dream 
state’ in a way that appears to have cultural validity and nothing to do with mental 
illness. Dissociation has long been described as a psychological defence mechanism 
with psychological components such as self-identity encompassing the body, social 
roles, values, attitudes and goals (Foote, Smolin, Kaplan, Legatt & Lipschitz, 2006). 
Some Black people seem to invoke this psychological mechanism to defend against 
perceived racism. Hooks (1992, p. 169) describes racism as follows: 
 
I want to focus on that representation of Whiteness that is not formed in 
reaction to stereotypes but emerges as a response to the traumatic pain and 
anguish that remains a consequence of White racist domination, a psychic state 
that forms and shapes the way Black folks "see" Whiteness. 
Hooks (1992) described racism as traumatic pain and anguish arising from the 
domination of Black people by White. However, racism is not simply about 
domination; it is about perceived negative appraisal and rejection of the Black body in 
contexts in which proximity is important (MacDonald & Leary, 2005).  
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Although skin tone as a single distinguishing criterion has been widely 
discredited (Berthoud, Moodley & Parkin, 1992), I have previously argued that skin 
tone and country of family origin remain distinguishing features that set Black people 
apart without making them independent (De Maynard, 2006). Central to the 
experience and anxious expectation of race-based rejection is perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body, and the effect that perceived concern 
and preoccupation could have in the context of future social interaction. In work-
related situations in which status and money are coveted, Black people may find 
themselves relating to individuals who do not appear to value that within which Black 
people are embodied (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002). In such situations, 
Black people may be required to maintain proximity to those with opinions about 
Black people that conflict with their own and undermine self-perception and identity 
security (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Freyd, Martorello, Alvarado, Hayes & 
Christman, 1998). Judgements about the aesthetic or functional value of the whole or 
part aspects of the physical Black body determine the degree to which others grant or 
deny proximity (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Capara & Pastorelli, 1996; Bowlby, 1969, 
1973, 1980; Downey & Feldman, 1996). Black people may construct “relational race-
based schemata” to represent these relationships, whereby proximity to those who can 
help and support the Black people depends on the positive evaluation of their 
attributes and characteristics. These mental representations of oneself in relation with 
the world may then be used to interpret new or different future experiences in ways 
that reflect a form of “racialised body image disturbance”, internal conflict, and 
emotional distress (Cash & Grasso, 2005; Westen, 1985, 1991).  
Although racial differences are not based on empirical fact (Templeton, 1998), 
race and racism as social constructs are confounding variables in the aetiology of 
schizophrenia (Dein et al., 2007; Jarvis, 2008; McKenzie, 2006). Perceived concern 
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and preoccupation with an individual’s Black body constrains the extent to which 
Black people as an ethnic group embed, and are embedded, in their family 
relationships, social networks, communities and society (Morgan & Swann, 2004; 
Morley, 2012; Reynolds, 2004). An imbalance of institutional, interpersonal, social 
and power characterises the political and social construction of race and racism, 
increasing the propensity of some Black people to interpret everyday sensed 
experience as derogatory and directly related to his or her phenotype (Carter, 2007). In 
the absence of other explanations, Black people sensitised to perceived racism are 
more likely to attribute accumulative and chronic academic and socioeconomic failure 
to factors beyond their control than to any enduring shortcomings in themselves 
(Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, Blascovich & Lee, 2007).  
Olweus (1994) defines bullying as ‘repeated exposure to the negative actions 
on the part of one or more person resulting in physical and emotional injury’ (p. 1173). 
Race-related bullying may be real or imagined, but a true reflection of experience. 
Race-related bullying is defined here as ‘repeated exposure to negative actions, on the 
part of one or more persons, resulting in physical and emotional harm and the need to 
question self-perception and identity”. Perceived race-related bullying is defined here 
as ‘the perception of repeated exposure to negative actions on the part of one or more 
persons, resulting in physical and emotional harm and the need to question self-
perception and identity’. Perceived race-related bullying or perceived racism stems 
from the belief that a particular ethnic group should treat other ethnic groups 
differently according to the extent to which perceived phenotypical, cultural or 
religious differences are appraised and evaluated (Chakraborty & McKenzie, 2002), 
and begins from an early age. The Department for Education and Schools (DfES, 
2002) in the UK found that 25% of minority ethnic pupils in the sample had 
experienced racist name-calling in the previous seven days. The abuse had continued 
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over an extended period for one in six of those interviewed. In 2005, the Hampshire 
Education Authority found that one-fifth of Year Nine pupils had experienced race-
related bullying at school in the previous 12 months. In Years Six and Seven, the 
proportion was approximately a quarter (23% and 25%, respectively), and in Year 2 it 
was more than 37% (DfES, 2006). Black people worry about race-related incidents 
(DCLG, 2003, 2004; HORDSD, 2006, 2007, 2008; Home Office, 2012, 2016). This 
anticipatory fear or worry of racism is likely to have a negative impact on their mental 
health (Bryant & Ocampo, 2005; Carter, 2007; Miller, 2009; Sanchez-Huclés, 1998; 
Sue et al., 2007).  
Interestingly, as mentioned above, Black people detained for the assessment 
and/or treatment of schizophrenia often blame racism for their presenting health and 
financial difficulties (Chakraborty & McKenzie, 2002; Cooper et al., 2008; Gilvarry, 
et al., 1999; Kirkbride et al., 2008; Lawlor, Johnson, Cole & Howard, 2012). 
Institutionally-derived positive or negative behaviour towards an individual or group 
based on positive or negative beliefs about that individual or groups might constitute a 
form of social betrayal trauma that compounds pre-existing trauma. According to 
Betrayal Trauma Theory (Freyd, 1994), betrayal of trust, particularly childhood abuse 
and neglect, can cause severe emotional distress and social dysfunction, increased risk 
of further victimisation, perpetration of ill-treatment and various mental health and 
social problems. The symptom cluster known as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) arises from two conceptually independent dimensions of trauma (Freyd, De 
Prince & Zurbriggen, 2001). The first dimension of ‘life-threat’ might be most salient 
where symptoms of anxiety, hyperarousal, and intrusive thoughts and memories are 
evident. The second dimension of ‘social betrayal’ is more salient when symptoms of 
dissociation, numbness, and constricted or abusive relationships are present. Under 
such conditions, Black people often find themselves in social situations they cannot 
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avoid and in which their views, attitudes and values conflict with those they relate to 
and those in positions of relative power. Jaspers (1951) referred to situations that 
threaten to annihilate a person in relation to others as ‘limit situations’. In limit 
situations a person cannot avoid, such as the classroom, work or hospital, social 
betrayal trauma might give way to mental disorder (Freyd, 1994, 1996).  
Deriving an integrated model that adequately deconstructs the subjective 
experience of racism as a function of the negative appraisal of the Black body has not 
yet been attempted. Some researchers propose a gene-environment interaction 
hypothesis for schizophrenia, implicating accumulative and chronic social failure or 
‘social defeat’ in the sensitisation of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, which 
increases the risk of schizophrenia (Selten, van der Ven, Rutten & Cantor-Graae, 
2013). The accumulative and chronic effect of real or perceived race-related stress and 
subsequent academic, economic, and social failure or defeat thus sensitises the 
mesolimbic dopaminergic system in the brain, increasing susceptibility to psychosis. 
Race or ethnicity might not determine whether mental health services systematically 
pathologised and detained Black people under the Mental Health Act in the UK 
(Burns, Tyrer, Islam, Parsons & Crawford, 2013; Singh & Burns, 2006, 2007). 
However, ‘minimal attention has been devoted to understanding the stress that stems 
from (racial) discrimination and other conditions associated with membership in a 
stigmatised group’ (Brown, 2008, pp. 54-55). The conflation of ‘race’, nationality and 
ethnicity (Brown, 2008) and the inconsistent methods of measuring perceived racism 
in research (Paradies, 2006; Thompson & Neville, 1999) might ensure that the 
relationship between psychosis and the subjective experience of racism remains 
elusive.  
As there is little evidence of misdiagnosis in the literature (Selten & Hoek, 
2008), it would appear that either there is a clinical bias towards diagnosing 
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schizophrenia in Black people (Dein et al., 2007; Jarvis, 2008) or that environmental 
factors conspire with biological and genetic factors, resulting in schizophrenia-like 
symptoms disproportionately occurring  in Black people (Selten et al., 2013). Without 
determining the relationship between perceived racism and schizophrenia and ensuring 
appropriate and consistent application and interpretation of measurement instruments 
(Zandi, Havenaar, Limburg-Okken, van Es, Sidali,  Kadri, van den Brink & Kahn, 
2008), the overrepresentation of Black people in the mental healthcare system in the 
UK is likely to persist (Sashidharan, Duffy & Bhui, 2014; Selten & Hoek, 2008). 
Perceived racism might limit personal agency, self-efficacy and confidence in Black 
people. The context within which Black children and young adults learn how to deal 
with perceived hate, disgust and intolerance is crucial to their developing resilience 
(Castelli & Tomerelli, 2007; Howarth, 2006; Crocker & Major, 1989; Gopaul-
McNicol, 1988, Thomas, 2000). Black children learn as much about themselves in 
groups of their peers as they do from their parents (Castelli, Carraro, Tomelleri & 
Amari, 2007; Castelli, Zogmaister & Tomelleri, 2009; Harris, 1995; Morrow, 1999; 
Verkuyten, 2002). The opportunity to talk through race-related issues using social 
networks might reduce race-related stress (Helms, 1990; Phinney, 1992; Pinel, 1999; 
Sellers, 1997), but the effects of ethnic group orientation, ethnic pride and social 
capital on race-based rejection sensitivity might be limited in the absence of sufficient 
knowledge and skills to develop resilience (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Some Black 
people may maintain kinship ties with families and friends, which are beneficial to a 
sense of belonging and ethnic identity (Maxíme, 1986; Reynolds, 2004). In the 
absence of sufficient self-efficacy, personal agency and confidence to achieve 
academically, economically and socially, however, the effect of social capital on race-
related stress seems limited (Ajrouch, Reisine, Sungwoo, Sohn & Amid, 2010; 
Lightsey & Barnes, 2007; Bécares, Nazroo, Jackson & Huevelman, 2012).  
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Risk factors outside individual or ethnic group control might limit the extent to 
which personal agency, self-efficacy and confidence bolster resilience to social 
adversity (Sue et al., 2007). Black parents might use negative overtones about skin 
colour when communicating with their children and adolescents, almost as though 
they forget that their children are Black (Banks, 1992). Black children may mimic 
their parents or take subliminal cues from factors in their lived worlds (Berry, 2003; 
Castelli, De Dea & Nesdale, 2008; Sinclair, Dunn & Lowery, 2004). When mentally 
represented, these relational race-based schemata enable those children to apply 
prejudicial thoughts and feelings about Black people to new and different future 
interactions (Westen, 1985, 1991). By identifying with their parents, more securely 
attached Black children may also identify with their prejudice (Banks, 1993; Castelli, 
Zogmaister & Tomelleri, 2009). Less securely attached Black children are not likely to 
acquire the prejudices of their parents (Sinclair, Dunn, Banks & Lowery, 2004). 
Contexts tinged with the perception that trust is threatened or betrayed may further 
compound the anxious expectation of race-related rejection, promoting insecure ethnic 
identity, psychopathology and ill health (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Freyd et al., 
2001; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis & Pietrzak, 2002; Sanchez-Huclés, 
1998). The apparent inability of a Black person to help and support him or herself 
financially – to be self-efficacious and have personal agency – often results in family 
and friends referring their loved ones to mental health services as I and others have 
previously argued (De Maynard, 2008; Morgan et al., 2005). Unfortunately, involving 
health and social care services might be perceived as a 'betrayal of trust’, further 
traumatising an already vulnerable Black person who is susceptible to psychosis and 
sensitised to perceived racism (Freyd, 1994, 1996; Freyd et al., 2001).  
Where academic and socioeconomic failure and defeat is weighted against the 
parental, personal and societal expectation of success (Benner & Mistry, 2007; Zhang, 
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Haddad, Torres & Chen, 2011), the fear of academic and subsequent socioeconomic 
failure might prove so debilitating that mental illness ensues (Selten et al., 2013). 
Superficially, Black people might seem to cope with race-related stress, while 
harbouring deep-seated anger, intrusive thoughts and feelings, vulnerability and 
sadness (Armstead, Lawler, Gordon, Cross & Gibbons, 1989; Franklin & Boyd-
Franklin, 2000). Whether stigma consciousness or the anxious expectation of being 
stigmatised can pre-empt academic, social and economic failure or defeat remains 
unclear (Pinel, 1999). However, the accumulative and chronic effect of perceived race-
related socioeconomic disadvantage and deprivation, compounded by perceived social 
betrayal, can result in dopamine dysregulation and dissociative symptoms in Black 
people susceptible to psychosis and sensitised to perceived racism (Freyd, 1994; 
Selten et al., 2013).  
Although a considerable body of research on the effects of childhood abuse 
exists (De Prince & Freyd, 2001; Freyd, 1994, 1996), few studies on the positive and 
negative effect of racial discrimination on self-esteem and identity security in Black 
people in the UK from an early age. According to Sanchez-Huclés (1998), emotional 
abuse ‘consists of both acts of commission and omission that are psychologically 
damaging and can be perpetuated by groups or by individuals’ (p. 73). Miller (2009, p. 
41) highlights the difficulty that non-dominant group members might experience in 
attributing psychological trauma to race-based stressors in situations in which racial 
discrimination is ‘insidious, pervasive and ubiquitous’. Race-related incidents 
involving verbal, physical or other abuse and resulting in injury fit the standard 
definition of trauma at the individual level (Carter & Forsyth, 2007). Therefore, race-
related experiences could be traumatic for Black people for whom ‘race’ is salient, 
inducing dissociation to the same extent as in other cases of neglect, abuse or post-
46 
 
traumatic stress disorder (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Carter, 2007; Sanchez-
Huclés, 1998; Sue et al., 2007). 
 The DSM-V (2013) defines PTSD as an anxiety disorder that ‘always follows a 
traumatic event which causes intense fear and helplessness in an individual’ (Code 
309.81). The symptoms often appear shortly after the event but may take years to 
develop. Symptoms include re-experiencing the trauma through nightmares, obsessive 
thoughts and flashbacks. The duration of symptoms is at least one month for this 
diagnosis. The individual avoids situations, people or objects that remind him of the 
traumatic event. For example, a person experiencing PTSD after a serious car accident 
might avoid driving or being a passenger in a car. Finally, there is a general increase in 
anxiety, often including a heightened startle response (Bryant, 2007). Dissociation is 
more likely to mediate traumatic life events and psychotic symptoms in Black people 
than in their Hispanic, and Asian counterparts are (Anglin et al., 2015), but this may 
be due to Black people reporting more traumatic life events. 
Perceived racism may not only be considered stressful in those sensitised to it 
(Crocker & Major, 1989; Utsey, 1998; Clark, Anderson, Clark & & Williams, 1999), 
but also traumatic in those Black people for whom race is salient (Bryant & Ocampo, 
2005; Carter, 2007; Sanchez-Huclés, 1998; Sue et al., 2007). Some Black people may 
well re-experience the race-related trauma through nightmares, obsessive thoughts and 
flashbacks, and thus be more likely to avoid people, places and events that remind 
them of such experiences (Franklin, Boyd-Franklin & Kelly, 2006). Where the 
objective or subjective experience of racism invokes the possibility of death, serious 
injury or physical or emotional harm damage, racism can be as traumatic as any other 
form of abuse (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Carter, 2007; Jernigan & Henderson, 
2011; Scurfield & Mackey, 2001). 
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Trauma-induced dissociative attachment prohibits reality checking (Allen, 
Coyne & Console, 1997). Hence, some Black people might anxiously anticipate the 
experience of racism but fail to test their assumptions against reality in new or 
different social situations (Freyd, 1994, 1996). The subjective experience of racism 
might explain the disorganised thought, paranoia and persecutory delusions mental 
healthcare professionals often found observed in Black people in distress in the UK 
(Combs et al., 2006; Spauwen, Krabbendam, Lieb, Wittchen & van Os, 2006). 
Psychologically dissociating the self from the meaning attributable to one's phenotype 
may indicate the extent to which an individual’s psyche integrates everything that 
constitutes a person's racial or ethnic identity in relation to a lived world that appears 
constantly hostile (Landrine & Klonoff, 1996; Sinason, 2000). Black people who 
dissociate may assume an altered identity to avoid or escape the emotional pain of 
race-related lived experience (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005). They may be unable to 
recall important information in a way too extensive to be explained by ordinary 
forgetfulness, prompting family and friends to seek professional help (Freyd, 1996, 
1994).  
 In those experiencing the perception of stereotypical threat, the danger is very 
real (Steele & Aronson, 1995); especially when directed towards a whole or part 
aspect of their  Black person (Larsen, 2004). Human identity, however, appears bi-
directional, incorporating both individual and ethnic group membership (Krippner, 
1997). Movement along a continuum of stigma consciousness might transcend social 
identity as an ethnic group, yet tend towards social identity as an individual in the 
other (Pinel, 1999). In proposing that many of the dissociative phenomena observed in 
people may be misidentified, Krippner (1995) further developed this bi-directional 
model into a ‘model of cross-cultural comparisons’, emphasising the extent to which 
reported experiences and observed behaviour appear disconnected yet culturally-
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bound. Van Deurzen (1997), however, suggested that there are physical, social, 
personal and spiritual ways of being-in-the-world. Therefore, being-in-the-world may 
best be perceived as a relational, multidimensional construct. Mild, transient feelings 
of depersonalisation, derealisation and imaginative involvement appear to be normal 
experiences for most people and reflect an individual’s ability to imagine him or 
herself in various ways of being-in-the-world (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Carlson & 
Putnam, 1993; Edge, 2004). Accumulative and chronic dissociative experiences, 
however, might not be commensurate with health, a sense of well-being and a sense of 
personal worth in Black people.  
Purposeful induction of altered states using meditation differs qualitatively 
from the pursuit of an altered state with the specific purpose of dealing with traumatic 
or disturbing experiences only at the level of conscious awareness and control 
(Castillo, 2003; Krippner, 1997). Dissociation may be achieved purposefully for its 
sake (Brunet, Holowka & Laurence, 2001) and for the specific purpose of defending 
against unresolved issues (Ellenberger, 1970). Without carefully considering the 
context within which the presenting mental state is found and critically appraising 
presenting symptoms using standardised tests, the implicit attitudes of clinicians will 
probably continue to compound the assessment and treatment of Black people who 
present in a state of emotional distress, with obvious intergenerational consequences 
(Moskowitz, Stone & Childs, 2012). Clinical evaluation of Black people’s behaviour 
in mental health care settings may seriously conflict with the experience of those being 
evaluated (Keating et al., 2002; Secker & Harding, 2002; Wilson & Francis, 1997). 
 Black people who fail to resolve psychological issues arising from perceived 
racism are likely to employ psychological defences such as dissociation. Sue (1981) 
commented on the apparent calmness, imbued with some anxiety, expressed in 
relation to experienced racism. McWilliams (1994) argued that some forms of 
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dissociation might not only make everyday functioning possible but might also 
enhance an individual’s ability to function. Apparent calmness and a little anxiety, 
however, are not usually associated with dissociation (Holtgraves & Stockdale, 1997). 
Dissociation is not the only mechanism employed for this purpose, but people show a 
preference for employing some psychological defence mechanisms as opposed to 
others, according to their early experiences (McWilliams, 1994). Indeed, Rose (1997) 
described how young children brought their "internalised racism" into the therapeutic 
counselling session and externalised or projected their anger, shame and guilt about 
being visibly Black compared to the therapist. Pervasive, persistent shame acquired in 
early childhood tends towards a sense of low self-worth, powerlessness and negative 
self-image (Schmitt & Allik, 2005; Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999). For ‘the 
Black man amongst his own in the twentieth century does not know what moment his 
inferiority comes into being for others’ (Fanon, 1967, p. 109), but in situations in 
which Black people’s "will-to-power" seems thwarted, his or her inferiority reveals 
itself (Neimeyer, 1895/1968). Black people may dissociate in anticipation of the 
inevitable until they can safely assimilate and accommodate the inevitable 
(Pinderhughes, 1973; Ross & Joshi, 1991). In the next section, I will explore the 
human need for relatedness, and propose and apply an integrated object relations and 
social cognition model of racial identity to the development of the fragmented Black 
self. 
 
1.6 Dissociation and the fragmented self 
 
A primary assumption of Object Relations Theory is the human need for 
relatedness, beginning in infancy (Fairburn, 1952; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). People 
are motivated to associate themselves with those who can help meet their needs and 
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reject those who cannot. Personality distortions occur when the need for relatedness is 
‘thwarted, or not met, due to pain, anxiety-provoking, and unempathic experiences’ 
(Westen, 1991, p. 431). In relation to the world, Black people do not merely 
internalise racism (Sellers et al., 1997), but actively construct mental representations 
or race-based relational schemas about themselves in relation to other people, places, 
things, events – “objects” in their lived worlds (Bandura, 1986). Object Relations 
Theory explains how individuals construct mental representations of self in relation to 
others (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983), and Social Cognition of Object Relations 
concerns itself with how individuals process social information (Westen, 1985; 1991). 
The  Model of Nigrescence proposed by Cross and Thomas (1971) presupposes the 
importance of developing a positive racial identity. Franklin-Jackson and Carter 
(2007) argued that the failure to presuppose the importance of racial identity might put 
some Black people at risk of experiencing emotional distress. A new model is 
therefore proposed and developed in Chapter 2. This integrates object relations, social 
cognition and racial identity, consistent with the notion that Black people construct 
mental representations of self in relation to others (Horowitz, 1988) and that these 
mental representations reflect the development of a racial/ethnic identity that is 
racialised in situations from a very early age (Shelton & Sellers, 2003). Attention will 
be drawn to the Black person’s physicality as a racialised black object for others 
(Miles, 1989). The evaluation of the Black body determines the proximity others are 
prepared to maintain in relation to the person (Klein, 1959) and the quality of the 
attachments he or she has to significant others (Bowlby, 1982, 1973).  
The human need for relatedness brings Black people into direct conflict with 
those who would apportion aesthetic or functional value (Heidegger, 1927/1962), 
determining the proximity that Black people are permitted (Downey & Feldman, 
1996). It is difficult to form secure attachments with those who can help and support 
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the Black person to gain mastery over the world when those people cannot bear being 
in proximity to aspects of his or her Black body. Many writers have identified defining 
features, including skin tone, breadth of the nose and hair texture, as aspects of the 
Black body commonly ridiculed and devalued by others (Coard, Breland & Raskin, 
2001; Hajnis, Farkas, Ngim, Lee & Venkatadri, 1994; Miller, 2001; Wade, Dyckman 
& Cooper, 2004b). Although there is nothing “wrong” with the physical features of the 
individual (Veale, 2004), in relations with others the individual may come to believe 
that something about his or her physical person is unattractive or socially undesirable 
(Cash & Grasso, 2005; Philips, Atala & Pope, 1995; Philips, Nierenberg, Brendel & 
Fava, 1996). The physical features that have come to define Black people in relation to 
others often lead to racialised body image disturbance. Mental representations or 
relational race-based schemas, constructed in relation to those who would ridicule or 
devalue those aspects of the Black body that have come to define Black people, may 
be reactivated when primed in new or different external, stable, ambiguous situations. 
Such experiences may result in the disintegration of the self-construct and the 
reinforcement of an earlier constructed negative self-schema (Sedikides & Green, 
2000), according to the extent to which the subjective experience of racism is salient 
(Clark, 2004; Branscombe et al., 2002; Major & O’Brien, 2005). Some Black people 
might anxiously expect race-related rejection (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002), 
especially when they have experienced race-related animosity or rejection as an 
individual (Downey & Feldman, 1996) or as a member of a stigmatised ethnic group 
in the past (Major & Croker, 1989). 
When confronted with their sense of powerlessness to alter how others 
perceive their physicality, Black people may react differently, according to how they 
appraise the event/situation. Some may react violently (Combs et al., 2006); others 
may suppress their race-related thoughts and feelings (Wegner, 1989), becoming sad 
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and depressed (Jernigan & Henderson, 2011), or try to avoid or escape such 
experiences by embedding themselves in groups of people who share their phenotype 
(Stafford, Bécares & Nazroo, 2010). Early primal traumatic experiences of racism thus 
represent the primal ‘split’ - the fragmentation of the Ego. To protect the Ego, identity 
security and self-esteem, some Black people may invoke immature psychological 
defence mechanisms, such as dissociation (Cramer, 1991). Dissociation is a 
completely ‘normal psychological process, that may initially be used defensively by 
the individual to handle traumatic experiences’ (Putnam, 1989, p. 9). In the short-term, 
a person might appear to cope and function adequately in society (Douglas, 2009; 
Barnes & Lightsey Jr, 2007; Sue, 1981). However, when early primal race-related 
traumatic schemata are reactivated in the context of new or different race-related 
incidents, dissociation invoked defensively might become maladaptive, resulting in 
cognitive vulnerability (Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005), low self-esteem (Helms, 1993; 
Landrine & Klonoff, 1996) and identity insecurity (Shweder, Minow & Marcus, 
2002). Bolstering resilience in Black people from an early age might reduce the impact 
of race-related incidents on mental health, significantly improving the health of the 
nation as a whole (Morley, 2011).  
 It is still not clear why Black people in the UK are more than three times more 
likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act for the assessment and treatment of 
schizophrenia than are their White counterparts are. Research reveals that biological 
and socioeconomic factors are not significantly associated with schizophrenia in 
isolation. Black people with schizophrenia often attribute their health difficulties to 
racism. If accumulative and chronic stress is associated with social failure and defeat; 
accumulative and chronic race-related stress might be so traumatic in susceptible 
Black people that dissociative experiences indicative of schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders ensue. If racism is a common experience of Black people in the UK, Black 
53 
 
people commonly attribute their mental health difficulties to racism, and the 
symptomatology of dissociative disorders remains difficult to distinguish from that of 
schizophrenia, there should be evidence of this relation in a nonclinical sample of 
Black people in the UK. However, no studies have been conducted examining the 
relationship between perceived racism and dissociative experiences where the Black 
body is at the centre of the experiencing. Therefore, this thesis will examine the 
relationship between perceived racism and dissociative experiences in a nonclinical 
sample of Black people in the UK. In the next chapter, I will outline and operationalise 
race-related schemas, perceived appraisal of the Black body and the effect of that 
appraisal on future social interaction from an integrated object relations and social 










While there may be very few cultural differences between different ethnic 
groups within the UK (Solomos & Goulbourne, 2003), skin tone is still used to 
differentiate Black people from others phenotypically without making them 
independent as I have previously argued (De Maynard, 2006). Aspects of the Black 
body, such as skin tone and hair texture, are often stigmatised and have come to define 
Black people as an ethnic group, determining how events and social interaction 
involving Black people are appraised (Payne, 2001). To understand what it is about 
Blackness that invokes the cognitive miser in others requires it seems an exploration 
of what Blackness means. Nordgaard et al. (2008) suggested that the absence of a 
phenomenological approach with which to describe this behaviour means that these 
psychological phenomena remain poorly defined. In order to theorise how dissociative 
experiences might mediate the subjective experience of racism in Black people in the 
UK, it is, therefore, necessary first to ‘go to the thing itself’, (i.e., the object of others’ 
intention – the Black body). Although Black people are more than the sum of their 
component parts, eidetic reduction employed in order to explore ‘embodied 
Blackness’ should reveal how Black people are often reduced to being an ‘object for 
others’, phenomenologically. In itself, skin tone is meaningless. When one considers 
the possibilities of someone possessing one particular skin tone as opposed to another 
in relation with others, the limitation of personhood might be readily inferred. The pre-
existence of stereotypes based on evaluations of phenotype determine the extent to 
which rights and privileges are conferred in past, present and future situations.  
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Racism, real or imagined, can and does threaten mental health because it limits 
the possibilities that Black people may enjoy relative to others. The social context 
within which Black people find themselves is important in terms of how they 
symbolically represent and activate information in novel situations. Being stigmatised, 
or the fear of being stigmatised, in relation with others not only limits personal agency, 
confidence and self-esteem but may also cause some Black people to change their 
appearance to look more like the dominant ethnic group. Black people sensitised to 
racism may apply an attribution style that reflects an underlying anxious expectation 
of race-based rejection in stable, uncontrollable, ambiguous situations. Repeated 
challenges to racial identity and autonomy could result in ontological insecurity, 
identity confusion and fragmentation, manifest in the mental representations Black 
people have of themselves. In this chapter, Blackness is phenomenologically explored, 
to understand its essence and to develop an integrated model of object relations and 
social cognition of racial identity, to demonstrate how race-related experience might 
be represented mentally. This new theoretical model will be used to explain how, 
having attributed academic and socioeconomic defeat, for example, to cumulative and 
chronic race-related stress, Black people sensitised to perceived racism may mentally 
represent socially constructed experiences as race-related schemas.  
 
2.1 A phenomenological approach to Black racial identity 
Whilst phenotypical differences are objectively observable, such differences 
cannot be meaningfully quantified. Despite there being no scientific basis for either 
‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ (Diamond, 1999; Templeton, 1998), these constructs are often 
used interchangeably, both socially and politically, as a basis for differentiating 
between individuals and social groups (Bradby, 2012). The behaviours of ethnic 
groups are often perceived as fixed, immutable, and indicative of people who share 
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observed visible morphological characteristics. Such categorisation reflects the human 
propensity to rationalise experiences, limiting the extent to which social comparison 
and appraisal of ability, opinion, attractiveness, emotion and behaviour may be 
compared and appraised (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009). According to the essentialist 
view, certain races are characterised by essential characteristics. Although the concept 
of ‘race’ is not based on scientific fact,  racism in the form of prejudicial thoughts, 
feelings and behaviour towards certain races or ethnicities is very real to those 
experiencing it, adversely affecting health and well-being (Bhui, Stansfeld, McKenzie, 
Karlsen, Nazroo & Weich, 2005; Krieger, Smith, Naishadham, Harman & Barbeau, 
2005). Before attempting to explore the problem of racism, however, it seems 
necessary to evaluate the concept of ‘Blackness’ as a project of the phenomenological 
investigation.  
According to Heidegger (1927/1962), phenomenology is the study of 
appearances, a method of research that aims to discover ‘how’ things appear to the 
investigator or observer. Phenomenology begins with sensed experience and ends with 
verbalised thought and feeling (Husserl, 1925/1977). The investigator attempts to 
establish meaningful relationships in given contexts, using naming, description and 
categorisation. The aim is to establish prerequisites for lived experience. Establishing 
such pre-requisites requires prior knowledge of what constitutes an object or subject 
appears to be, and what the object appears to be doing in context (i.e., a priori). The 
investigator is required to suspend any preconceptions she or he might have in relation 
with the object and direct his or her embodied consciousness towards it. In this sense, 
the directedness of the act of sensing seems purposeful. The object of conscious 
experience remains to be discovered anew every time, however. Nothing exists outside 
of conscious awareness. 
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Husserl (1918/1983, 1925/1977) suggested that both what is and what is not 
ready-to-hand as a construct of embodied consciousness are worthy of investigation. 
People derive an understanding of the object of their intentions, and what the object 
may or may not be observed doing, from ascertaining the difference between what is 
and is not ready to hand. This method of experiencing relies upon the accurate naming, 
description and categorisation of what the observer or investigator senses before he or 
she can attempt to manipulate any aspect of what has materialised. Hence, the 
scientific investigation cannot begin until the observer has described the object as it 
appears to him or her at that moment in time and space. This is an important aspect of 
any investigation. In this particular context, the observer or investigator is asked to 
describe ‘Blackness’. How does Blackness reveal itself? How people establish 
relationships between the meanings of what is revealed in a given time and context, 
and what is revealed as a consequence of intersubjectivity, is another important aspect 
of research (Ihde, 1986). 
An application of this phenomenological method to the experience of 
Blackness requires the observer or investigator to set aside their prior judgements and 
describe the object of his or her intentional discovery as it appears to him or her in a 
given time and space. To illustrate, consider the picture of the Black person in Figure 
2 below. At its horizons, the shape appears in a context in a given time and place. 
Further, eidetic reduction results in the deconstruction of the object of intention into its 
apparent constituent parts, such that, were it to cease to be a Black person – at its 
horizon – the object fades into an outdoor scene with trees and traffic, which would 
then come to the foreground. This seems important in terms of categorising the person, 
who, by virtue of the colour of his skin, appears ‘black’ against an outdoor scene or 
background. The investigator or observer may choose to acknowledge the humanity of 
the black object or not, predicated on his physical features and what the black person 
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is observed doing. Against an horizon that does not appear part of the same object, the 
object of our intention is no more than skin colour. Skin colour or relative Blackness 
has only the meaning one chooses to attach to it, transcendentally. Until the 
investigator attempts to enter into genuine dialogue with that Black object, the 














Like inanimate objects, Black people appear to be made up of constituent parts 
or features that have come to define them. Although non-Black people have difficulty 
in distinguishing Black faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001), they often subject aspects 
of the Black body, such as skin tone, to ridicule. Physical features such as thicker lips, 
wider noses, wider-spaced eyes that are vertically narrower with a greater inclination 
and longer, thinner faces with a longer upper (versus lower) face, set Black people 
apart from other human forms (Hajnis et al., 1994). Interestingly, it is precisely these 
aspects of the Black body that are often ridiculed and stigmatised (Coard et al., 2001; 
Miller, 2001; Wade, Dyckman & Cooper, 2004b). Skin colour remains meaningless 
beyond the statement of the factual existence of Black people as separate and distinct 
from other ethnic groups. However, other possibilities of what a person of this skin 
colour could be doing are typically not considered. Where does information about 
these defining features originate?  
Apparently, the component parts of the object in Figure 2 are recognised as 
such. The point at which the ‘Blackness’ disappears appears clearly demarcated, and 
the connectedness of each point of the object has been revealed. Even without prior 
knowledge of the illustration, some idea of what it means to be a Black person must be 
categorised and deconstructed, psychologically. Until the observer invokes the 
transcendent, however, nothing else about the skin colour that could become ‘known’ 
remains a mystery until discovered. Where the object has distinguishable 
characteristics, such as skin tone, the observer or investigator can only ascertain that it 
belongs to him or that it belongs to someone else. The observer or investigator is, 
however, able to invoke the transcendent and consider the possible actions of which 
this skin colour is capable. On observation, the skin colour does not appear to be doing 
anything. The observer or investigator makes the movement from the ‘thing’ to the 
‘thing doing’. In so doing, subjectivity is conferred on skin colour. Of a range of 
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possible views and opinions about what this skin colour might be, the observer must 
locate skin colour as a symbol, from which people readily conjure meaning. In itself, it 
is nothing more than skin colour. It is doing nothing. Associating connected blocks of 
information confers meaning. What might be true about people of certain skin 
colours? This invokes the stereotype. Personhood need not reveal itself. It is inferred 
by the gestalt of that which is presented. Yet, in situations in which the Black person is 
separated from others without making him or her independent, no attempt is made to 
discover the object’s subjectivity. 
 In simply observing, the investigator behaves as if the object of their 
intentions has revealed itself – he or she imagines that he or she knows the person 
when in fact he or she does not. If the observer proceeded beyond the purely empirical, 
he might be able to determine the intentions of others. Presuming the subjectivity of 
the object without first finding out something about the qualities of the object-in-itself 
might appear to be ‘poorly done science’ (Weiner, 2010). Similarly, attempting to 
predict the subjectivity of a Black person before it has revealed itself is arguably 
useless, as the person might choose to behave in unexpected ways. The problem does 
not appear to lie with the method of investigation, or indeed with its application 
because the subjectivity of the Black object remains undiscovered. The problem 
instead is a lack of desire to discover the subjectivity of the object beyond the 
observable. For some, being in relation with those whose intentions are obscure may 
be unbearable.  
Acculturation has removed many of the barriers to social cohesion that were 
present in the UK 30 or 40 years ago (Solomos & Goulbourne, 2003). Stigmatisation 
of Black people persists, however, casting doubt on the extent to which 
intersubjectivity can be achieved (Castilo et al., 2004; Castelli, De Amicis & Sherman, 
2007; Castelli, Zogmaister & Tomelleri, 2009). The term ‘social identity’ refers to the 
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status that society confers on an individual or group, such as builders, firefighters or 
doctors; social categorisation, comparison and appraisal are used to establish 
membership (Tajfel, 1969, 1970, 1981). Stereotyping a particular group exaggerates 
its characteristics, often without enhancing its uniqueness. Social groups arguably 
ascribe a particular set of attributes to confer ‘in-group’ membership; those who do not 
possess these attributes or match a given exemplar are afforded ‘out-group’ status 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1979). Identification with the group not 
only enables individuation and the pursuit of individual tasks separate from the group 
but also limits how each individuation can occur. The pre-existence of stereotypes or 
exemplars of ‘the other’ enables and limits the assignment of rights and privileges 
between and within groups (Ogbu, 1999; Neal-Barnett, 2001). 
The nature of this ‘otherness’ might not be readily identifiable. Studies in the 
US show that, even when White European Americans evaluate Black African 
Americans as favourably as they do their own group, anti-Black bias persists in White 
American public opinion (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald, McGhee 
& Schwartz, 1998; Nosek et al., 2007). The incongruence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes towards Black people refutes the view that anti-Black sentiment is 
decreasing (Greenwald et al., 1998). Some researchers doubt whether tests devised to 
measure implicit attitudes are valid, however (Cameron, Alvarez & Bargh, 2000; 
Devine, 1998). For instance, using the classic bogus pipeline procedure (Sigall & 
Page, 1971) to evaluate implicit measures, Nier (2005) demonstrated that social 
desirability mediated the difference between implicit and explicit attitudes. Crown and 
Marlow (1960) defined social desirability as ‘the need to obtain approval by 
responding in a culturally appropriate and acceptable manner’ (p. 352). By producing 
a socially desired response, respondents may ‘hide’ their true prejudice. By 
minimising the ability to produce the desired response using the bogus pipeline 
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method, strong correlations were observed between explicit and implicit measures. 
Anti-Black implicit and explicit attitudes might not be as dissociated, as Greenwald et 
al. (1998) suggest. 
 Cinematic characters of the past that represented Black people, such as in 
‘Gorillas in the Mist’ (Kennedy, 1998), ‘Mandingo’ (Onstott, 1987), and ‘King Kong’ 
(Selznick, Cooper & Schoedsack, 1933) not only dehumanised and objectified Black 
people as a social grouping, but also reflected, enhanced and reinforced contemporary 
views and opinions of Black stereotypes (Eberhardt, Dasgupta & Banaszynski, 2003). 
Ethnic or racial identity might well be based on passively internalised negative views, 
opinions and attitudes of the dominant ethnic grouping in ambiguous, unstable, 
uncontrollable situations (Burke, 1984; Helms, 1993; Weiner, 1986, 2000). However, 
Black people may co-construct their own racial/ethnic identity in relation to 
stereotypical portraits of Black people in the media, and those with whom they spend 
most of their time. In a series of experiments on the association between anti-Black 
implicit and explicit attitudes, White respondents endowed Black people with less than 
human attributes or dehumanised out-groups when primed (Goff et al., 2008). Being 
stigmatised and the fear of being stigmatised in relation with others in ambiguous, 
unstable, uncontrollable situations can undermine self-esteem, self-confidence and 
personal agency in those susceptible (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Major & O’Brien, 
2005). When coupled with a self-fulfilling prophecy, implicit stereotyping by 
clinicians and teachers increases the risk of stereotype threat in Black people 
(Campbell, 2013; Dovidio et al., 2002; Eberhardt, 2005; Moskowitz et al., 2012).  
Confronted with dehumanisation, some Black people might alter their physical 
appearance, mannerisms and the range and quality of their sociocultural interactions 
(O’Kawaza-Rey, Robinson & Ward, 1986; Keith & Herring, 1991; Howarth, 2006). 
There is no evidence to suggest that Black men are less likely to change their external 
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appearance than are Black women. The desire to change physical appearance to 
resemble that of the ideal of the dominant ethnic group indicates a desire to ‘fix’ 
aspects deemed less socially desirable (De Souza, 2005; Klein & Azzi, 2001; 
Kpanake, Munoz-Sastre & Mullet, 2010; Lonzozou et al., 2010; Thorpe, Ahmed & 
Steer, 2004). This kind of meta-stereotyping implies that the features of the Black 
body might become so undesirable in some social contexts that some Black people 
might prefer not to possess them at all (Mussweiller & Epstudes, 2009). In situations 
in which Black people seem unhappy with their physical form, a form of ‘racialised 
body image disturbance’ may be indicated. 
 An exploration of the concept of ethnic/racial identity based on the Black 
physical form seems critical to any exposé that seeks to describe how Black people 
may behave in ambiguous, unstable, uncontrollable situations where stigma 
consciousness is high (Pinel, 1999; Steele, 1992, 1997). Determining how best to 
relate to others without one form of humankind superseding another appears to be the 
work of humankind since time immemorial. To my knowledge, no one has explored 
the concept of ethnic or racial identity in the context of the Black human condition as a 
function of racialised body image disturbance predicated on anticipated race-related 
injury. Fundamental to such an approach are the relationships between personal, ethnic 
and racial identity, and reference group orientation (Brewer, 1991; Castelli & 
Tomelleri, 2007; Deaux, 1993), as well as the effect of mental representations of 
perceived appraisal of the Black physical body on self-esteem, self-confidence and 
personal agency (Stets & Burke, 2000; van Laar, 2000).  
Race-related trauma,induced by race-related bullying or perceived racism, can 
significantly impact the mental health of Black people in the UK (Bryant-Davis & 
Ocampo, 2005; Carter, 2007; Douglas, 2009). Perceptions of responsibility mediate 
between outcomes and the actions of individuals (Weiner, 2000). The social contexts 
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in which Black people find themselves are, therefore, important when deliberating on 
the symbolic information mentally represented and processed (Westen, 1992). 
Perceived racism or race-related bullying has been associated with paranoid delusions 
(Combs et al., 2006), persecutory ideation (Janssen et al., 2003), post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Neria, Bromet, Sievers, Lavelle & Fochtmann, 2002), and schizophrenia as a 
form of social adversity (Chakraborty, McKenzie & King, 2009; Chakraborty, 
Williams, Yu, Jackson & Anderson, 1997; Gilvarry et al., 1999; Janssen et al., 2003). 
There is no integrated model that adequately explains how race-related bullying or 
perceived racism might be mentally represented and operationalised in novel situations 
in which race is salient. Such a model would be predicated on racism being a risk 
factor in the development of the fragmented self. In the next section, racism as a risk 
factor in the social construction of the fragmented self is explored. 
 
2.2 Racism as a risk factor in itself 
Some psychologists suggest that the subjective experience of racism reflects 
the propensity of some Black people to attribute negative experiences to external 
agents as opposed to internal events (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994); for 
example, attribution theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1989) and social cognitive learning 
theory, derived from social learning psychoanalytical theory (Miller & Dollard, 1941). 
In Social Learning and Imitation, Miller and Dollard (1941) present operant 
conditioning models of human behaviour, according to which behaviour was either 
reinforced or extinguished following interaction with different aspects of the 
environment and motivated by internal drives. Heider (1958) argued that the 
individual comes to attribute cause and effect through a process of observation or 
direct or indirect interaction with both animate and inanimate objects. By so doing, he 
or she understands something about him or herself in relation to the world. According 
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to Weiner (1986, 2000, 2010), individuals are positively or negatively motivated to 
reproduce observed behaviour or behaviour acquired through experience, depending 
on the locus, stability and controllability of the cause, ability and expectancy to 
achieve the desired outcome in a given social context.  
By contrast, Bandura (1977, 1986, 1989) argued that individuals are not 
passive actors in or observers of the world around them, and that observed behaviour 
could be pre-meditated, reflexive, reinforced, ameliorated or extinguished. Emotion 
(affect) is not only an outcome of intrapersonal characteristics but also a modifier of 
human behaviour. How an individual feels about his or her behaviour or the behaviour 
of others is important in establishing consistent beliefs about cause and effect, and in 
determining future action or interaction with others (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993). Black 
people may attribute cause and effect through the process of observation or direct and 
indirect interaction with the world-around. Societal constraints may limit the extent to 
which Black people are actively self-organising, proactive, self-reflecting, and self-
regulating and participate in creating or socially co-constructing a worldview for 
themselves and attributing cause and effect accordingly. Acculturated Black people are 
not expected to attribute cause and effect differently from other ethnic groups who 
have grown up in the UK (Castilo et al., 2004). Black people who have recently 
migrated to the UK, or who have no previous knowledge or experience of British 
culture, may attribute cause and effect differently from those who have grown up 
within British culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Recently-migrated Black people 
may, therefore, be more likely to attribute the adverse effects of perceived racism to 
external, stable, controllable causes than acculturated Black people are. Hence, Black 
people may be observed reproducing the behaviour observed or acquired through 
experience to help and support them in life, while avoidance that extinguishes the 
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desire to maintain proximity to that which emotionally distresses results from negative 
observed, primed or acquired behaviour.  
Attribution theory may not be so far removed from social cognitive theory and 
social schema theory that their central concepts cannot be integrated (Augustinos, 
Walker & Donaghue, 2006). Like social cognitive theory, social schema theory 
explains how social experiences are encoded, stored, retrieved, processed, applied and 
mentally represented to attribute cause and effect. Unfortunately, errors may occur 
during the encoding, storage, retrieval, processing and application of schematic mental 
representations of cause and effect, resulting in faulty attributions (Allisson & Mellick, 
1985; Kleider, Pezdek, Goldinger & Kirk, 2008). Black individuals actively participate 
in the processing of social information. During that process, however, the opportunity 
for cognitive error arises. According to Jones and Nesbitt (1972), ‘there is a pervasive 
tendency for “actors” to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas 
observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions’ (p. 80). 
Black people are more likely to attribute their behaviour to the prevailing social 
context and to attribute the decisions of outside groups to the prevailing personality 
traits of its members (Allison & Messick, 1985). In response to behaviour that appears 
to reflect the personality traits of the actor, the Black person may project their anger 
and disappointment into the space between him or herself and the actor. In so doing, 
however, he or she risks reinforcing any negative perception the actor may have of the 
Black person, and of Black people in general, resulting in further isolation and 
alienation (Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid, 1977). Those acting attribute their own 
behaviour to prevailing circumstances, and the self-fulfilling prophecy is acted out 
based on a fundamentally biased attribution of cause and effect. Where Black people 
expect and believe that perceived racism is based on the external, stable and 
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uncontrollable personality traits of those with whom they interact socially, ethnic pride 
is reduced and low self-esteem occurs. 
The ‘ultimate fundamental cognitive error’ recurs whenever Black people are 
confronted by ‘limit situations’ they cannot avoid in everyday life (Jaspers, 1951; 
Kleider et al., 2008; Pettigrew, 1979). Black people may then attribute socially 
undesirable behaviour to the behavioural predispositions of others. Black people 
sensitised to perceived racism may develop a paranoia or excessive wariness of the 
others and the world around them (Combs et al. 2006; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). In 
such contexts, multiculturalism might give way to ‘cultural mistrust’ (Thompson, 
Neville, Weathers, Poston & Atkinson, 1990; McNeilly, Anderson, Armstead, Clark, 
Corbett, Robinson, Pieper & Lepisto, 1996). The Home Office Citizenship Survey 
(2003) found that one in five minority ethnic respondents worried about being 
physically attacked because of their ascribed race. Perhaps cultural paranoia has been 
normalised in multicultural societies (Combs, Penn & Fenigstein, 2002), indicating the 
way minority ethnic people cope with life in a hostile environment (O’Connor & 
Nazroo, 2002). Nevertheless, this paranoia or excessive wariness appears rooted in 
Black people’s direct and indirect experience of being Black in a hostile environment 
(Thompson et al., 1990). This perceived existential threat might give rise to the 
anxious expectation of race-based rejection sensitivity (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002). 
McKenzie, van Os, Fahy, Jones, Harvey, Toone and Murray (1995) proposed a 
model according to which the chronic experience of racial discrimination gives rise to 
a ‘paranoid attributional style’, which puts people at risk of developing psychosis-like 
symptoms. Some Black people may attribute observed behaviour to the 
predispositions of others, but this may be incongruent with the reasons others give for 
their own behaviour (LaVeist, Sellers & Neighbors, 2001). Black people may attribute 
their behaviour to prevailing circumstances, while observers might attribute it to 
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behavioural predisposition. The tendency to attribute negative experiences to external 
agents might be based on experience (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & 
Kinderman, 2001). When projecting themselves into the future, Black people 
sensitised to racism anxiously anticipate race-based rejection on an ongoing basis. 
Externalising blame might relieve the tension between ‘ideal’ and ‘actual’ perceptions 
of self (Bentall et al., 2001). Self-serving bias disappeared when independent raters 
evaluated causal statements on a reliable measure of attributional style (Martin & 
Penn, 2002). Humphreys and Barrowclough (2005) argued that the findings that self-
serving bias is used to protect against real or imagined threats are inconsistent. Over 
time, Black people may develop a cognitive vulnerability to perceived racism that 
predisposes them to low self-esteem, and to the kind of paranoid thinking often 
observed in clinical settings (Bebbington, McBride, Steel, Kuipers, Radovovic, 
Brugha, Jenkins, Howard, Meltzer, & Freeman, 2013). Black people may attribute 
observed behaviour to the predispositions of those with whom they relate, but this may 
be incongruent with the reasons those people give for their own behaviour.  
Perceived threat in specific situations and expectant threat in all situations 
(global) may determine the extent to which an individual interacts with others 
(Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Branscombe et al., 1999; Martin & Penn, 2001). 
In anxiety-provoking situations, cognitive inhibition of the threat appears weakened in 
those prone to dissociation and dissociative experiences. Such individuals may report 
heightened threat-induced anxiety, negatively priming otherwise inhibited race-related 
information (Dorahy, 2006). The movement from specific attribution of racism in the 
everyday life of a Black person to a more global attribution of racism in the everyday 
lives of all Black people, may reflect a weakening of cognitive inhibition during threat 
processing, resulting in a ‘paranoid delusional style’ of relating (Abramson, Seligman 
& Teasdale, 1978; Bentall et al., 2001; Dorahy, 2007). In contexts in which mental 
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health is assessed, a Black person’s excessive wariness of those who represent all that 
appears oppressive in that Black person’s lived-world stereotype threat-induced 
anxiety may give way to disorganised thinking, hallucinations, and paranoia (Bryant-
Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Combs et al., 2006; Crocker et al., 1998). Trauma-induced 
dissociative attachment prohibits reality checking, rendering a person at risk of 
developing psychosis. Black people may anticipate the experience of racism but fail to 
check out their assumptions against reality in a social situation (Allen, Coyne & 
Console, 1997). Consequently, Black people may construct or automatically reactivate 
categories of mental representations or relational race-related schemas to assign 
meaning to sensed experience that threatens or challenges their free will, confidence, 
personal agency and identity, employing psychological defence mechanisms such as 
dissociation to defend against the threat of personal injury arising from anxiously 
expected racism. In the next section, racial identity theories will be reviewed, since 
how the Black body is appraised in relation to others seems important in the 
development of racial identity. 
 
2.3  Racial identity theories 
Racial identity is a sociopolitical construct not based on biological fact (Mayr, 
2002). Most racial identity theorists, however, describe the process of self-
categorisation as a process of becoming a racialised Black person (i.e., Nigrescence). 
The process of accepting genetically predetermined phenotypical characteristics 
begins in early childhood and culminates in early adulthood. Racial identity theorists 
maintain that there is no avoiding this process (Cross, 1971; Thomas, 1971; Phinney, 
1989; Helms, 1993). Racial identity should not, however, be confused with ethnic 
identity. King (2002) defined ethnicity as ‘a sense of personhood and commonality 
derived from kinship patterns, a shared historical past, common experiences, religious 
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affiliations, language or linguistic commonalities, shared values, attitudes, perception, 
modes of expression and identity’ (p. 247). According to Phinney, Dupont, Espinosa, 
Revill and Sanders (1994), ethnic identity is ‘a feeling of belonging to one’s group, a 
clear understanding of the meaning of one’s membership, positive attitudes towards 
the group, familiarity with its history and culture, and involvement in its practices’ (p. 
169). Such definitions, however, imply that Black physicality is inconsequential when 
identifying with a particular ethnic group.  
Race and racial identity cannot reliably be defined in terms of ethnicity and 
ethnic identity without considering the way the Black physical body is objectified and 
appraised wholly or partially in relation with others (Howarth, 2002; Coard et al., 
2001). Human beings strive to maintain a positive view of themselves and identity 
security. Self-esteem and ethnic pride relate to how Black people might evaluate their 
self-worth (Lockett & Harrell, 1993; Coopersmith, 1967; McDonald, 2006; 
Rosenberg, 1965). Perceived racism threatens identity security, casting doubt on the 
value of the whole or part aspects of the Black person, resulting in the disintegration of 
the Black body construct and often in low self-esteem and psychopathology (Hughes 
& Hertel, 1990; Klonoff & Landrine, 1999; Sanchez-Huclés, 1998). However, not 
every Black person experiences a loss of self-esteem (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, 
Hoshino-Browne & Correll, 2003; Charles, 2003). A review of Black racial identity 
theory is appropriate here. 
Constantine, Richardson, Benjamin and Wilson (1998) reviewed the major 
racial identity theories over the 25 years prior to 1998. They distinguished between 
those theories that had received the most attention in the literature and those that 
remained obscure. The most prominent theories appeared to reflect the views of those 
with an academic ruling hegemony and those who subscribed to this opinion. 
‘Mainstream’ interpretations of racial identity are based upon the internalisation of a 
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negative self-perception in response to the experience of racism. Thomas (1971) first 
conceptualised racial identity development as a staged process, beginning with 
withdrawal from an overdependence on white social groups for self-definition, and a 
movement towards Black social groups. This withdrawal stage is followed by a 
testifying stage, during which the Black person is confronted with the anxiety of 
becoming a self-defined Black person. The information processing stage follows, 
which involves acquiring knowledge about Black heritage and experience. The activity 
stage requires active involvement in culture-specific activities. The final stage, 
transcendence, requires the resolution of personal conflicts associated with ‘being 
Black in relation’. 
The Cross Model of Nigrescence (1971, 1978) was originally a developmental 
model, according to which the Black individual moves through a series of different 
stages of racial identity in the process of becoming Black. The process of becoming 
Black is predicated on the assumption that acknowledging that racism exists is 
required and that immersing oneself in Black culture would help resolve inner 
conflicts and encourage the development of a positive Black identity. The pre-
encounter stage is characterised by anti-Black sentiment. The encounter stage is 
characterised by a shift away from anti-Black sentiment and identification with Black 
culture. The immersion-emersion stage is characterised by pro-Black sentiment to the 
exclusion of White sentiment, and engagement in Black activities. Lastly, the 
internalisation-commitment stage is characterised by the achievement of a positive 
Black identity in relation to other racial identities. Helms (1984) argued that changes 
in the individual’s attitudes to racial identity indicate movement from one 
developmental stage to the next. Helms (1984, 1993) operationalised the model 
proposed by Cross and Thomas (1971). Parham (1989) and Cross (1991) developed 
the model, describing five different states of being, as opposed to the process of 
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becoming ‘Black’. Test-retest reliability studies using the Black Racial Identity 
Attitude Scale (BRIAS; Helms, 1993) suggest that these states are relatively stable 
across short periods of time and space, likely ensuring that an individual may be 
shown to move into and out of the various states, according to prevailing 
circumstances (Vandiver et al., 2002). 
 Other identity theorists have focused on racial identity as a function of ethnic 
group identity. For instance, Atkinson, Morten and Sue (1979) proposed the Minority 
Identity Development Model (MIDM), which consists of five states: Conformity, 
Dissonance, Resistance, Introspection and Awareness. Qualitatively, each state 
appears similar to the racial identity models advanced by Thomas (1971), Jackson 
(1975) and Cross (1971), as well as the Racial Identity Attitudes Scale proposed by 
Helm (1985). The overarching themes may be labelled differently, but the individual 
transcends each state, culminating in the achievement of a mental state whereby racial 
identity or ethnic identity becomes an integral part of the personality of the Black 
person. Phinney (1989, 1992) developed the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Model 
(MEIM), based on the Ego identity work of Eriksson (1968; Marcia, 1980) and 
identified four states: diffuse, foreclosed, moratorium and achieved. The MEIM 
presupposes that ethnic identity is common to all and develops in each ethnic group in 
the same way. The diffuse and foreclosed states represent ethnic identities that remain 
unexplored but vary according to a commitment to a predetermined ethnic group 
orientation. The moratorium and achieved states represent ethnic identities that are 
explored but also vary according to a commitment to a predetermined ethnic group 
orientation. This model consists of two factors (an ethnic group search factor and 
affirmation, belonging and commitment factor), but does not differentiate between 
racial and ethnic classifications of identity. These racial and ethnic identity models 
show that racial and ethnic identity appears stable across situations where ‘race’ is 
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salient. However, the physicality of the Black person is never central to the process of 
being becoming Black in these models, nor do they adequately describe how the 
experience being Black might be mentally represented, and thus how it might underpin 
racial identity. Only the objectivity of the racialised person is called into being in 
circumstances in which ‘race’ is salient and, therefore, how the Black body is 
appraised in relation to others seems important in the development of racial identity. 
Many authors have commented on the apparent ability of Black people to 
differentiate among different racialised groupings from an early age, and to attribute 
value to others based on the presence or absence of racially-defined aspects of 
personhood (Clark & Clark, 1947; Gopaul-McNicol, 1985; Hesse-Biber, Howling, 
Leavy & Lovejoy, 2004; Hraba & Grant, 1969; Katz, 1982; Bigler & Liben, 1993; 
Kohl & Yeshiva, 1995; Miller, 2001). Some have argued that very young children 
have no a priori theory of ‘race’ or its meaning, per se, but that they are hard-wired to 
recognise humankind and to categorise others according to their degree of perceived 
‘sameness’ (Aboud & Mitchell, 1977; Milner, 1996). In relation to others, Black 
people are affirmed and not affirmed, validated and denigrated, or acknowledge and 
ignored based on an appraisal of that within which they are embodied (Augoustinos & 
Rosewarne, 2001; Rosenberg, 1979; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin & Griffiths, 2005). 
Awareness appears limited to perceived physical differences, but humankind 
comprises so much more than physicality (Hirschfeld, 1996, 1998; Nesdale et al., 
2003). Nonetheless, 25% of pupils from ethnic minority backgrounds reported 
experiencing recent racist name-calling from their peers (DfES, 2002, 2005). There is 
no evidence to suggest that children do not understand what they are saying, or that the 
words used will not have the same meaning for them as it does when used by adults 
(Castilli et al., 2004). From an early age, children categorise one another according to 
perceived phenotypical differences and comments by important people in their lives. 
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In situations in which Black pride is threatened, Black people may identify with their 
oppressors in the hope that their distinctiveness will go unnoticed (Lieberman & van 
Horn, 2008). 
Racial identity theorists in the US have considered the predisposition to think, 
feel and behave in a particular way as a function of racial identity (Byrd, 2012). The 
primary assumption is that positive racial identity is critical to success in the world. 
However, racial identity theories say little about the centrality of the Black body to 
sensed experiences or mental representations of self that might underpin racial identity 
attitudes. Caution is exercised in applying the US-derived racial identity theory to the 
experiences of Black people in the UK. It would be unreasonable to assume, however, 
that the experience of being African American in the US was utterly dissimilar to that 
in the UK. In the next section, I will explore identity confusion resulting from the 
prevailing uncertainty about the value and expectations that UK society places on 
Black people in general; delusions of reference and identity confusion may well give 
rise to identity confusion and mental ill health. 
 
2.4 Identity Confusion 
The delusions of reference observed in psychotic patients might well reflect a 
persistent confusional state involving Black and not-Black object relations. This 
confusional state, however, seems more indicative of dissociative disorders than of 
schizophrenia. Laing (1960) describes the individual who feels real, alive and 
differentiated from the rest of the world, and whose identity and autonomy are never 
questioned in relation to the concept of ontological security. Repeated challenges to 
personal identity and autonomy may result in ontological insecurity and identity 
confusion (Helms, 1993; Hossack, 1993; Alter et al., 2010). Chris Mullard (1973) best 




'You are not West Indian, Indian, Pakistani or African, because you were born in 
Britain, and know little or nothing about your parents' country. Even if you wished to 
you cannot pretend you are a Black immigrant, because embedded in your being is the 
knowledge that you are not. If you choose to ignore this, then it is forced upon you by 
the way Black immigrants see you, treat you, and react towards you when in the 
presence of fellow Black immigrants or White people. Similarly, if you choose to 
identify with Whites, the same mechanism goes into reverse gear. In the end, you have 
no alternative but to remain alone, insecure, without an identity of your own making. 
(pp. 13-14) 
 
 It is a broader society that sets the limit within which Black people can express 
themselves, and therefore that determines identity security (Shweder, Minow & 
Marcus, 2002). Any claim that society had prevented Black people from assuming an 
equal identity would need to identify how the expectations Black people have for 
themselves differ from those of society in general. 
In his theory of human motivation, Maslow (1943, 1954) identified a hierarchy 
of needs that must be met in linear succession in order to reach an optimal state of 
being, self-actualisation or transcendence. Black people who have difficulty finding 
and keeping paid work are less likely to be able to participate in the everyday social 
activities necessary to satisfy their need for social, personal and spiritual security 
(Kolko-Rivera, 2006). Identity insecurity negatively affects the ability of Black people 
to maintain healthy and secure personal and social relationships (Freeman, 1994) and 
to successfully negotiate the interplay between social existence and organic 
dysfunction (Fernando, 2003; Chua & McKenna, 1995). Racism thus presents a 
problem, which Black people need to resolve both externally and internally. This 
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problem situation can be magnified in health and social care settings in which 
proximity to ‘the love-object’ – the caregiver – is denied or is physically, emotionally 
and spiritually, absent. In such situations, the Black person may reinvent the 
perpetrator in relation to others, exacerbating underlying anxiety, depression or 
psychosis (Lieberman & van Horn, 2008). In the next section, I will explore contexts 
in which identity confusion and insecurity may give rise to ontological anxieties. 
 
2.5 Attachment theory and race-related distress  
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) and attachment style 
(Ainsworth et al., 1978; Cicirelli, 1989, 2004; Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Main & 
Solomon, 1990) seem critical to understanding how stereotype threat undermines 
identity security in contexts in which free will and personal agency are limited. 
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978) outlined three distinct mother-infant 
attachment styles: secure, avoidant and ambivalent. Black people exhibiting secure 
attachment styles enter willingly into relationships without concerns about the other 
being too close. Black people with an insecure avoidant attachment style may worry 
about others getting too close. Those with an anxious-ambivalent attachment style may 
be unconcerned about whether others are close or not. Early attachment schemata 
reflect the assimilation and integration of early interpersonal relations with meaningful 
others (Bowlby, 1969; 1973). In situations in which the source of the child’s 
consternation is also the source of his happiness, the child might find it difficult to 
develop organised attachment patterns (Main, 1991). The child who cannot integrate 
and assimilate race-related rejection, and striving to control his or her emotions in 
some other way, may form insecure, ambivalent, avoidant or disorganised attachment 
patterns (Ainsworth, 1967).  
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Regardless of culture or ethnicity, both avoidant and ambivalent children often 
blame some aspect of themselves for the emotional and/or physical inattentiveness of 
their love object (Minde, Minde & Vogel, 2012; Mofrad, Abdullah & Uba, 2010). 
They may activate any one of the 31 different ‘automatic psychological processes that 
protect the individual against anxiety and the awareness of internal or external dangers 
or stressors’ (DSM-V, 2013, p. 807). Another defence mechanism is denial (Cramer, 
1991; Valliant, 1994). Older children may develop more mature defence mechanisms, 
such as sublimation and suppression (Segal, Coolidge & Mizuno, 2007). Certainty as 
to whether stereotype threat or perceived race-related rejection is due to an act of 
omission or commission may induce to contact-seeking behaviours, such as calling or 
searching for the love object. Uncertainty as to whether perceived race-related 
rejection is due to an act of omission or commission may cause ambivalence 
(Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978). Perceived racism may not be traumatic for 
all Black people. For those so vulnerable to it, however (Briere, 2006), hypervigilance 
and a sense of imminent danger may always be present (Bentall et al., 2001; Combs et 
al., 2006; Kimmerling, Ouimette & Wolfe, 2002; McDonald, 2006; Miller, 2009; 
Payne, 2001). 
In situations in which the perceived object of race-related rejection is either 
whole or part of the Black physical body, however, the unconscious activation of 
immature or maladaptive defences, such as projection and dissociation, may prove 
counterproductive. Chronically abused Black people may be predisposed to seek 
proximity with idealised others or love objects, particularly when those others have 
what they need, such safety and security, help and support, love and affection. 
Unfortunately, where the idealised love object and the perpetrators are the same, the 
traumatising event is likely to recur (Lieberman & van Horn, 2008). In such 
circumstances, Black people may adopt avoidant, ambivalent or disorganised 
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relationship patterns to maintain proximity to the idealised love object, by dissociating 
or ‘separating out’ those aspects of sensed experience that cannot yet be readily 
accommodated and assimilated, psychologically (Brumariu & Kerns, 2012; 
Pinderhughes, 1973; Ross & Keyes, 2004). In relation with others, some Black people 
may separate out those racialised aspects of their person and everyday lives, and 
assume a different racial identity that denies the pre-existence of an integrated Black 
physical identity (Parham, White & Ajamu, 1999). However, others may become so 
traumatised by subjective experiences of racism that psychopathology ensues (Bryant-
Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Dunn et al., 1994; Jernigan & Henderson, 2011; Sanchez-
Huclés, 1998).  
In situations in which threat avoidance or escape is impossible, however, 
chronic dissociation may fail, and unwanted intrusions, paranoid ideation and 
persecutory delusions prevail (Green & Philips, 2004). Dissociation may disrupt the 
processing of race-related information by directing attention to less threatening stimuli 
in situations in which race is salient (Douglas, 2009). Post-traumatic cognitions about 
the relationship between the Black physical body and adversity firmly establish the 
Black body at the centre of racialising experiences. The visibly Black body 
experiences adversity in relation with the other; in so doing, the Black body may come 
to symbolise everything that should be kept at a distance but never made independent 
as I have p[reviously argued (De Maynard, 2006). There are many ways of coping 
with racialising experiences (Brondolo, ver Halen, Pencille, Beatty & Contrada, 2009), 
but suppressing anger cannot be considered coping, as suggested by Brondolo et al. 
(2009). Denying and suppressing anger requires effort (Cramer, 1987; Valliant, 1994; 
Wegner & Zanatos, 1994), and such feelings are likely to find expression through the 
Black body if not dealt with. For instance, Kreiger and Sidney (1996) found that 
‘blood pressure was highest among those reporting having experienced no racial 
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discrimination, and lowest among those reporting discrimination in one or two of the 
specified situations' (p. 1375), whether or not they talked to others about their 
experiences indicating a level of anxiety that is often not expressed. 
Phenomenologically, Black people seem to be made up of physical features 
that have come to define them (Hajnis et al., 1994). Central to the experiencing of 
Black people appears to be the Black body – the object. A person's racial and ethnic 
identity may be construed as a 'complex integration of each individual's psychosocial 
context, physical characteristics, personality attributes, unique experiences, and 
personal choices' (Babad, Birnbaum & Berne, 1983, p. 37). Racial/ethnic identity, 
however, is a social construction relating his or her physicality and personal attributes 
to the world-around (Bliss, 2011; Brady, 2012). In relation with a lived world that 
appears to be constantly hostile, susceptible Black people may activate psychological 
defence mechanisms such as dissociation in order to protect against perceived racism, 
especially where physical avoidance or escape is impossible. Such race-related 
schemas may be reactivated in new race-related situations, to which they do not 
accurately apply (Dohrenwend, 2000; Pinderhughes, 1973; Rose, 1997; Rack, 1982). 
In the next section, an integrated object relations and social cognition approach to 
racial identity is developed, as this appraisal of the ethnic Black body is central to the 
experience of racism. When operationalised, this new theoretical model will then be 
used to infer cause and effect of social failure or defeat from the effect of relational 
race-based schemas on the dissociative experiences scale in a nonclinical sample of 





2.6 An integrated object relations and social cognition approach to 
racial identity 
 
Historically, Black people have rarely possessed sufficient inherent aesthetic 
expectancy or value in relation with others. Their functional value has arguably 
diminished exponentially since the end of the 19th century (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/1962; Ward & Lott, 2002; Lott, 1999). The enslavement of Black African people 
was common at the time of Herodotus, Aristotle and Mohammed, and was almost 
certainly introduced to the Spanish peninsula by ethnic Arabs during the occupation of 
Spain before Emperor Charlemagne finally defeated them in the 14th century (Segal, 
2001; Segal, Coolidge & Mizuno, 2007). All countries in the world have enslaved 
people at different times historically, and it was not until the 17th and 18th centuries in 
European states, and the 19th and 20th centuries in South American states, that slavery 
was abolished (Gilroy, 2001). Some might argue that where the profits of enslavement 
are high and the risk of being penalised low, the desire to exert power or control by 
constraining personal liberty and disposing of their labour at will has never ended 
(Siddhartha, 1984; Wright, 2010). Today, Black men in the UK are twice as likely to 
be unemployed as are Black women, and four times as likely to be unemployed as 
their White counterparts (ONS, 2002; Census, 2011; The Black Training & Enterprise 
Group, 2014). Despite efforts to compete successfully socioeconomically (Leverenz, 
1989), the potential for some form of social and economic enslavement remains high, 
especially where teachers engage in negative stereotyping and bias determines 
academic achievement. Black graduates are still twice as likely to be unemployed as 
their White counterparts (Census, 2011; Campbell, 2013). In the absence of any 
possibility to change in the social order, it might be best to consider the ways in which 
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Black people can better manage the devaluing effects of perceived racism and stress 
(Major & O’Brien, 2005; Berjot & Gillet, 2011).  
From an existentialist perspective, Sartre spoke of how the Black people he 
had observed in the US appeared to be becoming objects for others. Perhaps, by 
becoming objects for others and refusing to accept their own objective responsibility 
for the choices they make in the world, some Black people cease to be for themselves 
and exist only for others. By assuming this position, the Black person achieves her or 
his aim in the world. He or she performs tasks with great diligence while absolving 
him- or herself from personal responsibility for his or her condition. In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre (1943) describes a café waiter whose ‘movement is quick and 
forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid' (p. 59). He comes towards the patrons 
with a step that is a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his 
eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally, 
there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of 
automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope walker by 
putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium, which he 
perpetually re-establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All his behaviour 
seems to us a game. But what game is he playing? We need not watch for long before 
we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café. Society almost demands 
that the Black person assumes the position of the object for others in relation, as 
though she or he were an ‘automaton’. She or he is unable to separate out, 
accommodate or assimilate mentally represented experiences of racism from 
consciousness, becoming the ‘automaton’. In these circumstances, the Black person’s 
actions become mechanistic, devoid of all conscious effort. Here, some Black people 
could be accused of acting in bad faith. This argument would not be true, however, if 
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it could be shown that such actions were deliberate and executed with full 
consciousness.  
From a social cognition and learning perspective, people are motivated to 
attend to, retain and reproduce the behaviour they observed in their early surroundings 
(Heider, 1955; 1958; Weiner, 1986), attributing cause and effect in their co-
construction of everyday experience (Gergen, 1971, 1985; Bandura, 1977, 1989; 
Tajfel, 1981; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In race-related 
situations in which personal agency and competence are limited, Black people may 
find it difficult to avoid situations that trigger inconsistencies in his self-concept 
(Festinger, 1954). Black people may be motivated to make social comparisons, but the 
social comparison may be limited where uniformity appears impossible. Black people 
are most able to maintain ‘optimal distinctiveness’ in relation to the wider society in 
which stereotype threat prevails (Brewer, 1977, 1991). However, where uniqueness 
threatens that proximity, a sense of belonging, self-esteem and stigma consciousness, 
optimal distinctiveness is challenged (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997; Pinel, 
1999). According to Blascovich and Tomaka (1996), stereotype threat occurs when 
stigma-coping resources are exceeded. Inconsistencies between one's real and ideal 
self may give rise to anxiety, low self-esteem and emotional distress. When primed, 
schematic mental representations of stigma-induced experience may result in extreme 
feelings. Over time, chronic discrimination induces an expectation that discrimination 
will occur a priori, and a self-fulfilling prophecy is acted out ad infinitum (Jussim, 
Palumbo, Chatman, Madon & Smith, 2000). To maintain proximity to idealised 
meaningful others and to cope with the trauma of perceived racism and stereotype 
threat, some Black people may dissociate those aspects of body consciousness that 
conflict with their ideal sense of self and assume a different identity: a fragmented self 
(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Valiant, 1994).  
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From an evolutionary perspective, the interrelations within and among social 
groups that best enhance the chances an individual will survive and reproduce are 
selected by the environment as they compete for scarce resources. Since time 
immemorial, lighter-skinned humans have exalted themselves over the darker skinned 
(Comas, 1960). Those with ‘good enough’ socio-political capital and the ability to 
conform to commonly held stereotypes about how Black people should behave in 
relation to the dominant social group are usually those who accept their place in the 
prevailing social order. Those who do not possess the necessary socio-political capital 
(Cote & Healey, 2001; Coleman, 1994) or who are unable to conform to the social 
demands for subordination are doomed to suffer continual frustration, anger and 
emotional distress.  
From an object relations perspective, Black people are motivated to maintain 
‘good enough’ relations with those who can help them meet their needs, maintain self-
esteem and facilitate the development of abilities to gain mastery over his or her 
environment in pursuit of autonomy. Object relations theory is a Eurocentric view of 
psychological development based on the ‘individual’s interactions with external and 
internal (real and imagined) other people, and the relationship between their internal 
and external object worlds’ (Greenberg & Mitchell, pp. 13–14). ‘Object’ is collective 
term encompassing people, places, events, situations and things that, when mentally 
represented, forms the basis of future interactions with the world. People learn from 
infancy how to categorise and differentiate others through interaction, and are 
motivated to form and maintain good enough relations with both internal and external 
objects (Fairbairn 1952; Guntrip, 1969, 1961; Klein, 1959).  
Early in life, a child receives most of what she or he needs from his primary 
caregivers. The basis of the relationship is need-gratifying. She or he may form mental 
representations that reflect the quality of that Black child’s relationship with these 
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external objects, passively or actively. Relations with good-enough-ethnic-Black-
parents, good-enough-care, good-enough-home-environment, good-enough-school, 
etc., are internalised as important good whole or part objects. Conversely, relations 
with not-good-enough-objects, such as parents who fail to provide for the child’s 
needs, are internalised as important bad whole or part objects (Banks, 1992; Harris, 
1995). As the child grows up and explores the world, she or he forms relations with 
objects outside the home. She or he needs to find ways of expressing her or his 
innermost desires in relation to others who can best provide for her or his needs and to 
reject that which prohibits self-expression.  
 The Black child may be observed seeking others through which she or he can 
express him or herself. He or she encounters people, places, situations, and events that 
challenge his or her self-perception (Alter et al., 2010). She or he meets people who do 
not share his or her defining features, but in relation to whom she or he still seeks 
expression, through rejection. When relating to objects that do not appear to value his 
own defining features, the Black child may find it difficult to separate the good and 
bad part objects in his or her own mind. What he or she mirrors to others is denigration 
or disgust with some aspect of his or her person. The cognitive dissonance arising 
from social comparison frustrates the Black child (Festinger, 1954, 1957). The Black 
child finds his or her self needing to maintain proximity to those who will provide for 
his or her, and yet, at the same time, he or she may feel unwanted. On realising that 
she or he cannot reject the whole or part bad object because she or he depends upon 
the part good-object for his or her needs, the child confronts a dilemma. Determining 
how to preserve the internalised good part of the important love-object while rejecting 
the bad part of the object that frustrates appears to be the ‘work’ of relationship. One 
must choose whether to split the love-object or to seek someone else better able to 
provide for one's needs. Black people who embed themselves in Black culture at the 
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expense of all other cultures may be seeking others who validate the Black self-
concept (Helms, 1993). 
 According to Winnicott (1896-1971), the ‘true or authentic self’ – one built on 
autonomy – develops in environments that are ‘good enough’. By contrast, the ‘false 
or inauthentic self’ – one built in compliance – develops in environments that are ‘not 
good enough’. Heidegger (1927/1962) might argue that Black people are thrown into a 
world not of their own choosing, that they exist in a state of dependency, oscillating in 
and out of a state of compliance and never really being there. For Guntrip (1969), this 
state represents the true ‘schizoid’ position – never realising a multidimensional 
integrated sense of self with any permanence. British society, as a whole or in part, 
appears locked into what Winnicott might refer to as the ‘bad parental role’. Whether 
the parental style arises from guilt-arousing blame or gratification of its own need for 
mastery of the environment, is uncertain (Weiner, 2000). The responses of others to 
the Black person’s demand for autonomy are often inappropriate or indifferent (Liotti, 
2006). Not enough Black children learn how to become good-enough ethnic-Black 
adults – adult Black people who no longer need to live through British society, and are 
able to form ‘mature object relatedness based on mutual love, respect, and concern’ 
(Westen, 1991, p. 446).  
 To my knowledge, object relations theory has not as yet been applied to the 
‘Black human condition’. Although it constitutes a Eurocentric approach, there is no 
reason to believe that Black people do not strive to form ‘good enough’ object 
relations in the same way, as does everybody. Negative object relations to some extent 
accounts for how the illness behaviour of Black people detained under the Mental 
Health Act of 1983/2007 arose (Wilson, 1993). Unlike in Cross (1991), however, 
personal and reference group identity is deemed equally salient, and inextricable 
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(Castilli et al., 2004). Object relations cannot be directly measured; they are inferred 
from observation (Stricker & Healey, 1990; Westen, 1991). 
From the social cognition perspective, people process information from the 
world and perceive themselves in relation to others (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). These 
cognitive and affective mental representations influence behaviour (Frith & Frith, 
2007). Social cognition is concrete early in life, becoming more abstract with 
developmental maturity (Piaget, 1954; Werner, 1957; Western, 1991). Fundamental to 
social cognition in Black people is the perception of external cues for self-
categorisation. According to Nesdale, Durkin, Maass and Griffiths (2005), children’s 
racial and ethnic attitudes develop through a sequence of four phases. In the first stage, 
ethnic identity is undifferentiated from others and unimportant to Black children. By 
the age of three years, however, Black children are able to differentiate between self 
and other and apportion expectancy and value, accordingly. They may apportion more 
value to their own attributes and to those who share them. Preference for those who 
share defining features, however, depends upon the extent to which identity is 
threatened or challenged in relation to others. Turner et al. (1987) argued for a 
continuum between self-categorisation as an individual and as a group member.  
According to optimal distinctiveness theory, individuals prefer to join groups, 
teams or collectives with particular properties (Brewer, 1977, 1991) while remaining 
distinctive, whether embedded in a collectivist culture or not. Movement along this 
continuum or orientation towards a particular reference group remain a function of the 
context within which these interactions occur and the social value allotted to group 
membership (Castelli, De Amicis & Sherman, 2007; Castelli & Tomerelli, 2007). 
Ethnic pride remains a function of the context within which race-related incidents 
occur and of the value society apportions to the identity, form and function of the 
reference group. Therefore, optimal distinctiveness or individuation depends upon 
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how the Black body is depicted in the literature and the media. Where the Black 
collective appears threatened or the value apportioned to Black people as a social 
group seems poor, the Black individual may abandon membership of his or her 
reference group and assume a different social identity, one that denies the pre-
existence of this reference group (Badea, Jetten, Czukor & Askevis-Leherpeux, 2010). 
Relational schemas in the cognitive sense and object relations in the analytical 
sense refer to the mental representations of people, places, things and spaces with 
which people interact in everyday life. These object relations are perceived as being 
good object relations (good relational schema) or bad object relations (bad relational 
schema) according to the extent to which they permit personal agency and autonomy 
(Westen, 1985). Object relations or relational schemas that frustrate the Black person 
are encoded and stored as dyad mental representations or relational schemas of the 
‘Black person and bad whole or part object’. It is not the object per se that frustrates, 
but the relationship of the subject with the perceptually bad whole or part object. 
Individuals form object relations with whoever can meet his needs until he can meet 
these independently. This requires cognitive and affective processes that enable the 
Black person to decide whether objects in the world gratify or frustrate his needs – the 
Black person as a judge (Weiner, 1991). In need-frustrating contexts, psychological 
defence mechanisms such as dissociation may be used to protect identity security until 
this need-frustrating information can be assimilated or accommodated, or until the 
needs and desires are realised (Greenberg, 1979).  
 
2.7 The ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position 
The paranoid-schizoid position emphasises the Black person’s dilemma in 
relation to the important love-object: the one who meets all his or her needs (Klein, 
1959/1993). Does he or she accept a positive racial identity attitude towards the 
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important whole or part love-object who appears to threaten his or her very existence, 
or does he or she risk losing the important whole or part love-object in the process? 
From an early age, children are wary of negative comments from their parents or 
peers; images in the media and teachers, who are often not Black, typically frustrate 
and threaten the identity security, personal agency and self-esteem of Black children 
(Banks, 1992; Castelli et al., 2009; Campbell, 2013; Maximé, 1980; Verkuyten, 2002). 
The Black person may feel unable to express her or himself positively through others 
or gain mastery over his or her lived world without threatening his or her relationship 
with the important or idealised love-object. Her or his frustration and fear of losing the 
important love-object may give way to existential angst as she or he attempts to 
assimilate or accommodate perceived negative race-related information (Sartre, 
1943/1956). In external, stable, uncontrollable contexts, the Black person may attempt 
to separate or dissociate from the bad whole, or part objects psychologically, or 
repress the feelings of anger and aggression she or he cannot express from waking 
consciousness, psychologically.  
 
2.8 Anger turned inwards - The ‘Depressed’ Position 
In his paper entitled Mourning and Melancholia, Freud (1917) suggested that 
depression is ‘anger turned inwards’. Black people who have been unable to deal 
constructively with the negative meanings attributed to some internal, stable and 
uncontrollable, often ambiguous aspect of their physical person, may direct the anger 
and frustration associated with such negative meanings and feelings towards the 
offending object – the Black body. Some Black people may be motivated to change 
their hair texture or skin tone to emulate the dominant ethnic group. Others are 
motivated to acquire personality characteristics alien to their reference group of origin, 
and to assume a different social identity, which denies the pre-existence of this 
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reference group (Badea, Jetten, Czukor & Askevis-Leherpeux, 2010). The mind 
appears to be ‘doing violence’ to itself as the Black individual ‘battles’ with mental 
representations of self in relation to need-frustrating others in the world he has 
constructed for himself. The Black person struggles to free him- or herself from the 
tension arising from relationships with need-frustrating others in the world; such 
challenges undermine his or her identity security, personal agency and self-esteem. 
Faced with imminent annihilation (being reduced to an object) or loss of the idealised 
loved-object, the Black child assumes the depressive position, which is akin to learned 
helplessness (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). Where the offending object is 
external to the self, the Black person may be perceived as being violent and aggressive 
in relation with others. 
 
2.9 Anger turned outwards 
Black people who are unable to deal constructively with the negative meanings 
assigned to stable, uncontrollable aspects of their physical person may direct the anger 
and frustration associated with such negative meanings and feelings towards the 
offending object, external to the self. Whether the locus of control is internal or 
external is important in the development of mental disorders (Neighbors et al., 1996). 
Identification with or idealisation of the abusive object may temper the fear of 
abandonment and annihilation, tempering the rageful response (Howarth, 2002). Black 
people who attribute their dejection and social exclusion to social structures such as 
‘the capitalist system’ are more likely to direct their anger and frustration towards 
perceived offending external, stable, uncontrollable social situations without 
experiencing guilt, shame or low self-esteem (Bentall et al., 1994; Croker & Major, 
1989; van Laar, 2000). When the offending object or perceived cause of all Black 
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people’s suffering is believed to be part of the self, the anger and aggression, guilt or 
shame may be directed towards the self, resulting in low self-esteem. 
   
2.10 Oscillating between the paranoid-schizoid and depressed position, 
contextually  
 
On accepting that there is no avoidance of or escape from these stable, 
uncontrollable, ambiguous contexts, the Black person may appear to oscillate between 
the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position, realising that he may lose 
the good whole or part idealised love-object(s). Whether anger and frustration are 
directed outwards or inwards, however, the outcome is likely to be detention in the 
mental health care or criminal justice system (Jarvis, 2008; Jones, Singer & Magill, 
2007). In situations from which there is no escape or avoidance, Black people face a 
dilemma they may or may not be motivated to resolve – Black person as a scientist 
(researcher) (Jaspers, 1951; Weiner, 1991, 2000). Where the Black person realises that 
the good and bad idealised whole or part love-objects are part of the same idealised 
love-object, he or she may be motivated to separate or dissociate from the bad aspects 
of idealised others. By so doing, he or she maintains self-esteem and is highly 
motivated to achieve the desired outcome in ambiguous, stable, uncontrollable 
contexts, despite low expectations and negative psychological outcomes (Crocker & 
Major, 1989; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa & Major, 1991). If the desired aim or goal is to 
be achieved, however, the susceptible Black person sensitised to perceived racism 
seems compelled to assume the paranoid-schizoid position. Transforming the 
paranoid-schizoid state to a depressed state in stable, uncontrollable contexts, in which 
the locus of control for the desired outcome is ambiguous, would indicate immanent 
fear of failure or the fear of losing whole or part of the idealised love-object. 
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Congruent with psychological distancing and separating bad whole or part 
idealised love-objects is the movement to avoid and escape from need-frustrating 
object relations that give rise to such intense feelings of anxiety, with a preference for 
relations with objects that do not. However, that which comforts is often also a source 
of consternation. In ambiguous, stable, uncontrollable contexts, Black people may be 
motivated to search for a cause for their presenting feelings. Where perceived racism 
is deemed the cause of their feelings, a flight or fight response might indicate trauma-
based experience. Where frustration gives way to anger, a fight response may be 
observed. Interestingly, Holtgraves and Stockdale (1997) found that low anxiety was 
equated with repressing traumatic experiences. Black people may not feel guilt, shame 
or self-depreciation in stable, uncontrollable contexts if the locus of control is external 
(van Laar, 2000; Weiner, 1986). Dissociation may, therefore, also be associated with 
compliance and high self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003). Black people who dissociate 
may appear calm and collected to observers (Sue, 1981). Whether such calmness 
comes from accepting that there are good and bad part idealised love-objects, 
indicative of giving up and identifying with the abuser, or evidence of denial and 
repression of unwanted thoughts and feelings, remains unclear.  
Where frustration in stable, uncontrollable, ambiguous contexts gives way to 
unbearable emotional distress, a flight response may be observed. The immersion-
emersion phase or state of racial identity (Helms, 1990, 1993; Vandiver et al., 2002; 
Worrell et al., 2004) reflects a flight from that which distresses, characterised by 
increased reference group orientation and anti-White sentiment. Black people 
expressing this state of racial identity appear to avoid contact with White people, and 
therefore are less likely to be confronted with the anti-Black sentiment. This flight 
response, however, does not necessarily mean that Black people who prefer to 
associate with people who share their phenotype are any more likely to value their 
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own Blackness than those who do not. The presumption that Black people may prefer 
to spend time with other Black people because they value their own Blackness is 
unsubstantiated. Black Caribbean people may be less likely to immerse themselves in 
Black Caribbean culture than Black African people are (Bécares et al., 2012).  
Further, in certain contexts, Black reference group orientation can invite equal 
amounts of persecution and ridicule (Banks, 1992; Morley, 2011; Shelton & Sellers, 
2000). Arguably, there should be some acknowledgement of the presence of Black and 
White people in order for anti-Black sentiment to be mirrored. Anti-Black sentiment 
following Black reference group orientation, however, may be more traumatic because 
it is unexpected. Here, the Black person fears the loss of the idealised Black love-
object but also hates it: the paranoid-schizoid position. In external, stable, 
uncontrollable, ambiguous situations, the Black individual may construct defence 
mechanisms such as dissociation to separate or dissociate from the bad parts of the 
idealised love-object, in order to manage the frustration, guilt, shame and anger. 
Where the Black individual comes to realise that she or he cannot separate the bad 
parts of the important love-objects in relational race-based mental representations 
without losing the whole love-object, she or he may assume the depressive position 
until assimilation or accommodation is possible. Black people’s response to perceived 
racism may vary according to the context within in which she or he finds him or 
herself because Black people differ when attributing cause and effect (Crocker et al., 
1991; Shelton & Sellers, 2000; van Laar, 2000).  
Ideally, the Black person should come to accept the probability that others will 
make value judgements about his or her physical attributes, and deal constructively 
with these judgements. In ambiguous, stable, uncontrollable contexts, the search for 
the cause of perceived racism may be located externally. In external, stable, 
ambiguous uncontrollable race-related contexts, the potential for perceived racism 
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may prove unavoidable. The Black person may believe that such experiences are less 
likely to occur in relation to those who value his or her defining features, and with 
those for whom race appears unimportant, but find that perceived racism is as likely to 
be experienced in Black reference group contexts. In their conceptualisation of the 
immersion-emersion state Worrell, Cross and Vandiver (2001) argue that paranoia or 
extreme wariness of the possibility of experiencing racism may override any changes 
in the environment (Bentall et al., 2001; Combs et al., 2006), tending towards a 
persistent racial identity attitude (Helms, 1984, 1993). Fear, low expectations and a 
reluctance to experience the emotional distress of perceived racism may prevent a 
change that would facilitate the achievement of desired aims or goals. In the next 
section, I will explore the cognitive dissonance that might arise between the perceived 
self and that mirrored by others.  
 
2.11 Importance of cognitive dissonance to racial identity 
According to social comparison theory, people are motivated to evaluate 
themselves in relation to others, where non-social comparisons are not possible 
(Festinger, 1954, 1957). Black people may avoid making social comparisons that 
threaten their self-esteem (Thornton & Arrowood, 1966). The reasons why Black 
people are motivated to compare themselves with White people remain unclear. The 
greatest cognitive dissonance between one's real and ideal self probably occurs in race-
related limit situations, in comparison with others who are highly dissimilar in 
attractiveness and social desirability (Suls, Martin & Wheeler, 2002). Black people 
may be motivated to compare themselves to White people if they believe that such a 
comparison may lead to self-improvement or enhancement (Collins, 1996). Situations 
may occur in which cognitive dissonance is greatest, and all possibilities appear 
equally attractive. For instance, being with the racist may be attractive if the racist has 
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something the Black person needs or wants: it may be attractive even if the racist 
devalues the Black person's phenotype if the need remains attainable (Collins, 1996). 
Similarly, Black people may be less motivated to compare themselves to non-White 
people, unless such a comparison proves self-protective (Wills, 1981).  
In limit situations in which race-based tension is low, the cognitive dissonance 
between real and ideal self is also low, and the Black individual is more likely to 
process social information that reflects a more tolerant attitude to his or her racial 
identity, irrespective of perceived attractiveness and familiarity. Conversely, in limit 
situations in which race-based tension is high, cognitive dissonance between real and 
ideal self is high and the Black individual is more likely to process mentally 
represented social information that reflects a less tolerant attitude to his or her racial 
identity, irrespective of perceived attractiveness and familiarity (Coetzee, Greeff, 
Stephen & Parrett, 2014; Fink, Bunse, Matts & Emiliano, 2012). The cognitive 
dissonance between real and ideal self depends upon prior observation or experience 
of being treated badly based on ascribed social factors, such as race – Black person as 
‘judge’ (Weiner, 1991, 2000, 2010). In judging that racial tension is high and that 
cognitive dissonance between real and ideal self is also high, the Black individual may 
be motivated to change his racial identity attitudes in the direction of least resistance, 
since this would result in the less cognitive dissonance between the perceived real and 
ideal self: it would be self-protective. To reach their full potential and remain 
integrated, Wilkins (2010) argues that Black people will need to learn how best to 
constructively manage the intense feelings arising in the context of race-related 
incidents. 
 Helms and Piper (1994) proposed that a constellation of ‘core’ attitudes 
underpins racial identity and that it is impossible to hold more than one attitudinal 
state of racial identity at the same time and place. Black people may present an attitude 
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to the world that reflects a constant sense of oppression and wariness (Combs et al., 
2006), but its expression is more likely in situations in which race is salient (Shelton & 
Sellers, 2000). Racial identity attitude expression, therefore, appears context-
dependent. The extent to which a Black individual adheres to his racial identity 
attitude, however, depends upon the extent to which doing so proves self-protective 
and -enhancing (Suls, Martin & Wheeler, 2002). When mentally represented, his 
relational race-based schemas will always reflect his perceived evaluation or appraisal 
of his physical form and the context in which he finds himself. Such racial identity 
attitudes might not necessarily indicate an internal predisposition to behave in that 
way. The perceived race-related incident, event or situation may be real and taken 
directly from personal experience, from the experiences of other people or from 
imagined and constructed experiences. The emotions aroused, however, are likely to 
reflect how the person feels about the race-related schemas he or she has co-
constructed in relation to others and the effect of perceived appraisal aspects of his or 
her Black body might garner in the future (Bandura, 1986; Weiner, 2000, 2010; van 
Laar, 2000). Where identity threat precedes social comparison, Black people are more 
likely to denigrate the situation or others, or to immerse themselves in Black culture 
(Wilkins, 2010; Helms & Parham, 1993). However, reference group orientation might 
not provide the self-protection the Black individual expects. The Black individual 
might not easily separate or dissociate from anti-Black sentiments, either physically or 
psychologically (Jost & Kuglanski, 2002; Malle, 2004). He or she may downplay or 
displace anti-Black sentiment to maintain some semblance of identity security and 
maintain his proximity to important others until successful assimilation and 
accommodation of anti-Black sentiment. In the next section, the Model of Nigrescence 
(Cross & Thomas, 1971) is explored from an integrated social cognition and object 
relations perspective. The Black body is central to experiencing racism, and to 
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allowing changes to racial identity attitudes according to which race-related schemas 
are activated in response to prevailing circumstances.  
 
2.12 Transforming the ‘Cross and Thomas model of Nigrescence.'  
 Horowitz (1988) defines a mental state as a recurrent pattern of cognitive-
affective experience constructed from enduring relational schemas of self and others. 
The Black individual may appear to have constructed relational race-based schemas 
and to express behaviour indicative of the activation of such schemas with associated 
affect (Cox, Abramson, Lyn, Devine, Devine, Hollon & Steven, 2012). The resulting 
action, however, can only represent one state or generalised position at a given time. 
The Black person moves into and out of four different racial identity states according 
to perceived concern about and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body and the 
context within which he or she finds him or herself (see Figure 3). When mentally 
represented, these race-based schemas determine how the Black individual is likely to 
evaluate him or herself in comparison with others, and how they are likely to interpret 
future experience (Crocker et al. 1991; Major & Crocker, 1989; Mendoza-Denton et 
al., 2002; Westen, 1985, 1991). The four relational racial identity states are 
characterised as follows: 
 
Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity - 1 (ORSCRIS1) 
describes a state of being whereby the Black individual develops a worldview 
according to which she or he is aware of her or his Blackness and how her or his 
physical features define her or his existence in relation to others. He or she co-
constructs mental representations of the self from those who make derogatory 
comments about others, having not yet personally experienced racial discrimination. 
She or he is aware of how other people think about Black people in general, but he or 
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she has not experienced racial discrimination directly. Racial discrimination happens 
‘out there’, to someone else, and has nothing to do with him or her. She or he is aware 
of her or his abilities and, so far, these abilities have allowed her or him to get to 
where she or he wants to in life without too much difficulty. She or he wants to believe 
that those with whom she or he associates, but is conscious of how others who share 
his or her defining features are denigrated value that within which she or he is 
embodied. This represents the primary ‘split’: the separation from ethnic group 
orientation and retraction into self for protection. He or she is aware of the 
mistreatment of those who share his or her phenotype, but there is no personal or 
emotional value attached to these indirect, relational race-based mental representations 
because those closest to her or him do not treat him or her in the same way. He or she 
co-constructs mental representations of the self in relation to those make derogatory 
comments about others with his or her phenotype 
Contextual Shift  
 
Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity - 2 (ORSCRIS2) 
describes a state of being whereby the Black person’s lived-world changes, such that 
he or she is brought into direct contact with people who express hate or disgust for 
people who share his or her defining features. The Black person enters a state of 
identity confusion, as his or her worldview is challenged and frustrated. Previously 
held views about being-in-the-world no longer seem valid. When mentally 
represented, the relational race-based schemata constructed in relation with racialising 
objects that challenge and frustrate her or his existence reflect the cognitive dissonance 
experienced between the real and ideal self. The denigration of his or her whole or part 
Black body may give rise to extreme emotional pain: the primal wound. He or she 
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wants to avoid, or escape from, the source of his or her trauma and emotional pain by 
immersing her or himself in Black cultural activities or repressing the libidinal drive to 
maintain close proximity to the important love-object, which has what he or she wants 
or needs. He or she cannot risk losing the important love-object. He or she assumes the 
paranoid-schizoid position, separating from experience those aspects of his or her self 
that may draw unwarranted attention from those who would denigrate him or her. The 
primary ‘split’, the paranoid-schizoid position, is now invested with personal emotion 
and triggered when primed in relation to a lived-world that appears constantly hostile.  
 
  Contextual shift   
 
Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity – 3 (ORSCRIS3) 
describes a state of being whereby the Black person flees from perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of his or her Black body, immersing him or herself in the 
Black culture in the hope that her or his defining features will be positively appraised. 
He or she co-constructs mental representations of the self-related to those who share 
his or her phenotype. He or she excludes those who challenge this view. She or he 
invites into his or her newly formed lived-world people who value his or her 
phenotype more than those of other ethnic groups. This need not be an absolute 
rejection of all things, not Black. However, the drive to locate a new, important love-
object – the ‘transferential-love-object’ – excludes that which had previously 
threatened or frustrated. In the absence of object constancy, other Black people 
become that transferential love-object, just as when the child is first abandoned by his 
or her mother at bedtime and seeks comfort in a blanket or his or her thumb. Without 
successful association with the transferential-love-object, the Black child is more 
likely to develop psychological defence mechanisms such as repression, introjection, 
100 
 
projection, projective identification, displacement and dissociation. When channelled 
inwards, the narcissistic rage invoked in the Black person threatens to destroy the 
important love-object and this may be transformed into physical or mental disorder or 
illness. Whereas anger turned inwards is more likely to result in detention under the 
Mental Health Act of 1983/2007 (Gilbert, 1992), anger turned outwards is more likely 
to result in detention in the penal system (Jones et al., 2007).  
 
  Contextual shift   
 
Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity – 4 (ORSCRIS4) 
describes a state of being whereby the Black person accommodates and assimilates the 
possibility that there may be aspects of her or his person to which others simply do not 
want to maintain proximity. He or she co-constructs mental representations of the self 
in relation to those who value their own phenotype as much as they do others. He or 
she realises there is no escaping that within which he or she is embodied or what his or 
her physicality might represent for others. He or she accepts that there will always be 
some people in the world who will set limits to the proximity his or her Black body 
may maintain, and the denied proximity may negatively impact the objectives he or 
she has set him or herself. Each new day will present anew the primal challenge of 
how to coexist with others who want to annihilate him or her. He or she appears 
thrown into limit situations, in which the possibilities and limitations will need 
repeatedly to be discovered and rediscovered in relation to a world that seems 
constantly hostile. He or she accepts that that within which she or he is embodied 
limits the extent to which self-evaluation through social comparison is possible: that 
is, he or she cannot transcend his everyday existence and become White. She or he 
also accepts that she or he can no more force others to maintain proximity to 
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something that disgusts them than he or she would feel obliged to force him or herself. 
The Black individual realises there are limits to the amount of change he or she can 
make to him or herself to reduce his or her own uncertainty. She or he is confronted 
with his or her sense of powerlessness in relation to the physical, social, personal and 
spiritual world and assumes the depressive position until better able to assimilate and 
accommodate challenging or frustrating race-related information. When he or she  
accepts that there are good and bad aspects of that within which she or he is embodied, 
she or he values his or her own racial identity.  
 According to my proposed integrated Object Relation and Social Cognition of 
Racial Identity (ORSCRIS) model, Black people will hold mental representations or 
relational race-based schemas of self that vary according to their perceived appraisal 
of the Black body and the prevailing social context within which the individual or 
group is situated in time and space. Which mental representations Black people 
operationalise and activate in relation to others is critical to the outcome of any 
subsequent or future social intercourse (Westen, 1985, 1991). The resulting behaviour 
might not necessarily represent a response to prevailing circumstances, but might 
rather indicate what is already believed to be true about the self in a given situation or 
represent an affect that a perceived appraisal might induce in the future. In Table 1, 
four different models of racial identity and their apparent relatedness are compared. 
My Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity model, however, 
attempts to identify those race-based mental representations that might underpin racial 
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3.1 Methodology  
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the relationship between mental 
representations of the subjective experience of racism, a form of “racialised body 
image disturbance” arising from perceived obsession with the Black body, low self-
esteem, and dissociative experiences, in a nonclinical sample of the UK’s Black 
population. As racism is a common experience for Black people in the UK (HORDSD, 
2008), and race-related stress could be traumatic for susceptible Black people (Bryant 
& Ocamp, 2005), a study on the relationship between race-based schemas and 
dissociative experiences in this population is justified. The thesis was based on the 
assumption that when race-related mental representations or race-related schemas are 
activated in new or different social situations, the stress of such experiences could 
undermine identity security, personal agency and confidence to the extent that 
dissociative experiences such as depersonalisation and derealisation ensue. For this 
thesis information was required about relational race-based schemas, perceived 
obsession with the Black body, self-depreciation and dissociative experiences, to be 
objectively collected, collated and analysed within the constraints of the resources that 
were available (Kumar, 2005). Before the proposed theoretical model could be tested, 
however, it was necessary to operationalise relational race-related schemas and 
perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body, as well as the 
effect of these perceived concerns on future interaction from an integrated object 
relations and social cognition perspective. I designed the ‘Object Relations and Social 
Cognition Model of Racial Identity (ORSCRIS)’ to measure relational race-based 
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schemas and the ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ to measure 
perceived concern and preoccupation (perceived obsession) with aspects of the Black 
body and the effect of that perceived obsession on future social interaction. 
Respondents were asked to specify those aspects of their Black bodies they believed 
concerned others during the validation of RBIDS, and their responsess were analysed 
thematically. The validity of my two new instruments will be tested in two separate 
studies, (i.e. Study 1 & 2, respectively).  
A series of studies using a within-subjects design with survey methods was 
employed to collect and analyse data. This information could have been acquired using 
qualitative methods, such as interviews or experiential focus groups. Exploring these 
concepts and the relationships between them would not, however, revealed the size of 
the prevalence of the proposed relational race-based schemas in the wider Black 
community. Interviews and focus groups would also have introduced the risk of 
undesirable researcher-participant effects, such as interviewer bias, social desirability 
and halo effects, indirectly influencing responses and confounding outcomes (Duffy, 
Smith, Terhanian & Bremer, 2005). If focus groups or other qualitative methods were 
used, objectivity would be compromised because there is always the risk of co-
construction of participant experiences in these situations. Although Fielding (1992) 
argued that co-construction should not detract from the potential value of qualitative 
research, and such issues could be addressed reflexively, Goodwin (1998) raised 
concerns about the implications of qualitative research in which theoretical 
assumptions are made about facts and events, and the strength of relationships derived 
from qualitative data. Establishing the strength of relationships is the aim of this 
thesis. 
Quantitative methods of data collection and analysis are often employed where 
the measurement of facts about people, events or things and establishing the strength 
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of the relationship is required. A within-subjects design with survey methods enabled 
the examination of the prevalence of a phenomenon in a sample population by 
surveying a cross-section of the sample population at one place in space and time 
(Babbie, 1989). Various data collection methods were considered to help manage 
common method biases (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Lee, 2003). A ‘within-subjects’ 
design using survey methods, however, minimises researcher influence on the 
outcome of the study. Therefore, three web-based multivariate questionnaires, which 
allowed the same subjects to be tested under similar conditions in cyberspace, were 
designed for use in this thesis. To my knowledge, using the internet to collect 
quantitative data from the chosen target population has not previously been attempted 
in the UK. 
Using the internet to collecting data has various advantages. It is cheaper, 
faster and more cost-effective than mailing questionnaires (O’Neill, 2004). Further, it 
provides the opportunity to reach a broader target population than might be possible 
with individuals or groups of investigators at a physical site (Carbonaro et al., 2002). 
Response rates to internet surveys are typically higher, and handling time is reduced 
(Kittleson, 1997). The validity and reliability of data obtained using web-based 
questionnaires do not differ significantly from those of data obtained using paper 
methods (Schmidt, 1997). Evidence suggests that web-based surveys that are easy to 
access, provide clear instructions for the completion of the questionnaire and require 
minimal computer skills from respondents are more readily completed (Eysenbach & 
Wyatt, 2002). This method would also offer respondents the opportunity to answer 
questions about themselves that they might have had difficulty speaking about to a 
researcher directly, and they could complete the questionnaire at times of the day 
when researchers would not be available on-site (Johns, Chen & Hall, 2003). 
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Difficulties would only be revealed, however, by asking participants to comment on 
them. 
Internet survey methods also present some disadvantages. Differences in 
computer equipment and the software used could confound results. Targeting Black people 
with access to the internet would exclude all those who did not have access. The 
proportion of the Black British population with a modest income, or who lack the 
necessary knowledge and skills to use the internet, might also be denied the 
opportunity to participate (Madden & Rainie, 2003). However, as most Black people 
in the UK live in inner-city areas (between 61% Black African and 78% Black people 
of African Caribbean descent in the UK, live in London alone; ONS, 2001), a 
significant proportion of Black people would have as much chance of gaining access 
to the internet as anybody else. Having to find the website on which the questionnaire 
was published might also limit the number of possible participants (Hewson, Yule, 
Laurent & Vogel, 2003). Every effort was made to advertise and promote the study on 
websites frequented by Black people, such as ethnicmedia.co.uk, lsbusu.ac.uk, the 
voice-online, ethnicnow.com, blackbritain.co.uk, blacknet.co.uk, blink.org.uk and 
blackukonline.com and in the local community to ensure that the sample of 
respondents fitted the selection criteria for inclusion in the study. 
 Various factors were considered when determining how best to encourage 
participation without compromising the integrity of the study. Different people have 
different interests in the virtual world, just as in the real world; for instance, 61% of 
the total population in the UK would have accessed the internet in the last three 
months to purchase goods, services or send emails (ONS, 2005). Selection bias and 
variability in computer hardware and internet software technology might reduce 
external validity, especially where colour was used in the survey (Eysenbach & Wyatt, 
2002). However, selection bias might also have been introduced into the study (the 
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volunteer effect) if respondents had been asked to complete paper questionnaires at 
selected sites. Similarly, incentives used to encourage interest may distort results, 
providing an inaccurate reflection of the issues under investigation. The 
overrepresentation of Black people in mental healthcare services in the UK was a hot 
topic of conversation among activists in the Black community; amendments to the 
Mental Health Act mean that the relationship between racism and mental health 
remains an important topic in the Black community.  
 Despite probable internet competence, some Black people might not be 
interested enough to participate (Sterne & Priore, 2000). Even with repeated 
approaches to website administrators asking them to encourage Black people to 
participate in the study, it was difficult to acquire a reasonably sized sample without 
spamming prospective participants (Rosenspan (2000) defines spamming as the 
indiscriminate distribution of messages without the permission of the recipient or 
considering the appropriateness of the message). Other university campuses were 
restricted in their ability to support the research by Data Protection and anti-spamming 
legislation. Ipsos Mori did not possess a panel of possible survey respondents 
representative of the ‘hard-to-reach groups’ that the researcher wanted to contact. 
Permission marketing was thus considered most appropriate (Krishnamurthy, 2001) 
and a web page was designed to incorporate this function. 
 The possibility of a low uptake by Black people was a real possibility, an 
‘email contact response approach’ could boost responses (Yun & Trumbo, 2000), 
although this approach also depends upon a pre-existing contact list and participant 
interest in the study. When consent rates were compared among groups matched on 
ethnicity and race in 20 different health research papers representing some 70,000 
people in the USA, Black and ethnic minority people were no less likely than those in 
other groups to participate in health-related research (Wendler et al., 2005). Research 
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topics that are salient and meaningful to Black populations tend to receive the most 
participation; for instance, Elford, Anderson, Bukutu and Ibrahim (2006) examined the 
experience of Black African people living with HIV in East London, using a paper 
questionnaire, and the response rate was 73% of eligible patients. On the other hand, 
Freeman et al. (2005), looking at paranoia in university students and using a web-
based questionnaire, only managed to recruit nine Black African students and nine 
Black African Caribbean students, as opposed to 98 Asian and 1001 white students. 
The researchers felt that as well as its relevance and importance to them; respondents 
might have been concerned about the implications of taking part in their study 
(Freeman et al., 2005).  
This research was actively promoted as a health-related study on websites 
frequented by Black people. Access to the internet in the UK across all age ranges has 
improved significantly since the year 2000 and is approximately 61% nationally 
(ONS, 2005), and every effort to obtain a representative sample of Black internet 
users. For example, if most potential participants were politically active and had 
independently logged on to the internet for specific purposes other than taking 
participating in this study, this would distort the sample affecting generalisability 
(Duffy et al., 2005). Hence, tests for skewness (a measure of lack of symmetry) and 
kurtosis (a measure of ‘peakedness’ relative to normal distribution) were conducted to 
determine how far removed from the sample mean the data was. 
 
3.2 Procedure 
Three multivariate questionnaires were designed and published online. To 
ensure that all the ethical issues were addressed, and to protect both the organisation 
and the researcher against the potential legal implications of neglecting to address 
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important ethical issues, the web-based questionnaire was submitted for ethics 
approval at Brunel University and ‘Charing Cross Ethics Committee before being 
published online. The Code of Ethics in Research (2006) of the British Psychological 
Society was applied throughout the study and any changes following this review were 
implemented (see Appendix P). With internet research, the researcher has less control 
over who participates. Implementations that are more complex have greater scope for 
procedural variability owing to the range of hardware and software configurations 
participants may be using (Birnbaum, 2004). Not being able to identify the 
respondents prevented measures to ensure that they did not belong to vulnerable 
groups and were not underage. However, the questionnaire was unlikely to distress 
respondents unduly (Bartram, 2005) and the contact details of the lead researcher were 
provided.  
 Potential respondents were reached by advertising on websites 
commonly frequented by Black people, such as New Nation, The Voice, 
Blackplanet.com, 100 Black Men and Colourful Network. Advertisements were 
published for a four-month period. The researcher offered to enter potential 
respondents into a prize draw as an incentive to participate. Responses to the 
questionnaire were to be sent directly by email to the researcher on submission and 
stored electronically on a computer to which only the researcher had access to, and, 
therefore, not held readily accessible to the public. Each response had a unique URL. 
The researcher could, therefore, check each response to determine whether the 
respondent lived in the UK or elsewhere. 
The questionnaires were tested for functionality before being published. The 
questionnaires were designed such that, so that potential participants were required to 
read an information sheet and a consent form, before being permitted to continue with 
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the questionnaire. Although participants were requested to answer all items on the 
three questionnaires, they were instructed to leave questions blank if they did not want 
to answer them. Also, participants were informed of their right to discontinue the 
questionnaire at any time by simply navigating away from the website. There was no 
facility for not answering any of the questions, but respondents could either indicate a 
‘nil response’ by leaving the item blank or agree to complete the entire questionnaire 
or none of it. The latter may have reduced the number of participants, but it was 
important to offer respondents all choices. A pilot study with 24 participants found 
that a single questionnaire would have met the criteria for within-group analysis, but 
the likelihood of recruiting that many people were slim. Therefore, three studies with 
three associated questionnaires were constructed rather than a single questionnaire 
comprising all instruments.  
Using a within-subjects design in Study 1, the validity of my ORSCRIS (and 
RBIDS was tested by examining the relationships between relational race-based 
schemas, perceived obsession with aspects of the Black body and its effect on future 
social interaction, low self-esteem and appraised racist events were examined. The 
web-based multivariate questionnaire comprised a demographic component, my 
RBIDS, my ORSCRIS, the Schedule of Racist Events (SRE) (Landrine & Klonoff, 
1996) and the Self-esteem Scale (RSES) (Rosenberg (1965).  
Using a within-subjects design in Study 2, the validity of my ORSCRIS and 
RBIDS was tested by examining the relationships between race-based schemas, 
perceived obsession with aspects of the Black body and its effect on future social 
interaction, low self-esteem, and race-based rejection sensitivity. The web-based 
multivariate questionnaire comprised a demographic component, my RBIDS, my 
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ORSCRIS, the Race-based Rejection Sensitivity Scale (RBRS) (Mendoza-Denton et 
al., 2002) and Rosenberg’s Self-esteem Scale (RSES) (1965).  
Using a within-subjects design in Study 3, the proposed theoretical model was 
tested by examining the relationships between race-based schemas, perceived 
obsession with aspects of the Black body and its effect on future social interaction, 
low self-esteem, and dissociative experiences. Questionnaire 3 comprised of a 
demographic component, my RBIDS, my ORSCRIS, Bernstein & Putnam’s (1986) 




 The data were analysed using SPSS 15.0. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EPA) 
using a regression method was conducted to A) determine whether a pattern of 
relationships among the variables could be identified (Floyd & Widamen, 1995), B) 
whether the scale items adequately loaded on to unique factors, and C) whether 
conceptual validity was achieved in relation to the theoretical model proposed (Cohen, 
1988). The inclusion of error variance and unrelated factors can occur when a non-
restricted method such as principal component extraction with varimax rotation is used 
to explore data (Gorsuch, 1997). Further, it would be unreasonable to assume that 
factors in each of the scales are unrelated (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum & Strahan, 
1999). Therefore, it was more appropriate to use Principal Axis Factor Analysis with 
an oblique rotation technique to disperse and isolate the factors identified. Overall, the 
analysis should not only show whether the instruments demonstrated internal 
reliability and structural validity, but also external reliability and validity. Convergent 
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and divergent validity would enable the researcher to use the scales to substantiate the 
proposed theoretical model (Cohen, 1988). 
  EFA of each scale and subscale used should not only determine whether each 
scale was comprised of items that best reflected each dimension of the scale used, but 
also determine whether each scale hung together as a coherent structure; that is, 
demonstrated structural or conceptual validity. Factor retention was based on a 
minimum loading of three items (Floyd & Widamen, 1995), and a minimum factor 
coefficient of 0.45 for each item (Comrey & Lee, 1992). Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) was conducted to test hypotheses corresponding to prior theoretical notions 
underlying my ORSCRIS and RBIDS. Adequate convergent and divergent validity of 
the two scales compared to the SRE (Landrine & Klonoff, 1996) and RBRS 
(Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002) were anticipated. This would demonstrate that 
relational race-based schemas, perceived concern and preoccupation with the Black 
body, the effect of perceived concern, and preoccupation with the Black body on 
social interaction correlated significantly with, and contributed to Appraised Acute 
Racist Events and Appraised Chronic Racist Events (Landrine & Klonoff, 1996) 
reported by Black people in the UK.   
 Cronbach’s (1951) alpha coefficient was used to determine the internal 
reliability of the scales. Tests of normalcy and homogeneity of variance of the 
outcome measures preceded multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
planned contrasts in the sample when differentiated according to gender and ethnicity. 
Categorical variables such as income were recoded into dichotomous one by assigning 
a dummy variable 1 for values below the median and a dummy value to 2 for values 
above the median. Hierarchical regression models were used to determine the extent to 
which the measures explained variance in dissociative experiences (Floyd & 
Widamen, 1995). Path analysis using structural equation modelling (LISREL 8.8) 
114 
 
confirmed predictor relations between expected and observed variables. Path analysis 
should indicate whether there was any evidence to support the proposed theoretical 
model: that preoccupation with perceived concern with the Black body and derogatory 
race-based relational schemas predict the frequency of reported dissociative 
experiences. The parameters in confirmatory factor analysis (factor pattern, factor 
covariance and uniqueness) are typically estimated using maximum likelihood (ML) 
factors of presenting factors contributing to the observed variance. Maximum 
likelihood factor analysis determined the goodness-of-fit of the proposed factor 
structure to confirm the structure of the proposed theoretical model. Figure 4 
illustrates how the subjective experience of racism is co-constructed in relation to 
others, giving rise to race-based relational schemas of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body, the effect of perceived concern and preoccupation 
with the Black body on future social interaction, low self-esteem and dissociative 
experiences. 
 
3.4 Expected outcome 
In Study 1, derogatory race-based schemas, perceived obsession with aspects 
of the Black body and its effect on future social interaction, low self-esteem will have 
a significantly large positive effect on reported appraised acute and chronic racist 
events thus validating ORSCRIS and RBIDS. In Study 2, derogatory race-based 
schemas, perceived obsession with aspects of the Black body and its effect on future 
social interaction, low self-esteem will have a significantly large positive effect on 
reported race-based rejection sensitivity thus validating ORSCRIS and RBIDS. In 
Study 3, derogatory race-related schemas, perceived obsession with aspects of the 
Black body and its effect on future social interaction, low self-esteem will have a 
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significantly large positive effect on the reported frequency of dissociative experiences 





































Validation of my ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity 
Scale (ORSCRIS)’ using Landrine & Klonoff’s (1996) ‘Schedule of Racist 
Events (SRE)’ – Study 1 
 
Using a within-subjects design in study 1, Landrine and Klonoff’s (1996) 
‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’ tested convergent and discriminant validity of my 
'Object Relations and Social Cognition of Race-related Incidents Scale (ORSCRIS)' 
and my 'Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)'. The main hypotheses are 
that: 
(1) Perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body and 
effect of this perceived obsession with the Black body on future social interaction with 
be significantly associated with and contribute to the variance in appraised acute and 
chronic racist events, (i.e., Hypotheses 1-2 & 7); 
 (2). Derogatory race-related schemas about self or others would be 
significantly correlated with, and contribute to the variance of, acute and chronic racist 
events, (i.e., Hypotheses, 2-6 & 7);  
 
4.1 Hypotheses – Study 1: 
1) Significant positive correlations will be observed between reported ‘Appraised 
Acute Racist Events (SRE), and (1) perceived concern and preoccupation with 
the aspects of the Black body (RBIDS); and (2) the effect of perceived concern 
and preoccupation on future social interaction components of the ‘Racialised 
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body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ that cannot be better explained by 
variation in age, gender, marital status, annual income, academic achievement, 
or skin tone; 
2) Significant positive correlations will be observed  between  reported 
‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE), and (1) perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the aspects of the Black  body (RBIDS); and (2) the effect 
of perceived concern on social interaction (RBIDS)’ that cannot be better 
explained by variation in age, gender, marital status, annual income, academic 
achievement, or skin tone; 
3) Significant positive correlations will be observed between reported ‘Appraised 
Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, and 1) reported mental representations of self in 
relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments about others 
(ORSCRIS1); and 2) mental representations of self in relation with people who 
made derogatory race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS2) that cannot be 
better explained by variation in age, gender, marital status, annual income, 
academic achievement, or skin tone; 
4) Significant negative correlations will be observed between ‘Appraised Acute 
Racist Events (SRE), and 1) reported mental representations of self in relation 
with people who made positive race-related comments about others 
(ORSCRIS3), and 2)reported mental representations of self in relation with 
people who valued each their own ethnicity as much as he or she did others 
(ORSCRIS4) that cannot be better explained by variation in age, gender, 
marital status, annual income, academic achievement, or skin tone; 
5) Significant positive correlations will be observed between ‘Appraised Chronic 
Racist Events’, and 1) reported mental representations of self in relation with 
people who make derogatory race-related comments about others 
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(ORSCRIS1), and 2) reported mental representations of self in relation with 
people who make derogatory race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS2) 
that cannot be better explained by variation in age, gender, marital status, 
annual income, academic achievement, or skin tone; 
6) Significant negative correlations will be observed between ‘Appraised Chronic 
Racist Events ( SRE)’, and 1) reported mental representations of self in relation 
with people who made positive race-related comments about others 
(ORSCRIS3); and 2) reported mental representations of self in relation with 
people who value their own racial as much as they do others (ORSCRIS4) that 
cannot be better explained  by variation in age, gender, marital status, annual 
income, academic achievement, or skin tone; 
7) Reported  mental representations of self in relation with people who make 
derogatory race-related comments about others (ORSCRIS1),  reported mental 
representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory race-
related comments about self (ORSCRIS2), perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the aspects of the Black body, the effect of perceived 
concern and preoccupation with the Black body on social interaction (RBIDS)  
and low self-esteem will significantly contribute to the variance of reported 
‘Appraised Acute and Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’. 
 
4.2  Respondents 
Of the 22 (39.3%) Black male respondents and 34 (60.7%) Black female 
respondents who responded to questionnaire 1, 26 (46.4%) described themselves as 
Black people African Caribbean descent, 20 (35.7%) Black people of African descent, 
and 10 (17.8%) as mixed Black descent. The age of the respondents ranged from 19-
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57 years, and the mean age was 36.2 years (SD = 13.12 years), and median age = 39.5 
years.   
Self-reported estimates of skin tones ranged from light colouration (denoted 20 
on the von Luschan (1922) chromatic chart) to darker colouration (denoted 36 on the 
von Luschan (1922) chromatic chart). There was very little difference between the 
mean skin tone (M = 27.52, SD = 3.43), and the median skin tone reported was 28.00 
(denoted 28 on the von Luschan’s (1922) chromatic scale. 
Fifteen (26.8%) of Black respondents reported being married or cohabiting, 
five (9.0%) were either separated or divorced, and 36 (64.2%) reported being single. 
Twenty-six (46.4%) Black respondents reported educational qualifications below 
degree level, and 30 (53.6%) reported educational qualifications of degree level and 
above. Twenty-six (44.4%) reported annual incomes of less than £20,000 per annum, 
and 30 (53.6%) reported annual incomes of more than £20,000 per annum. The mean 
annual income for the sample population was £24,500 per annum, SD = £20,000 per 
annum. The median annual income was £20,000 per annum. 
 
4.3 Materials: 
 Questionnaire 1 comprised of a demographic component and outcome 
component. The categorical or descriptive variables were chosen were age, gender, 
and ethnicity, the level of academic achievement, accessible annual income, and 
variation in skin tone. The skin tones used were copied from the original chart box per 
box using the paint programme’s dropper tool from Felix von Luschan’s (1922) book, 
‘Voelker, Rassen, and Sprachen’. These variables have been shown to influence the 
subjective experience of racism (Coard et al., 2001; Hajnis et al., 1994; Hughes & 
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Hertel, 1990; Tinsley & Jacobs, 2006), and therefore, likely to exert some effect on the 
following outcome measures.  
  My ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ is a 9-item self-
report scale, devised to measure: (1) perceived concern and preoccupation (perceived 
obsession) with aspects of the Black body; and, (2) perceived concern and 
preoccupation (perceived obsession) with aspects of the Black Body on future social 
interaction. For item 1, respondents were required to indicate whether they were ‘not 
at all concerned’ to ‘extremely concerned’ on a 5-point Likert scale. In item 3, 
respondents were required to indicate whether they were ‘not at all preoccupied’ to 
‘extremely preoccupied’ on a 5-point Likert scale. In item 5, respondents were 
required to indicate whether they were experienced ‘no distress’ to ‘extreme and 
disabling distress’ on a 5-point Likert scale. In items 6-9, respondents were required to 
indicate whether there was; ‘no interference’ to ‘extreme interference’ on a 5-Likert 
scale. Scores for each item ranged from zero to four and calculated by taking the 
average of all scores. Higher scores indicated agreement with the proposed concept, 
and lower scores indicated disagreement with the proposed concept. The scale 
possessed good internal reliability and validity. Reliability analysis indicated that the 
Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient alpha for (1) perceived concerns and 
preoccupations about the Black body, α = .75; and (2) the effects of perceived 
concerns and preoccupations on future social interaction, α = .83.  
 My ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition Scale of Racial Identity Scale 
(ORSCRIS)’ is a 20-item self-report tool comprised of four categories of race-based 
relational mental representations or schemata that might underpin racial identity 
attitudes using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; 
midpoint 4 = neither agree nor disagree). The first category ORSCRIS1 attempted to 
reflect mental representations of self in relation people who made derogatory race-
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related comments about other people. The second category, ORSCRIS2, attempted to 
reflect those mental representations of self in relation people who made derogatory 
race-related comments about self. The third category, ‘ORSCRIS3’ attempted to 
reflect mental representations of self in relation other Black people who made positive 
race-related comments about self; and the fourth category ‘ORSCRIS4 attempted to 
reflect those mental representations of self in relation people who appreciate their 
racial identity as much as do that of others. Scores ranged from 1-7 on each subscale. 
The score for each subscale was averaged. Higher scores indicated agreement with the 
proposed concept, and lower scores indicated disagreement with the proposed concept. 
Reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient alpha for 
each subscale was reasonable, ORSCRIS1, α = .70; ORSCRIS2, α = .86; ORSCRIS3, 
α = .73; ORSCRIS4, α = .80, respectively 
 Landrine and Klonoff’s (1996) ‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’ is 18-item 
self-report scale comprising three subscales to that measures the frequency of racist 
events in Black people over (1) the last year, and (2) over a lifetime, and (3) the extent 
to which they found these events distressing. For instance, item 1) States: How many 
times have you been treated unfairly by teachers and professors because you are 
Black in the past year? The individual answers using a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from one (the event never happened to me) to six (the event happened all the time). 
The individual then appraises each event as an indication of the events stressfulness. 
Each appraisal item is answered using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from one (not 
stressful at all) to six (extremely stressful). Scores were derived by multiplying the 
frequency of the event by the extent to which respondents found the event stressful 
(appraisal). Scores range from 18 to 108 on each subscale, and the Cronbach’s (1951) 
correlation coefficient alpha for Recent Racist Events, α = .95; Lifetime Racist Events, 
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α = .95; and Appraisal, α = .94, respectively (Landrine & Klonoff, 1996; Klonoff, 
Landrine & Ullman, 1999).  
 There has been some debate as to whether Landrine and Klonoff’s (1996) 
‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’ measures different types of racism, (e.g., Utsey, 
1998). Greer (2010) applied Harrell’s (2000) typology for race-related stress and 
concluded that SRE was comprised of three types of race-related stressors. 1) Seven 
items are pertaining to race-related stress in institutions, (i.e., chronic contextual race-
related stress). 2) Six items related to daily degradation or slights because of one's 
ascribed race, (i.e., microstressors), and 3) three items related to acute and time-limited 
racism-related stress). All other items were removed from confirmatory factor analysis 
because they did not fit with the subjective experience of racism or implied any coping 
strategy. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha for acute/recent racist events, chronic/lifetime racist 
events, and appraisal were .87, .92, and .92 respectively were found in the Greer 
(2010) original model. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha, α = .85 for chronic-contextual stress, 
α = .84 for microstressors, α = .71 for racism-related events in Greer’s (2010) 
alternative model, and an alternative model based unfair treatment alone was used 
here. In study 1, Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted on all items and three 
times were extracted for further analysis. Appraised chronic-contextual race-related 
stress in the last year, (i.e., items 7ab, 8ab, 9ab, 10ab, 11ab, 15ab, 16ab, 17ab; 18ab); 
Appraised acute time-limited racist events in the last year, (i.e., items 1ab, 2ab, 3ab, 
4ab, 5ab, 6ab, and their appraisal). Reliability analysis revealed Cronbach’s (1951) 
alpha for: 1) Appraised Recent Acute Racist Events, α = .86; and, 2) Appraised 
Chronic Racist Events, α = .93, respectively. 
 Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)’ is a 10-item unidimensional 
instrument devised to measure global self-esteem in adolescents (See Appendix K). 
The scale, however, has been found to measure feelings of self-worth in adults across 
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different ethnic and cultural groups and between male and female reliably 
(Greenberger, Chuansheng, Dmitrieva & Farrugia, 2003). Respondents were asked to 
indicate on the 4-point Likert scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with ten 
statements related to overall feelings of self-worth. For instance, respondents were 
asked: ‘At times I think I am no good at all’, or ‘I feel that I have some good 
qualities’. There are equal numbers of positively and negatively worded items in the 
scale, and this reflects its two-factor structure, (i.e., self-appreciation and self-
deprecation). The scale has been found to possess good internal consistency with 
Cronbach’s alpha for various samples typically in the range of 0.77 to 0.88 
(Rosenberg, 1986; Schmidt & Allik, 2005), and good reliability with test-retest 
correlations typically in the range of 0.82 to 0.88 in general populations (Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1993). Lockett & Harrell (2003) used this scale reliably in Black populations, 
reporting two-dimensional structure: (1) self-appreciation, and (2) self-depreciation, 
respectively.  
 
4.4 Sample Size 
  The sample size should have sufficient power to reduce the probability of 
achieving false positive (Type 1 error), and the possibility of false negative effects 
(Type 2 error), and hence, rejecting the null hypothesis out of turn. The null 
hypothesis was that there would be no correlation between relational race-based 
schema might underpin ethnic identity, or racialised body image disturbance, and the 
reported appraised racist events, p < .05. An appropriate sample size was computed 
using G*Power to determine the likelihood of detecting a small difference in the 
outcome measures. For an a priori analysis using 11 variables, the F-ratio in multiple 
regressions may be determined from a total sample size of 146 respondents would be 
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sufficient to stand a 95% chance of detecting a small effect size ( .15)  on the primary 
outcome measure, (i.e., Landrine & Klonoff  (1996) ‘Schedule of racist events (SRE)), 
in the sample population. Tables 2 & 3 shows a summary of scales used and 
abbreviations, and demographic variables, labels and dummy values used. 
 
4.5 Response rate 
 Five thousand, eight hundred, and sixty-nine people visited the website. One 
hundred and fifty-seven potential respondents did not answer or left the item blank. 
Only 56 people completed to Questionnaire 1 comprised of a demographic component, 
my ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’, my ‘Object Relations and 
Social Cognition of Racial Identity Scale (ORSCRIS)’, Landrine and Klonoff’s (1996) 
‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’, and Rosenberg’s (1965) ‘Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES)’. No non-UK nationals were included for analysis, (i.e., response rate overall 












Object Relations & Social Cognition of Racial Identity Scale ORSCRIS 
Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale RBIDS 
Schedule of Racist Events SRE 
Race-based Rejection Sensitivity Scale RBRS 
Dissociative Experiences Scale II DESII 
Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale RSES 
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Black African 3 
Black Caribbean 4 
Arab middle eastern 5 
Mixed Black African & Caribbean 6 
Mixed Black African & White 7 
Mixed Black African & Asian 8 
Mixed Black African & Middle Eastern 9 
Mixed Black Caribbean & white 10 
Mixed Black Caribbean & Asian 11 
Mixed Black Caribbean & Middle Eastern 12 
Equal time with friends from all ethnic groups 13 





4.6 Summary of response to the quantitative components of the 
Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBID) 
 
My ‘Racialised Body Image Scale (RBIDS)’ is comprised of seven quantitative 
items measured using a 5-point Likert scale, and two qualitative components. Scores 
range from zero to four. When asked ‘do other people appear concerned about the 
appearance of any part of your body, which they consider, especially unattractive?’ 12 
(12%) respondents reported that other people did not appear concerned or preoccupied 
with the appearance of any part of your body which they consider, especially 
unattractive. Twenty-eight (28%) reported that other people appeared somewhat 
concerned or preoccupied with the appearance of any part of your body which they 
consider especially unattractive. Nine (9%) reported that appeared moderately 
concerned or preoccupied. Five (5%) reported that other people appeared very 
concerned or preoccupied. Two (2%) reported that other people appeared extremely 
concerned or preoccupied. 
 
4.7 Summary of responses to qualitative components of my Racialised 
Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)  
 
A semantic approach to thematic analysis was used to identify, analyse and 
reporting patterns (themes) that represent the sum of qualitative data received. 
Analysis indicated that three themes or patterns of meaning could be extracted from 
the data when respondents were asked ‘what respondents felt other people’s concerns 
were’. and the theme's coded accordingly. The three codes or themes indicated 
perceived concerns and preoccupations with physical form or body, skin tone, or hair 
texture is summarised in were identified in Table 4. I did not attempt to go beyond 
what respondents had said, semantically.  
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Of the responses received, 16 (28.6%) thought that other people were 
concerned with their skin tone. Ten (17.9%) thought that other people were concerned 
with their hair texture. Thirty (53.6%) thought that others were concerned with their 
physical shapes such as large breast size; weight, or size and shape of the backside, the 














1) Physical form: 
 
 
‘Got a broad nose and fuller lips.'     
‘Big nose.' 
‘Extra-large lips and batty.'    
‘My bottoms too big.' 
‘Husband says I have a ridge at the top of my bottom.' 
‘My nose isn’t straight like some.'                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
2) Skin Tone: 
 
‘Lightness/darkness of skin.'  
‘Well as a full Black person, my body is very light. People 
tease me and make jokes about being a white girl all the 
time.' 
‘Not currently, but mother was very rude about people with 
dark skin.' 
‘How dark I am.'   
‘The general fact I am Black.' 
 
3) Hair Texture: 
 
‘I am asserting my ethnicity by leaving my hair natural, and 
not’ chemically straightening 
‘Thinning hair ‘, ‘baldness.' 
‘Dreadlocks. They are either patronising or over friendly or 
a little anxious.' 
‘Usually, my hair texture because it is (dread) locks. My 







When asked, ‘If you are at least somewhat concerned, do these concerns 
preoccupy you? That is, you think about them a lot, and they are hard to stop thinking 
about?’ Twenty-five (44.5%) of respondents said that they were not at all preoccupied 
with the concerns other people might have about their physical bodies. Eighteen (32%) 
said that they were somewhat preoccupied, seven (12.5%) said that they were 
moderately preoccupied. Five (8.9%) reported that they were very preoccupied, and 
one (1.8%) reported being extremely preoccupied. A semantic approach to thematic 
analysis was used to identify, analyse and reporting patterns (themes) that represent 
the sum of qualitative data received. Analysis indicated that seven themes or patterns 
of meaning could be extracted from the data when respondents were asked ‘what effect 
their preoccupation with the concerns of others has had on their lives’. The seven 
codes or themes indicated the effect of perceived concerns and preoccupations with 
physical form or body, skin tone, or hair texture on future social interaction, (e.g., lack 
of self-confidence or desire to fix their physical form, hair texture or skin tone),  are 
summarised in were identified in Table 5. I did not attempt to go beyond what 











1) Excessive wariness  
 
 
‘Always think that they might be staring at 
me.' 
‘I’m careful about where I go.'  
‘I’m terrified to go shopping or taking the 
bus.' 
 
2) Identity Insecurity and Confusion 
 
‘A difficult childhood, not knowing where I 
belonged.' 
‘Insecurities about oneself.' 
 




‘Every time I have it (hair) treated I worry 
that I’ll be blinded or scar and go 
bald…it’s like emotional torture. It’s as 
though I am angry with people who don’t 




‘When I am in a negative mood, my wish to 
be slimmer frustrates me and negates my 
sense of self-worth/attractiveness.' 
‘It has a frustrating effect. I feel I have to 
battle for acceptance constantly and it’s 
even harder for a partner.' 
 
5) Lack of confidence 
 
‘Makes me feel inhibited.' 
‘Very low confidence.' 
‘I’m not the most confident of people.' 
‘Self-conscious.' 
 
6) Interfered with life chances 
 
‘I feel it has definitely hindered my 
progress at work and in social situations.' 
‘Stops me from reaching some potential.' 
‘They tried to make schooling difficulty, 
and seemed to put obstacles in my way.' 
 
7) Desire to “fix it.” 
 
‘Slightly conscious of what I have put on.' 
‘Will be booking surgery to correct my 
nose.'  
‘I’m currently doing an exercise regime 
with my partner.' 




Of the responses received, 18 (32.1%) reported feelings of frustration, anxiety, 
or depression. Eleven (19.6%) respondents reported a desire to fix or modify those 
aspects of themselves they believed concerned and preoccupied with other people. 
Nine (16.1%) reported a lack of confidence. Six (10.7%) reported interference with 
life chances. Four (7.1%) respondents reported excessive wariness of others. Six 
(2.3%) reported identity insecurity and confusion. Two (3.6%) reported fear of 
damage due to skin and hair treatments.  
Of the responses received, 11 (19.6%) reported no distress at all. Thirty-three 
(57.1%) reported mild distress. Nine (16.1%) reported moderate distress. Two (3.6%) 
reported severe distress and one (1.8 %) reported extreme distress.  
Of the responses received, 31 (55.3%) reported not being socially impaired at 
all. Twenty-two (39.3%) reported mild social impairment. Three (5.4%) reported 
moderate social impairment. One hundred and sixty-six did not respond to this item.  
Of the responses received, 42 (75%) no reported interference with social 
relationships. Twelve (21.4%) reported mild interference with relationships. One 
(1.5%) reported moderate interference with social relationships, and one (1.5%) 
reported extreme interference with social relationships.  
Of the responses received, 45 (80.3%) reported perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body never interfered with schoolwork or job. Ten 
(15.9%) reported occasional interference with schoolwork of job, and one (1.6%) 
reported moderate interference with schoolwork or job.  
Of the responses received, 49 (87.5%) reported no avoidance of social settings. 
Five (8.9%) reported occasional avoidance of social settings. Two (3.6%) often 




4.8 Exploratory Factor Analysis of my Racialised Body Image 
Disturbance Scale (RBIDS) 
 
My ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ is comprised of 
seven quantitative items and two qualitative data. Unlike principal components 
analysis with varimax rotation, Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with a direct oblimin 
rotation assumes that all items are related removes the unique variance from the 
diagonal of the covariance matrix by setting the estimated commonality of each item 
to the squared multiple correlations of that item and (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Prior to 
performing PAF, the suitability for factor analysis was assessed, and the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.82, therefore exceeding the value 
of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1974), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached 
statistical significance supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix, χ
2 
= 
1277.8,  p =.01. In Table 6, two factors exceeded an Eigenvalue of one and accounted 
for ≥ 9 % of the total variance (65.8). In Table 7, all items loaded onto two factors and 
produced coefficients ranging from 0.531 to 0.960. Stevens (1992) indicated that the 
level of acceptable factor loading was set at ≥ 0.4. Therefore, only factor loadings ≥ 
0.5 were retained 
Inspection of the Scree plot of Eigenvalues (Cattell, 1966) in Figure 5 
indicated that two factors should be retained for further analysis. In Table 8, Monte 
Carlo’s Parallel Analysis supported the resolution. Using  (PCA) which showed that 
only two components:  (1) perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the 
Black body, and (2) effect of perceived concern and preoccupation about the Black 
body on future social interaction with Eigenvalues exceeding the corresponding 
criterion with values for randomly generated data of the same size should be retained 
(Lautenschlager, 1989). Reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach’s (1951) alpha for 
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(1) perceived concern and preoccupations with the Black body, α = .75; and (2) effect 
of perceived concern and preoccupation with the Black body on future social 








































































2 1.33 19.04 76.25   .84 12.06 65.78 
3  .62  8.87 85.12    
4  .54  7.67 92.79    
5   .27  3.83 96.62    























Has other people's apparent concerns with your 
appearance interfered with your schoolwork or 
job? 
.960  
Do you ever avoid things because of other 
people's concerns with your physical 
appearance? 
.953  
Have other people's apparent concerns interfered 
with relationships? 
.906  
Has other people's apparent concerns with your 
appearance socially impaired you? 
.667 .308 
Do other people appear concerned about the 
appearance of some part of your body, which 
they consider especially unattractive? 
 .697 
If, you are at least somewhat concerned, do 
these concerns preoccupy you? That is, you 
think about them a lot, and they are hard to stop 
thinking about? 
 .570 
Have other people's apparent concerns with your 
appearance often caused you a lot of distress, 









Comparison of Eigenvalues from Monte Carlo (PCA), and corresponding 






















2 1.33 1.26 Accept 
3    .62 1.19 Reject 
4    .54 1.13 Reject 
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4.9 Summary of responses to my ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition 




Summary of Responses to ORSCRIS1  
Variable Disagreed 











ORSCRIS1b 65.0% 14.0% 20.1% 








Note: ORSCRIS1 represented the view that most of the mental representations that 
come to mind are of self with people who make derogatory race-related comments 
about others, and was comprised of four items. The percentage of the total number of 























ORSCRIS2b 67.2% 9.8% 32.7% 








Note: ORSCRIS2 represented the view that most of the mental representations that 
come to mind are of me with people who make derogatory race-related comments 
about self, and was comprised of four items. The percentage of the total number of 























ORSCRIS3b 56.7% 13.5% 27.8% 








Note: ORSCRIS3 represented the view that most of the mental representations that 
come to mind are of me with people who make positive race-related comments about 
self, and was comprised of four items. The percentage of the total number of 























ORSCRIS4b 18.7% 12.5% 68.8% 










Note: ORSCRIS4 represented the view that most of the mental representations that 
come to mind are of me with people who make positive race-related comments about 
self, and was comprised of four items. The percentage of the total number of 






4.10 Factor Analysis of my Object Relations and Social Cognition 
Identity Scale (ORSCRIS) 
 
My ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition Identity Scale’ (ORSCRIS) is 
comprised of four subscales. Therefore, each subscale was analysed separately. 
Principal axis factoring (PAF) with direct oblimin rotation was used to test each 
subclass structure and reduce the number of items, if necessary. Unlike principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation, PAF removes the unique variance from 
the diagonal of the covariance matrix by setting the estimated commonality of each 
item to the squared multiple correlations of that item and assumes that all items are 
unrelated (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Prior to performing PAF, the suitability for factor 
analysis was assessed, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for 
ORSCRIS was .811, thus  exceeding the value of 0.60 (Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s Test 
of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance, χ2
 
(120) 1352.94, p = 
0.01, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. In Table 13, all items 
loaded onto four factors and produced coefficients ranging from 0.45 to 0.84.  In Table 
14, four factors exceeded an Eigenvalue of one, and it accounted for 50.48% of the 
variance. In Figure 6, an inspection of the Scree plot of Eigenvalues (Cattell, 1966) 
indicated that four factors should be retained for further analysis. Stevens (1992) 
indicated that the level of acceptable factor loading should be set at ≥ 0.5. Therefore, 
where two or more items appear to be cross-loaded, the highest factor loading ≥ 0.4 
was retained  In Table 15, this solution was confirmed using Monte Carlo (PCA) 
Parallel Analysis, indicated that four-factor should be retained. Reliability analysis 
indicated that Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient for each subscale was 
reasonable, ORSCRIS1, α = .70; ORSCRIS2, α = .86; ORSCRIS3, α = .73; 











































make insulting remarks about 
some aspect of my Black 
body 
 
.837       
 
ORSCRIS2b-People who tell 
me how much they don't like 
the darkness of my skin 
colour, my lips or texture of 
texture. 
. 
.775       
 
ORSCRIS2c-People who will 
not let me take part in games 
or other social activities 
because of the skin colour or 
what other people might 
think about it. 
 
.762       
 
ORSCRIS2d-People who say 
insulting things about some 
part of my Black body, and 
don't seem to care if it makes 
me feel unwanted and 
unhappy 
. 
.674       
 
ORSCRIS4c-People who 
often make positive 
statements about the physical 
bodies of people from 
different racial groupings 
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accept racial difference, and 
encourage socialising 






ORSCRIS4a-People who like 
being around people from 
different racial backgrounds 
 
  .686     
 
ORSCRIS4b-People who 
value their own individual 
racial identity, as much as 
they do, others 
 
  .568    
 
ORSCRIS3c-People who 
often make more positive 
remarks about the colour of 
my skin, the shape of my 
nose, texture of my hair, or 
thickness of my lips, than 
they do about people from 
other racial backgrounds. 
 
    .695   
 
ORSCRIS3b-People who 
rarely, if ever, socialise with 
anyone who is not Black 
 
    .683   
 
ORSCRIS3d-People who 
made you feel valued as 
Black person to the exclusion 
of people from other racial 
backgrounds. 
 
    .669   
 
ORSCRIS3a-People who are 
always of Black African 
Caribbean and/or African 
descent 
 
    .467   
 
ORSCRIS3d-People who 
made you feel valued as 
Black person to the exclusion 
of people from other racial 
backgrounds. 
 




ORSCRIS1a-People are more 
interested in what I do for a 
living than me, as an Black 
person 
 
.264     .544 
 
ORSCRIS1b-People who 
make racist comments about 
other Black people, but it's 
not serious, and it does not 
involve me. 
 
     .509 
 
ORSCRIS1c-People who 
make insulting remarks about 
other Black people, but they 
always make a point of 
excluding me 
.258     .448 
 
 
Notes: Each of the four categories of ORSCRIS1-4 (Object Relations and Social 











































2 2.66 16.61 44.26 2.19 13.70 38.47 
3 1.73 10.81 55.07 1.23 7.71 46.18 




















Comparison of Eigenvalues from Principal Components Analysis (PCA), and 
corresponding criterion values obtained from parallel analysis of the Object 












































4.11 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Landrine & Klonoff’s (1996) 
‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’ 
 
Prior to performing PAF, the suitability for factor analysis was assessed, and 
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for appraised ‘Schedule of 
Racist Events’ (SRE) was 0.83; exceeding the value of .60 (Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance, χ
2 (
136) 823.4, p = 
0.01, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. In Table 16, only three 
components possessed Eigenvalues exceeding one and accounting for at least 9% of 
the total variance. However, three factors were extracted for further analysis. These 
three factors accounted for 73.6% of the total variance. The intercorrelations ranged 



















Using Cattell’s Scree (1966) test in Figure 7, it was decided to retain three 
components for further investigation. In Table 17, however,  Monte Carlo (PCA) 
Parallel Analysis revealed that, two components: 1) Appraised Acute Racist Events in 
the last year, and 2) Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE), with Eigenvalues 
exceeding the corresponding criterion values for randomly generated data of the same 
size, should be retained (Lautenschlager, 1989). A two-factor structure was retained. 
Reliability analysis revealed Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient for, 1) 

















































Comparison of Eigenvalues from Principal Components Analysis (PCA), and 






































17. How many times have you been made fun of, picked on, 
pushed, shoved, hit, or threatened with harm because you are 
Black in the past year 
.88  
 
7. How many times have you been treated unfairly by 
neighbours because you were Black in the past year 
 
.87   
 
10. How many times have you been accused or suspected of 
doing something wrong (such as stealing, cheating, not doing 
your share of the work or breaking the law) because you are 
Black  in the past year 
 
.79   
 
15. How many times have you been called a racist name like 
"nigger", "coon", "jungle bunny", or other names in the past 
year 
 
.75   
 
16. How many times have you gotten into an argument or a 
fight about something racist what was done to somebody else 
in the past year  
 
.69   
 
11. How many times have people misunderstood your 
intentions and motives because you are Black in the past year 
 
.68   
 
9. How many times have you been treated unfairly by people 
that you thought were your friends because you are Black in the 
past year 
 
.67   
 
8. How many times have you been treated unfairly by 
institutions (schools, universities, law firms, the police, the 
courts, social services, benefits agencies and others), because 





4. How many times have you been treated unfairly by people in 
service jobs (store clears, waiters, bartenders, bank tellers and 
others) because you were Black in the past year 
 
  .87 
 
5. How many times have you been treated unfairly by strangers 
because you were Black  in the past year 
  .79 
 
3. How many times have you been treated unfairly by your co-
workers, fellow students, and colleagues, because you were 
Black  in the past year 
 
  .75 
 
6. How many times have you been treated unfairly by people in 
helping jobs (doctors, nurses, psychiatrist, case workers, 
dentists, school counsellors, therapists, social workers, and 
others because you are Black  in the past year 
  .70 
 
2. How many times have you been treated unfairly by your 
employers, bosses, and supervisors because you were Black in 
the past year 
 





4.12 Summary of responses to Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale 
 
Ninety point one percent of respondents reported that they felt themselves to be 
a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with other people. Sixty-three percent 
agreed with this statement that, ‘at times they thought they were no good at all’. 
Seventy point eight percent agreed with this view that they had a number of good 
qualities. Sixty-one point eight percent agreed with the view that they were inclined to 
feel that they were a failure. Thirty-nine point one percent agreed with this statement 
agreed with the view that they were able to do things as well as other people. Seventy-
nine point one percent agreed with the view that they did not have much to be proud. 
Seventy-two percent agreed with the view they took a positive attitude to themselves. 
Fifty-nine percent agreed with this view that they were satisfied with themselves. 
Forty-seven percent agreed with that view that they wished they could have more 
respect for themselves. Fifty-three point one  agreed with the view that they certainly 





4.13 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem 
Scale (RSES)’ 
 
The ‘Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale II (RSES)’ was comprised of 10 
items, and devised to measure self-esteem as single dimension using a 4-point 
Guttmann scale. Prior to performing Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with direct 
oblimin rotation using SPSS 14.0, the suitability for factor analysis was assessed. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.79, exceeding the value of 
0.6 (Kaiser, 1974), and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical 




 817.4, p < 
.05. Principal axis factoring using SPSS 15.0 revealed the presence of three 
components with Eigenvalues exceeding one, accounting for at least 9% of the total 
variance, should be extracted for further analysis. In Table 19, the three factors 
accounted for 62.8% of the variance, and intercorrelations ranged from .319 to .934.  
Using Cattell’s Scree (1966) test in Figure 8, three components were retained 
for further investigation. However, Monte Carlo (PCA) Parallel Analysis revealed that 
only two components, (i.e., self-appreciation, and self-depreciation), with Eigenvalues 
exceeding the corresponding criterion values for randomly generated data of the same 
size (10 variables x 92 respondents) should be retained (Lautenschlager, 1989). A two-
factor structure, self-appreciation and self-depreciation, was observed in the Scree plot 



















When simulating normal random samples that parallel the observed data in 
sample size and number of variables, 2 Eigenvalue were bigger than the mean of those 
eigenvalues obtained from the uncorrelated random data were (Lesdema & Valero-
Mora, 2007; Zwick & Velicer, 1986). In Table 20, Rosenberg’s 2-factor structure was 
replicated. Reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach’s (1951) alpha coefficient for 









Total variance of ‘Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-esteem Scale (RSES)’ explained 
 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues 
 











































2 1.61 16.14 52.70 1.12 11.16 43.42 1.20 
3 1.00 10.09 62.80   .47   4.65 48.06 2.26 
4   .85   7.18 71.27     
5   .72 
 














Comparison of Eigenvalues from principal components analysis (PCA), 












1 3.71 1.54 accept 
2 1.61 1.36 accept 
3 1.41 1.23 reject 
4 
 







Note: Decision to accept or reject the criterion was based on the value of the estimated 








Means, Medians, SD and Skewness for outcome measures in Study 1 
 
Measure Mean Median SD Skewness 
 
ORSCRIS1 
2.99 2.87 .319 .480 
ORSCRIS2 2.26 2.00 1.56 1.33 
ORSCRIS3 3.58 2.75 1.43 .200 
ORSCRIS4 4.81 5.00 1.58 1.07 
Perceived concern 1.28 1.00 .953 1.43 
Effects of Perceived concern .879 1.00 .557 .851 
Self-appreciation 9.70 10.00 3.84 .543 
Self-Depreciation 6.14 6.50 4.11 .543 
Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE) 5.35 3.29 3.84 .169 
Appraised Chronic Racist Events 4.58 2.70 1.09 .851 
 
Notes:  
ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people whom derogatory 
race-related comments about others. 
ORSCRIS2 – mental representations of self in relation with people whom derogatory 
race-related comments about self. 
ORSCRIS3– mental representations of self in relation with people whom positive 
race-related comments about others. 








In Table 21, the sample population reported below average mental representations of 
self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments self and 
others and above average mental representations of self in relation with people who 
made positive race-related comments about self and mental representations of self in 
relation with people who valued racial difference. Respondents reported higher self-
appreciation than self-depreciation despite reporting above average appraised acute 
and chronic racist events. Skewness for ORSCRIS, Perceived concern about aspects of 
the Black body (RBIDS), self-appreciation, and self-depreciation were < 2 (West, 
Finch & Curran, 1995). Hence, there was no need to transform the data using the 
square root.  
165 
 
4.14 Correlations between and ORSCRIS, RBIDS, SD, SA, and 1) 
Appraised acute racist events in last year, and 2) Appraised chronic 





Correlations between and ORSCRIS, RBIDS, SD, SA, and 1) Appraised acute 
racist events in last year,  and 2) Appraised chronic racist events, in the last year 
within the sample using Kendal’s- tau: 
  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. ORSCRIS1 1.000 .454** .290** -.262** .183 .240* .322** .276** -.184 .239* 
2. ORSCRIS2  1.000 .215* -.247* .254* .270* .423** .369**  -.271**   .282** 
3. ORSCRIS3   1.000 -.078 .114 .053 .233* .218* .000 -.180 
4. ORSCRIS4    1.000 -.234* -.195* -.212* -.265**   .342** -.118 
5. Perceived concern     1.000 .660** .054 .055 -.071   .021 
6. Effects of perceived 
concerns  
     1.000 .008 .034   -.038   .045 
7. Acute Racist Events        1.000 .722**  -.302**   .283** 
8. Chronic Racist Events         1.000  -.271**  .262** 
9. Self-Appreciation 
(SA) 
        1.000  -.297** 
10. Self-Depreciation 
(SD) 
         1.000 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed) 
 
ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about others. 
ORSCRIS2 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about self. 
ORSCRIS3 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-related 
comments about others. 







Table 22 shows the correlations between and ORSCRIS, RBIDS, Self Esteem, 
Self-depreciation, (1) Appraised Acute Racist Events in last year, and (2) ‘Appraised 
Chronic Racist Events in the last year (SRE)’ within the sample using Kendal’s- tau. 
Contrary to hypothesis 1, no significant positive correlations were observed between 
reported ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events in the last year (SRE) and (1) perceived 
concern and preoccupation with the aspects of the Black body (RBIDS), (τ = .054, p = 
.59). Nor were any significant positive correlations were observed between reported 
‘Appraised Acute Racist Events in the last year (SRE)’ and (2) perceived effect of 
concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black on future social interaction 
(RBIDS), τ = .008, p = .93. 
As predicted in hypothesis 2, significant positive correlations were observed 
between ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’ and mental representations of self in 
relation with people who make derogatory comments about others (ORSCRIS1) (τ  =  
.32,  p = .001). Significant positive correlations were observed between ‘Appraised 
Acute Racist Events (SRE)’ and mental representations of self in relation with people 
who make derogatory comments about self (ORSCRIS2) (τ = .42, p = .001). 
Significant positive correlations were observed between ‘Appraised Acute Racist 
Events (SRE)’ and low self-esteem, (τ = .28, p = .003). 
As predicted in hypothesis 3, significant negative correlations were observed 
between ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, and mental representations of self in 
relation with those who valued their own racial identity and those of others  
(ORSCRIS4),  (τ = -.21,  p = .025). The significant positive correlation between 
‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’ and mental representations indicative of self 
in relation with people who made positive race-related comments about self 
(ORSCRIS3) however, τ = .22, p = .014, however, was not expected. 
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Contrary to hypothesis 4, no significant positive correlations were observed 
between ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’, and (1) perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body (RBIDS),  τ = .06,  p = .57 ), or (2) 
perceived effect of concern and preoccupation on future social interaction (RBIDS), τ 
= .03,  p = .74. 
As predicted in hypothesis 5, significant positive correlations were observed 
between ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’, and mental representations of self 
in relation with people who make derogatory statement’s about others (ORSCRIS1),  τ  
= .28,  p = .004. Significant positive correlations were observed between ‘Appraised 
Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’   and mental representations of self in relation with 
people who make derogatory statement’s about self (ORSCRIS2), τ = .37, p = .001. 
Significant positive correlations were observed between ‘Appraised Chronic Racist 
Events (SRE)’ and low self-esteem, τ = .26, p = .006, that could be better explained by 
variation in age, gender, marital status, annual income, academic achievement, or skin 
tone. 
As predicted in hypothesis 6, significant negative correlations were observed 
between ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’ and mental representations of self 
in relation people valued their ethnicity and those of  others (ORSCRIS4), τ  =  -.27,  p 
= .005, that could be better explained by variation in age, gender, marital status, 
annual income, academic achievement, or skin tone. The significant positive 
correlation between ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’ and mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-related 














B Se B β 
  
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS1) 
 
-.61 2.7 -.04 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about self (ORSCRIS2) 
 
6.1 2.4    .45* 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made positive race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS3) 
 
.80 2.3    .06 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who were as accepting of their racial 
identity as they were of others (ORSCRIS4) 
 
-3.5 .1.9    -.29 
 
Perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body  
 
-6.4 3.9      -.63 
 
Perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body  
 
1.9 1.1        .61 




 = .323 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 





Table 23 shows the outcome of hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
carried out to determine whether any of the variables significantly contributed 
significantly to the variation in ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events in (SRE) (Landrine & 
Klonoff, 1996) in the sample population, overall. As predicted in Hypothesis 7, the 
overall model was significant, F (7, 48) = 2.794, p = .018, and accounted for 32.3% of 
the variation in ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’. However, only mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about self, β = .45, t = 2.50, p = .017, contributed to the variance in 
‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’. None of the other measures contributed 






Hierarchical regression model predicts ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’ 




B Se B β 
  
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS1) 
 
-.00 3.9 -.00 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about self (ORSCRIS2) 
 
19.2 3.5 .78** 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made positive race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS3) 
 
-1.0 3.3 -.04 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who were as accepting of their racial 
identity as they were of others (ORSCRIS4) 
 
-.78 .2.7 -.04 
 
Perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body  
 
3.3 5.6 .18 
 
Perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body  
 
-1.9 1.6 -.35 




 = .497 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 24 the outcome of hierarchical multiple regression analysis was carried 
out to determine which factors contributed significantly to the variation in ‘Appraised 
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Chronic Racist Events in the last year (SRE)’ (Landrine & Klonoff, 1996) in the 
sample population, overall. As predicted in Hypothesis 7, the overall model was 
significant, F (7, 48) = 7.769, p = .0005, and accounted for 49.7% of the variation in 
‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’. However, only mental representations of 
self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments about self, β 
= .78, t = 5.49, p = .0005, contributed to the variance in ‘Appraised Acute Racist 
Events (SRE)’. None of the other measures contributed significantly to the observed 





4.16 Discussion - Study 1 
In study 1, the validity of the two new scales: ORSCRIS and RBIDS, was 
tested using the Landrine & Klonoff’s (1996) ‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’ by 
examining the relation between race-based schema and perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body and appraised racist events. Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EPA) of SRE indicated that SRE had two dimensions: (1) ‘Appraised 
Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, and (2) ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’. The 
EPA of the ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ indicated that 
RBIDS also contained two components:  (1) perceived race-related concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body (RBIDS)’, and (2) the effect of perceived concern 
and preoccupation have on  interaction (RBIDS). EPA of ‘Object Relations and Social 
Cognition of Racial Identity Scale (ORSCRIS)’ revealed four components. The 
analysis was therefore only conducted on responses where a complete data set was 
received (n = 56). The numbers of people  who looked but did not respond to this part 
of the web-based questionnaire is also given. Although post hoc tests indicated that the 
study power reduced from  95% to 88%, it was deemed sufficient to detect a small 
significant effect on the main outcome measure: Landrine & Klonoff’s (1996)’ 
Schedule of Racist Events’. 
Contrary to expectation neither reported perceived concern and preoccupation 
with aspects of the Black body (RBIDS),  or the effect of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body on future social interaction (RBIDS), positively 
correlated with or contributed to reported ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, and 
‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’ in Black people overall, (i.e., p  = ns). 
Although mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory 
race-related comments about other people (ORSCRIS1) and mental representations of 
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self in relation with people who made derogatory comments about self  (ORSCRIS2) 
were positively correlated with reported ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, only 
ORSCRIS2 contributed to explained ‘Appraised Acute and Chronic Racist Events 
(SRE)’ in the sample overall. This may be due to respondents believing that appraised 
acute and chronic racist events have nothing to do with perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body or the effect of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body on future social interaction (RBIDS). The 
significant positive correlation between ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’ and 
mental representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-related 
comments about self (ORSCRIS3), however, was not expected. This would suggest 
that positive race-related comments are significantly associated with appraised acute 
and chronic racist events and this relationship will be further investigated in the next 
two studies further investigation. Although the sample size was small, there was the 
limited convergent validity of ORSCRIS and divergent validity for RBIDS using SRE 
in this study enabling the researcher to have some confidence that the new instruments 







Validation of my Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS) and 
Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity Scale (ORSCRIS) 
using Mendoza et al.’s (2002) Race-based Rejection Sensitivity Scale – 
study 2 
 
Using a within-subjects design with web-based research methods in study 2, 
Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey’s (2002) ‘Race-based Rejection Sensitivity 
(RBRS)’ tested the convergent and discriminant validity of my 'Object Relations and 
Social Cognition of Race-related Incidents Scale (ORSCRIS)' and my 'Racialised 
Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)'. The main hypotheses are that: 
(1) Derogatory race-related schemas about self or others would be significantly 
correlated with, and contribute to the variance of, race-based rejection sensitivity, (i.e., 
Hypotheses 1 -2); 
(2) Perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body and 
effect of this perceived obsession with the Black body on future social interaction with 
be significantly associated with and contribute to the variance in race-based rejection 
sensitivity, (i.e., Hypotheses 3 -4). 
5.1 Hypotheses – Study 2 
1) Significant positive correlations will be observed between reported ‘Race-
Based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS)’, and reported (1) concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body (RBIDS), and (2) perceived 
effect of concern and preoccupation with aspects of the  Black body on future 
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social interaction (RBIDS), that cannot be better explained by variation in age, 
gender, marital status, annual income, academic achievement, or skin tone; 
2) Significant positive correlations will be observed between reported ‘Race-
Based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS)’,  and mental representations of self in 
relation with people who make derogatory race-related comments about others 
(ORSCRIS1), and mental representations of self in relation with people who 
make derogatory race-related comments about self  (ORSCRIS2),  that cannot 
be better explained by variation in age, gender, marital status, annual income, 
academic achievement, or skin tone; 
3) Significant negative correlations will be observed between ‘Race-Based 
Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS)’, and reported mental representations of self in 
relation with people who made positive race-related comments about self 
(ORSCRIS3), and mental representations of self in relation with people who 
valued each their own ethnicity as much as you did others (ORSCRIS4), and 
low self-esteem that cannot be better explained by variation in age, gender, 
marital status, annual income, academic achievement, or skin tone; 
4) Reported (1) concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body 
(RBIDS), (2) perceived effect of concern and preoccupation with aspects of the 
Black body on future social interaction (RBIDS), (3) mental representations of 
self in relation with people who make derogatory race-related comments about 
others (ORSCRIS1), (4) mental representations of self in relation with people 
who make derogatory race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS2), and  (5) 






Of the 38 (41.3%) Black male respondents and 54 (58.7%) Black female 
respondents who completed questionnaire 2, 46 (50%) described themselves as being 
of Black African Caribbean descent, 33 (35.8%) Black people of African descent, and 
13 (14.0%) as mixed Black descent. The age of the respondents ranges from 18-77 
years, and the mean age was 37.1 years (SD =12.56 years), and median age = 38.5 
years.   
Self-reported estimates of skin tones ranged from light colouration (denoted 20 
on the ‘von Luschan’s (1922) chromatic chart’) to darker colouration (denoted 36 on 
the ‘von Luschan (1922) chromatic chart’). Most respondents reported skin tones in 
the mid-range, (i.e., 27-29 on von Luschan’s chromatic chart). There was very little 
difference between the mean skin tone (M = 28.2, SD = 3.2), and the median skin tone 
reported was denoted 28.00 on the von Luschan’s (1922) chromatic scale. 
Thirty-six (39.1%) of Black respondents reported being married or cohabiting, 
11 (11.9%) were either separated or divorced, and 45 (48.9%) reported being single.  
Thirty-nine (42.4%) Black respondents reported educational qualifications 
below degree level, and 53 (57.6%) reported educational qualifications of degree level 
and above.  
Fifty-three (57.6%) reported annual incomes of £20,000 per annum or less, and 
39 (42.4%) reported annual incomes of more than £20,000 per annum. The mean 
annual income for the sample population was £26,600 per annum, SD = £19,630 per 





 Questionnaire 2 was comprised of the descriptive components: age, gender, 
ethnicity, academic achievement, annual income, and skin tone. The skin tones used 
were copied from the original chart box per box using the paint program’s dropper tool 
from Felix von Luschan’s (1922) book entitled: ‘Voelker, Rassen, and Sprachen’. The 
outcome measures were my ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity 
Scale (ORSCRIS)’, my ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS), 
Mendoza-Denton et al.’s (2002) ‘Race-Based Rejection Sensitivity Scale (RBRS)’, 
and Rosenberg’s (1965) ‘Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)’   
 My ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ is a 9-item self-
report scale, devised to measure: (1) perceived concern and preoccupation (perceived 
obsession) with aspects of the Black body, and (2) perceived concern and 
preoccupation (perceived obsession) with aspects of the Black Body on future social 
interaction. For example, participants were required to indicate whether they were ‘not 
at all concerned’ to ‘extremely concerned’ on a 5-point Likert scale for item 1, ‘not at 
all preoccupied’ to ‘extremely preoccupied’ in item 3, no distress’ to ‘extreme and 
disabling’ distress in item 5, ‘no interference’ to ‘extreme interference’ in items 6-9. 
Scores for each item ranged from zero to four and calculated by taking the average of 
all scores. Higher scores indicated agreement with the proposed concept, and lower 
scores indicated disagreement with the proposed concept. The scale has been found to 
possess reasonable internal validity. Reliability analysis indicated that the Cronbach’s 
(1951) correlation coefficient alpha for (1) perceived concerns and preoccupations 
about the Black body, α = .75, and for (2) the effect of perceived concerns and 
preoccupations on social interaction, α = .83.  
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 My‘Object Relations and Social Cognition Scale of Racial Identity Scale 
(ORSCRIS)’ is a 20-item self-report tool comprised of four categories of race-based 
relational mental representations or schemata that might underpin racial identity 
attitudes using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, 
midpoint 4 = neither agree nor disagree). The first category ORSCRIS1 attempted to 
reflect mental representations of self in relation people who made derogatory race-
related comments about other people. The second category, ORSCRIS2, attempted to 
reflect those mental representations of self in relation people who made derogatory 
race-related comments about self. The third category, ‘ORSCRIS3’ attempted to 
reflect mental representations of self in relation other Black people who made positive 
race-related comments about self, and the fourth category ‘ORSCRIS4 attempted to 
reflect those mental representations of self in relation people who appreciate their 
racial identity as much as do that of others. Scores ranged from 1-7 on each subscale. 
The score for each subscale was averaged. Higher scores indicated agreement with the 
proposed concept, and lower scores indicated disagreement with the proposed concept. 
Reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient alpha for 
each subscale was reasonable, ORSCRIS1, α = .70, ORSCRIS2, α = .86, ORSCRIS3, 
α = .73, ORSCRIS4, α = .80, respectively 
 Mendoza-Denton et al.’s (2002) ‘Race-Based Rejection Sensitivity Scale 
(RBRS)’ is a 12-item, self-report scale that measures the extent to which an individual 
is concerned about and expects to experience rejection because of his or her race, or as 
a member of a group stigmatised because of its ascribed race. For instance, item 1 
states: Imagine that you are in class one day and the boss, teacher or professor asks a 
particularly difficult question. A few people, including yourself, raise their hands to 
answer the questions: a) How concerned/anxious would you be that the boss, teacher, 
or professor might not choose you because of your race/ethnicity, on a 6-point scale 
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ranging from (1) very unconcerned to (6) very concerned. b) I would expect that the 
boss, teacher or professor might not choose me because of my race/ethnicity, on a 6-
point Likert scale ranging from very unlikely (1) to very likely (6). The cognition is 
weighted and amplified by the value and expectancy component, the items were 
multiplied, and the overall score is averaged. The scale has been internally reliable, 
Cronbach’s (1951) coefficient alpha, α = .90, and test-retest reliability, α = .80 
(Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002) 
 Rosenberg’s (1965) ‘Self-Esteem Scale (RSE)’ is a 10-item unidimensional 
instrument devised to measure global self-esteem in adolescents. The scale has been 
found to reliably measure feelings of self-worth in adults differentiated according to 
genders, ethnicity, and culture (Greenberger, Chuansheng, Dmitrieva & Farrugia, 
2003). Respondents were asked to indicate on the 4-point Likert scale the extent to 
which they agree or disagree with 10 statements related to overall feelings of self-
worth. For instance, respondents were asked - ‘At times I think I am no good at all’, or 
‘I feel that I have a number of good qualities’. There are equal numbers of positively 
and negatively worded items in the scale reflecting its two-factor structure, (i.e., self-
appreciation, and self-deprecation). The scale has been found to possess good internal 
consistency with Cronbach’s (1951) coefficient alpha for various samples in the range 
of 0.77 to 0.88 typically. Typically, test-retest correlations in Black populations range 
from 0.82 to 0.88 (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1993; Lockett & Harrell, 2003; Rosenberg, 
1986; Schmidt & Allik, 2005). 
 
5.4 Sample Size 
  The sample size should have sufficient power to reduce the probability of 
achieving false positive (Type 1 error), and the possibility of false negative effects 
(Type 2 error), and rejecting the null hypothesis out of turn. The null hypothesis was 
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that there was no correlation between positive relation between relational race-based 
schemas (ORSCRIS), and ‘racialised body image disturbance (RBIDS)’, and ‘race-
based rejection sensitivity (RBRS). Bland (2002) suggested that the sample size 
should have enough power to reduce the probability of observing an effect due to 
chance, and this usually set at ≥ 0.5. This means that there will be at least a 95% 
chance of correctly detecting an effect. To determine the maximum likelihood of 
detecting a significant difference in the outcome measures, an appropriate sample size 
was computed using G*Power. For an a priori analysis using 11 variables, the F-ratio 
in multiple regressions determined from a total sample size of 146 respondents would 
be sufficient to stand a 95% chance of correctly detecting a small effect size (.15 - .29) 
on the primary outcome measure in the sample, (i.e., RBRS).  
 
5.5 Response rate 
 Five thousand, eight hundred and sixty-nine people visited the website, but 92 
UK Nationals completed to Questionnaire 2 comprised of a demographic component, 
RBIDS, ORSCRIS, RSES, and RBRS. One hundred and five people responded to the 
questionnaire were UK nationals, but 13 respondents were non-UK nationals. The 
non-UK nationals were excluded from the analyses. Hence, data from 92 completed 
surveys were subjected to analysis, (i.e., response rate overall = .016%). 
 
5.6 Exploratory factor analysis of Race-based Rejection Sensitivity Scale 
Prior to performing ’Principal Axis Factoring (PAF)’, the suitability for factor 
analysis was assessed, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for 
Race-based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS) was 0.86 exceeding the value of 0.60 
(Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical 
significance, χ
2 
(276) 1804.5, p = 0.01, supporting the factorability of the correlation 
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matrix. Six factors are loaded on a single factor, (i.e., RBRS). In Table 25, only one 
component with an Eigenvalue exceeding one and accounting for at least 9% of the 
total variance was extracted for further analysis. In Table 25, one factor, (i.e., RBRS) 






Scree Plot for Mendoza-Denton et al.’s (2002)  














Using Cattell’s Scree (1966) test in Figure 9, one component was retained for 
further investigation. As shown in Table 26, Monte Carlo Parallel Analysis (PCA) 
revealed that a single component with an Eigenvalue exceeding the corresponding 
criterion values for randomly generated data of the same size (24 variables x 92 
respondents) should be retained (Lautenschlager, 1989). A single factor structure was 
retained. Internal consistency was good, Cronbach’s (1951) coefficient alpha, α = .90, 






Total variance of ‘Race-based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS)’ explained 
 














1 11.55 47.90 48.11 11.26 46.92 46.92 
2 1.64 6.82 54.93 1.36 5.65 52.57 
3 1.54 6.43 61.36 1.27 5.29 57.85 
4 1.34 5.59 66.95 1.05 4.39 62.25 
5 1.18 4.92 71.78 .86 3.50 65.83 
6 1.07 4.46 79.33 .63 2.62 68.45 










Comparison of Eigenvalues from Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and 




















2 1.64 1.84 reject 
3 1.54 1.70 reject 
4 1.34 1.48 reject 
Note: Decision to accept or reject the criterion was based on the value of the estimated 










Means, Medians, SD and Skewness of outcome measures in Study 1 
 











ORSCRIS2 2.58 2.00 1.56 .82 
ORSCRIS3 3.35 2.75 1.43 .25 
ORSCRIS4 4.31 5.00 1.58 .25 
Perceived concern (RBIDS) 1.41 1.00 .95 .51 
Effect of perceived concern (RBIDS 1.47 1.00 .70 .0 
Self-appreciation 8.85 10.00 3.84 .22 
Self-Depreciation 9.38 6.50 4.11 .36 
Race-based rejection sensitivity (RBRS) 12.02 11.42 7.66 .66 
Notes:  
ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people whom derogatory 
race-related comments about others. 
ORSCRIS2– mental representations of self in relation with people whom derogatory 
race-related comments about self. 
ORSCRIS3– mental representations of self in relation with people whom positive race-
related comments about others. 






In Table 27, the sample population reported below average (< 3.5) mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related 
comments others and self and mental representations of self in relation with people 
who made positive race-related comments about self, but above average (> 3.5) mental 
representations of self in relation with individuals who valued racial difference. 
Respondents reported higher self-depreciation than self-appreciation and high race-
based rejection sensitivity. Skewness for ORSCRIS, RBIDS, self-depreciation, and 
RBRS was < 2 (West, Finch & Curran, 1995). Hence, there was no need to transform 
the data. The data for ‘effects of perceived concern with the Black body (RBIDS), 




5.8 Correlations between RBRS, and ORSCRIS, RBIDS, SA, and SD 




Summary of Correlations between RBRS and ORSCRIS, PRBC, EPRBC, and 
RSES within the sample using Kendal’s- tau (n = 92) 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. ORSCRIS1 1.000 .455** .305** .059 .210**  .244** -.224** .232** .123 
2. ORSCRIS2  1.000 .477 -.034 .346** .387** -.282** .305** .252** 
3. ORSCRIS3   1.000 .145 .124 .159* -.127 -.112 .224** 
4. ORSCRIS4    1.000 -.061 -.060 -.021 -.036 -.051 
5. Perceived concern  (RBIDS     1.000 .802** -.163* .121 .200** 
6. Effect of perceived concern 
(RBIDS) 
     1.000 -.222** .197** .209** 
7. Self-appreciation       1.000 .844** -.126 
8. Self-deprecation        1.000 -.115 
9. Race-based Rejection Sensitivity         1.000 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 






Table 28 below shows the correlations between the outcome measures within 
the sample using Kendal’s - tau. As predicted by hypothesis 1, a significant positive 
correlation was observed between Mendoza-Denton et al.’s (2002) ‘Race-based 
Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS)’, and (1) perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS), τ = .20,  p = .008, and (2) effect of perceived 
concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future social interaction 
(RBIDS), τ = .21,  p = .005.  
As predicted by hypothesis 2, significant positive correlations between 
Mendoza-Denton et al.’s (2002) ‘Race-Based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS)’, and  
reported mental representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory 
race-related comments about self  (ORSCRIS2), τ = .25,  p = .001.  
Contrary to hypothesis 2, however, no significant correlation between RBRS, 
and mental representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory about 
others (ORSCRIS1), τ = .123, p = .09.  
Further, contrary to hypothesis 3, no significant relation was found between 
RBRS, and ORSCRIS4 (τ = -.04, p = .59), or low self-esteem, (τ = -.12, p = .114). The 
significant positive correlation between RBRS and mental representations of self in 
relation with people who made positive race-related comments about self 





5.9 Hierarchal multiple regression analysis to determine predictors 
explaining variance of RBRS 
 
Table 29 shows the outcome of hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
conducted to determine whether any of the variables measured contributed 
significantly to the variance in Race-Based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS) in the 
sample Black population overall. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the best predictors for 
RBRS were mental representations of self in relation with people who made positive 
race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS3), β = .29, t = 2.17, p = .033, and the 
effect of perceived race-related concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black 
body on future social interaction (RBIDS, β = .48, t = 2.41, p = .018. The overall 
model was significant, F (7, 85) = 5.03, p = .0005, and accounted for 24.9% of the 






Hierarchical regression model predicts race-based rejection sensitivity (RBRS) in 




B Se B β 
  
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS1) 
 
-.76 .61 -.15 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about self (ORSCRIS2) 
 
.89 .77 .19 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made positive race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS3) 
 
1.69 .78 .29* 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who were as accepting of their racial 
identity as they were of others (ORSCRIS4) 
 
-.45 .49 -.09 
 
Perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body  
 
-.89 .64 -.27 
 
Effects of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body  
 
.58 .24 .48* 




 = .249 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 





5.10 Discussion - Study 2  
 
In study 2, the construct validity of the two new scales: ORSCRIS and RBIDS, 
was tested against the Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002) ‘Race-Based Rejection 
Sensitivity Scale (RBRS)’ to determine whether perceived relational race-based 
schema (ORSCRIS) and racialised body image disturbance (RBIDS) were directly 
correlated to reported race-based rejection sensitivity. Unfortunately, only 92 self-
defined Black people responded to the web-based questionnaire (n = 92). The number 
who looked at the web-based questionnaire, but did not respond to this part of the 
web-based questionnaire is also given. Although post hoc tests indicated that the study 
power reduced from 95% to 90%, the power was sufficient to detect a small 
significant effect on the main outcome measure: Mendoza et al. (2002) ‘Race-Based 
Rejection Sensitivity Scale (RBRS). 
 Exploratory factor analysis of RBRS indicated that,  RBRS was comprised of 
a single factor or dimension, (i.e., ‘race-based rejection sensitivity’), and this factor 
was used to test the construct validity of the ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance 
Scale (RBIDS)’, and ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial Identity Scale 
(ORSCRIS)’, separately. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, race-based rejection sensitivity 
was significantly associated with perceived concern and preoccupation with the 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS1), and the effect of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future social interaction (RBIDS2).  
As predicted in Hypothesis 2, race-based rejection sensitivity was significantly 
associated with mental representations of self in relation with people who made 
derogatory race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS2). Contrary to Hypothesis 2, 
however, race-based rejection sensitivity was not significantly associated with mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related 
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comments about others (ORSCRIS1). Further, there was no significant negative 
correlation between mental representation of individuals who valued their own 
ethnicity as much as they did others and race-based rejection sensitivity in 
relationships with people who valued their ethnicity as much as they did others 
(ORSCRIS4).  
Construct validity is therefore demonstrated for self-referential derogatory 
race-based schemas (ORSCRIS2), but not other-referent derogatory race-based 
schemas (ORSCRIS1) or group-referent equal-value race-based relational schemas 
(ORSCRIS4). The idea of race-based rejection sensitivity being solely related to 
derogatory race-based comments (ORSCRIS2) is, however, confounded by race-based 
rejection sensitivity being positively related to mental representations of self in 
relation with people who make positive comments about self (ORSCRIS3). The fact 
that, ORSCRIS3 and the effect of perceived concern and preoccupation with the Black 
body on future social interaction (RBIDS2) contributed to the variance in reported 
race-based rejection sensitivity significantly supports Mendoza et al. (2002) finding in 
that Black people are more likely to be sensitised to perceived racism in external, 
stable, uncontrollable, ambiguous contexts. Other people need only mention those 
aspects of the Black Body often stigmatised in relation with others (Hajnis et al., 
1994), however, for Black people to activate race-related schema, experience race-
based rejection sensitivity, and worry about the effect perceived concern and 









Examining the relation between racialised body image disturbance, mental 
representations that might be indicative of the subjective experience of 
racism and low self-esteem, and dissociative experiences – study 3. 
 
Using within-subjects design in study 3, the relationship between relational 
race-related schemas (ORSCRIS), racialised body image disturbance (RBIDS), self-
depreciation (RSES), and the frequency of dissociative experiences (DES11) in a 
nonclinical sample of self-identified Black people in the UK was examined. The main 
hypotheses were that:  
1) Black people were significantly different in terms of their skin tone, 
academic achievement and annual income, (i.e., Hypotheses 1-10); 
2) That these within group differences affects the reported race-related schema 
and self-esteem, (i.e., Hypotheses 11-16); and, 
3) Low self-esteem, mental representations of self in relation with people who 
made derogatory race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS3), and perceived race-
based concerns and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future interaction 
(RBIDS) would significantly contribute to the variance in the reported frequency of 
dissociative experiences in a nonclinical sample of Black people, (i.e., Hypotheses 17). 
 
6.1 Hypotheses – Study 3 
 
1) Self-identified Black female respondents will report significantly higher level of 
academic achievement than Black male respondents will; 
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2) Self-identified Black female respondents will report significantly lighter skin 
tones than Black male respondents will; 
3) Although Black African respondents will report significantly higher academic 
achievement, they will report significantly lower annual income than Black 
African Caribbean respondents will; 
4) There will no significant difference between Black African and Black African 
Caribbean respondents with respect to in skin tone; 
5) Mixed Black respondents will report significantly lighter skin tones than both 
Black African and Black African Caribbean respondents will; 
6) Black African respondents will report significantly lower annual incomes than 
either Black African or mixed Black respondents will; 
7) Black male respondents will report significantly more mental representations of 
themselves with people who made derogatory race-related comments about self 
than Black female respondents will; 
8) Black male respondents will report significantly self-depreciation than Black 
female respondents will; 
9) Black African respondents will report significantly more mental representations 
of themselves in relation with people who valued each their racial identity than 
Black African Caribbean respondents will; 
10) African Caribbean respondents will report significantly more effects of 
perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body than 
mixed Black respondents will; 
11) There will be significant positive correlations found between mental 
representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory race-based 
comments about others (ORSCRIS1), perceived concern and preoccupation 
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with the aspects of the Black body (RBIDS), self-depreciation, and frequency of 
dissociative experiences in a sample of Black people in the UK; 
12) There will be significant positive correlation found between mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-based 
comments about self (ORSCRIS2), perceived concern and preoccupation with 
the aspects of the Black body (RBIDS1), self-depreciation, and the frequency of 
dissociative experiences in a sample of Black people in the UK; 
13) There will be no significant correlation between mental representations of self 
in relation with people who made positive race-based comments about self 
(ORSCRIS3), and perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the 
Black body (RBIDS1), self-depreciation, and the frequency of dissociative 
experiences; 
14) There will be significant positive correlation between mental representations of 
self in relation with people who make derogatory race-related comments about 
others (ORSCRIS1), and perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of 
the Black body (RBIDS1), self-depreciation, and dissociative experiences that 
cannot be better explained by variation in age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, 
annual income, academic achievement, skin tone, or the variation in the friends 
with whom Black people spend most of their time; 
15)  There will be significant positive correlation between mental representations of 
self in relation with people who make derogatory race-related comments about 
self (ORCRIS2), and perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the 
Black body (RBIDS1), the effect of perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS2), self-depreciation, and the frequency of 
dissociative experiences. These correlations will persist even when controlling 
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for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, academic achievement, annual income, 
skin tone. 
16)  There will be no significant correlation between mental representations of self 
in relation with people who made positive race-based comments about self 
(ORSCRIS3), and perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the 
Black body (RBIDS1), self-depreciation, and dissociative experiences even 
when controlling for age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, academic 
achievement, annual income, skin tone. 
17)  Mental representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory 
race-related comments about self (ORCRIS2), and perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body (RBIDS1), the effect of perceived 
concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body (RBIDS2), self-
depreciation will contribute significantly to the variance of dissociative 
experiences. These correlations will persist even when controlling for age, 
gender, marital status, ethnicity, academic achievement, annual income, skin 
tone 
 
6.2  Respondents 
Of the 146 (56.6%) Black male respondents and 112 (43.4%) Black female 
respondents, 130 (50.4%) described themselves as Black People African Caribbean 
descent, 75 (29.1%) Black people of African descent, and 53 (20.5%) as mixed Black 
ancestry. The age of the respondents ranges from 17-71 years, and the mean age was 
36.61 years (SD = 10.02 years), and the median age was = 37 years.  
Self-reported estimates of skin tones ranged from light colouration (denoted 20 
on the von Luschan (1922) chromatic chart) to darker colouration (denoted 36 on the 
von Luschan (1922) chromatic chart. There was very little difference between the 
198 
 
mean skin tone (M = 27.20, SD = 4.984, MD = 27.00), and the median skin tone 
reported was 27.00 on the von Luschan (1922) chromatic scale. 
One hundred and twelve (43.4%) of Black respondents reported being married 
or cohabiting, 36 (13.9%) were either separated or divorced, and 110 (42.6%) reported 
being single. One hundred and twenty-one (46.8%) Black respondents reported 
educational qualifications below degree level, and 137 (53.1%) reported educational 
qualifications of degree level and above. One hundred and seventeen (45.3%) reported 
annual incomes of less than £20,000 per annum, and 141 (54.7%) reported annual 
incomes of more than £20,000 per annum. The mean annual income for the sample 
population was £28,100 per annum, SD = £14,844 per annum. The median annual 
income was £30,000 per annum.  
Of the 258 Black respondents, 40 (15.5%) reported spending most of their time 
with mixed Black African and African Caribbean friends. Thirty-nine (15.2%) Black 
respondents reported spending most of their time with people of all ethnic groups. 
Thirty-three (12.8%) Black respondents reported spending their time with mixed 
Black African Caribbean friends only. Twenty-three (8.9%) Black respondents 
reported spending their time with White friends only. Nineteen (7.4%) Black 
respondents reported spending their time with mixed Black African Caribbean and 
White friends. Fourteen (5.5%) Black respondents reported spending their time with 
mixed Black African and White friends. Twenty-four (9.3%) Black respondents 
reported spending their time with mixed Black African Caribbean and Asian friends. 
Nine (3.5%) Black respondents reported spending their time with mixed Black African 
Caribbean and Arab friends. Only 6 (2.3%) Black respondents reported spending their 
time with only Asian friends. Only 4 (1.6%) Black respondents reported spending their 
time with only Black African and Asian friends, and one (0.1%) Black respondents 
reported spending most of their time with mixed black African and Arab or Middle 
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Eastern friends. Eight Black respondents report some other combination not specified 
and eight Black people did not respond to this item. 
 
6.3 Materials 
Questionnaire 3 is comprised of a demographic component: age, gender, 
ethnicity, academic achievement and annual income, ethnicity of friend's respondents 
spent most of their time with and skin tone. The skin colours used were copied from 
the original chart box per box using the paint programme’s dropper tool from Felix 
von Luschan’s (1922) book, ‘Voelker, Rassen, and Sprachen’. The outcome measures 
were my ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition Scale (ORSCRIS)’, my‘Racialised 
Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’, Rosenberg’s (1965) ‘Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES)’, and Bernstein and Putnam’s (1986) ‘Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(DESII).   
Bernstein and Putnam’s (1986) ‘Dissociative Experiences Scale II’ (DES) is 
28-item self-report scale measuring three factors believed to be indicative of 
dissociation in both normal and abnormal populations (see Appendix H). It was 
devised this instrument to help screen for dissociative experiences. It was not designed 
as a diagnostic tool these three factors were: 1) Depersonalisation and derealisation, 2) 
Absorption and imaginative involvement, 3) Dissociative amnesia (Carlson et al., 
1991). Participants are asked to indicate on a continuum ranging from ‘never’ = 0% to 
‘always’ = 100%, what percentage of time each dissociative experience listed happens 
to them. For example, participants are told that: ‘some people have the experience of 
feeling that other persons, objects, and the world around them are not real’ and asked 
to ‘indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you’. The average frequency 
of reported dissociative experiences could be calculated by adding up all the scores for 
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all items, (i.e. 1-100), and divide this number by 28. High scores or percentages 
indicate a greater propensity to report dissociative experiences whilst lower scores or 
percentages indicate that a lesser propensity. Reliability analysis indicated that 
Cronbach’s (1951) alpha coefficient, α = 0.94, Darves-Bornoz, de Giovanni & 
Galliard, 1998), N= 140, α = 0.93 (Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, Geraerts & Smeets, 
2004). These coefficients were not entirely different from those obtained by Frischholz 
et al. (1990), α = 0.95, Boon & Draijer (1993), α = 0.96, and Moyano et al. (2001), α = 
0.92.  
 My ‘Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale (RBIDS)’ is a 9-item self-
report scale, devised to measure: (1) perceived concern and preoccupation (perceived 
obsession) with aspects of the Black body, and (2) perceived concern and 
preoccupation (perceived obsession) with aspects of the Black Body on future social 
interaction. For example, participants were required to indicate whether they were ‘not 
at all concerned’ to ‘extremely interested’ on a 4-point Likert scale for item 1, ‘not at 
all preoccupied’ to ‘extremely preoccupied’ in item 3, no distress’ to ‘extreme and 
disabling’ distress in item 5, ‘no interference’ to ‘extreme interference’ in items 6-9. 
Scores for each item ranged from zero to four and calculated by taking the average of 
all scores. Higher scores indicated agreement with the proposed concept, and lower 
scores indicated disagreement with the proposed concept. The scale has been found to 
possess internal validity. Reliability analysis showed that the Cronbach’s (1951) 
correlation coefficient alpha for (1) perceived concerns and preoccupations with 
aspects of the Black body, α = .75, and for (2) the effect of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with an aspect of the Black body on future social interaction, α = .83.  
 My ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition Scale of Racial Identity Scale 
(ORSCRIS)’ is a 20-item self-report tool comprised of four categories of race-based 
relational mental representations or schemata that might underpin racial identity 
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attitudes using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, 
midpoint 4 = neither agree nor disagree). The first category ORSCRIS1 attempted to 
reflect mental representations of self in relation people who made derogatory race-
related comments about other people. The second category, ORSCRIS2, attempted to 
reflect those mental representations of self in relation people who made derogatory 
race-related comments about self. The third category, ‘ORSCRIS3’ attempted to 
reflect mental representations of self in relation other Black people who made positive 
race-related comments about self, and the fourth category ‘ORSCRIS4 attempted to 
reflect those mental representations of self in relation people who appreciate their 
racial identity as much as do that of others. Scores ranged from 1-7 on each subscale. 
The score for each subscale was averaged. Higher scores indicated agreement with the 
proposed concept, and lower scores indicated disagreement with the proposed concept. 
Reliability analysis indicated that Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient alpha for 
each subscale was reasonable, ORSCRIS1, α = .70, ORSCRIS2, α = .86, ORSCRIS3, 
α = .73, ORSCRIS4, α = .80, respectively. 
 Rosenberg’s (1965) ‘Self-Esteem Scale (RSES)’ is a 10-item unidimensional 
instrument devised to measure global self-esteem in adolescents. The scale has been 
found reliably to measure feelings of self-worth in adults across groups differentiated 
according to ethnicity, culture and gender (Greenberger et al., 2003). Respondents 
were asked to indicate on the 4-point Likert scale the extent to which they agree or 
disagree with 10 statements related to overall feelings of self-worth. The level has 
been found to possess good internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha for various 
samples typically in the range of 0.77 to 0.88 (Schmidt & Allik, 2005; Rosenberg, 
1986), and good reliability with test-retest correlations typically in the range of 0.82 to 
0.88 in general populations (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1993). Lockett & Harrell (2003) 
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showed that this scale could be used reliably in Black populations, reporting two-
dimensional structure and Cronbach’s (1951) correlation coefficient alpha, α = .84. 
 
6.4 Sample Size 
 The sample size should have sufficient power to reduce the probability of 
achieving false positive (Type 1 error), and the possibility of false adverse effects 
(Type 2 error), and rejecting the null hypothesis out of turn. The null hypothesis was 
that there would be no positive correlation between the perceived relational race-based 
schema that might underpin racial identity (ORSCRIS), racialised body image 
disturbance RBIDS), low self-esteem (RSES), and frequency of dissociative 
experiences (DES). To determine the likelihood of detecting a difference in the 
outcome measure an appropriate sample size was computed using G*Power. For an a 
priori analysis using 13 variables, the F-ratio in multiple regressions may be 
determined from a total sample size of 189 respondents. This sample size would be 
sufficient to stand a 95% chance of detecting a small effect size (.15 - .29) on the 
primary outcome measure, (i.e. DESII) in the sample population. 
 
6.5 Response rate 
Five thousand, eight hundred, and sixty-nine people visited the website, but 
only 267 people completed Questionnaire 3 comprised of a demographic component, 
RBIDS, ORSCRIS, DESII, and RSES. Nine respondents were non-UK nationals. The 
non-UK nationals were excluded from the analyses. Hence, data from 258 completed 




6.6 Examination of the demographic data from the sample population 
for normalcy 
 
Table 30 shows the output from the tests of normalcy in demographic 
measures. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S), using SPSS 15.0 indicated all the 
demographic measures deviated significantly from an estimated normal distribution at 
< .05. This test showed that there were significant deviations from normalcy on all 











Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Age .066 258 .009 .981 258 .002 
Marital status .272 258 .000 .750 258 .000 
Ethnicity .317 258 .000 .753 258 .000 
Academic Achievement .215    258 .000 .920 258 .000 
Annual Income .169 258 .000 .908 259 .000 
Friends .155 258 .000 .912 258 .000 
Skin Tone .122 258 .000 .962 258 .000 
 






6.7 Examination of data from independent variables for normalcy 
 
 In Table 31, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S) test, which compares the 
observed cumulative distribution function for a variable with a specified theoretical 
distribution, found that the test of normalcy was violated for all independent measures. 







K-S Tests for normality within outcome variables 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Shapiro-Wilk (SW) 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
ORSCRIS1 .07 258 .003 .98 258 .008 
ORSCRIS2 .16 258 .000 .92 258 .000 
ORSCRIS3 .06 258 .027 .99 258 .009 
ORSCRIS4 .10 258 .000 .94 258 .000 
RBIDS .25 258 .000 .71 258 .000 
Self-Depreciation .07 258 .003 .93 258 .000 
DES .20 258 .000 .71 258 .000 
 
Notes: KS statistic and degrees of freedom (df) is given by corresponding SW statistic and its degrees of freedom. 
ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments 
about others. 
ORSCRIS2 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments 
about self. 
ORSCRIS3 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-related comments about 
others. 
ORSCRIS4 – mental representations of self in relation with people who valued each other’s racial difference 
RBIDS – mental representations of self in relation with people who valued race-related comments about others. 





6.8 Examination of the independent data for homogeneity of variance  
 
Based on the median, Levene’s test for groups, differentiated according to 
gender, indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated for all 
outcome measures; except mental presentations of self in relation with people who 
made derogatory race-related comments about other persons (ORSCRIS1), Levene’s 
statistic (1, 253) = 4.497, p = .035 (see Table 32). This indicated that the homogeneity 
of variances did not differ significantly with respect to the outcome measures; except 
for data related to ORSCRIS1. Therefore, equal variances were assumed for all 

































     




ORSCRIS2 1.63 1 253 .203 
ORSCRIS3    .54 1 253 .465 
ORSCRIS4     .02 1 253 .899 
RBIDS1     .51 1 253 .474 
RBIDS2     .69 1 253 .407 
Self-Depreciation     .54 1 253 .780 
DES 
 








The table shows Levene’s statistic for each of the outcome measures, their significance, and their associated degrees 
of freedom when differentiated according to gender. 
ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments 
about others. 
ORSCRIS2 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments 
about self. 
ORSCRIS3 – mental representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-related comments about 
others 
ORSCRIS4 – mental representations of self in relation with people who valued race-related comments about others. 
RBIDS1 – Perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body 
RBIDS2 – Effect of perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future social interaction 






6.9 Examination of the demographic data for homogeneity of when 
differentiated according to gender  
 
All demographic variables were assigned values (see Table 3, p. 135) so that 
some indication as to the homogeneity of variance could be ascertained in Table 33. 
Based on the median, Levene’s test for groups, differentiated according to gender, 
indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated in any of 
the demographic measures; except for skin tone, Levene’s statistic (1, 254) = 4.43, p = 








Test of homogeneity of variances in demographic data when the sample was 


















Marital Status     2.44 1 253 .04 
Ethnicity 1.60 1 254 .11 
Academic Achievement   .00 1 253 .65 
Annual Income   .06 1 252 .76 
Friends   .67 1 252 .41 









Notes: Table shows Levene’s statistic for each of the demographic measures, their 








6.10 Examination of the demographic data for homogeneity of variance, 
when differentiated, according to ethnicity  
 
All demographic variables were assigned value (see Table 3, p. 135) so that 
some indication as to the homogeneity of variance could be ascertained. Based on the 
median, Levene’s test for sample population differentiated according to ethnicity 
(Table 34) indicated that, the assumption of homogeneity was not violated by all 
measures; except for gender, Levene’s statistic (2, 249) = 11.58, p = .001, and friends’ 
respondents associated with, Levine’s statistic (2, 249) = 4.69, p = .01. Based on the 
median this indicated that equal variances were assumed for all demographic measures 
in this group when differentiated according to ethnicity; except gender, and friends 








Test of homogeneity of variances in demographic data when sample was 


















Gender   11.58 2 249 .00 
Marital Status .75 2 249 .47 
Academic Achievement .58 2 249 .56 
Annual Income     1.83 2 249 .16 
Friends     4.69 2 249 .01 







Notes: Table shows Levene’s statistic for each of the demographic measures, their 






6.11 Examination of the sample population for significant differences in 
the demographic data when differentiated according to gender  
 
 
Table 35 shows the means, medians and the standard deviation of the means, 
for the outcome variables. As predicted in hypothesis 1, the difference between female 
Black respondents (Mdn = 4.00) and male Black respondents (Mdn = 3.00) with 
respect to academic achievement was significant, U = 6957.50, z = 2.04, p = .042 (2-
tailed). However, the effect size was small, r = .13.   As predicted in hypothesis 2, the 
difference in skin tone between female Black respondents (Mdn = 27.00) and male 
Black respondents (Mdn = 29.00) with respect to skin tone was significant, U = 































ORSCRIS2 2.74 2.25 1.66  .66 
ORSCRIS3 3.43 3.50 1.48 -.01 
ORSCRIS4 4.74 5.00 1.51 -.97 
RBIDS1   .55 .33   .72 1.51 
RBIDS2   .08 .00   .31 5.76 
Self-depreciation       8.52 8.00 3.06  -.07 




ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people whom derogatory race-related 
comments about others. 
ORSCRIS2– mental representations of self in relation with people whom derogatory race-related 
comments about self. 
ORSCRIS3– mental representations of self in relation with people whom positive race-related 
comments about others. 
ORSCRIS4 – mental representations of self in relation with people who valued racial difference 
RBIDS1 – Perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body 
RBIDS2 – Effect of perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future 
social interaction 






6.12 Examination of the demographic data for significant differences the 
sample population, when differentiated according to ethnicity  
 
As predicted in hypothesis 3, Mann-Witney tests indicated that, Black African 
Caribbean respondents (Mdn = 3.00) were reported significantly lower academic 
achievement than Black African respondents did (Mdn = 4.00) did, U = 3996.00, z = 
1.979, p = .05 (2-tailed), though the effect size is small, r = .101. The difference in 
annual income between Black African Caribbean (Mdn = 3.00) and Black African 
respondents (Mdn = 2.00) was also significant, U = 3527.00, z = 3.16, p = .002 (2-
tailed), and the effect size was small, r = .217, but unexpected.  
Contrary to hypothesis 4, Black African (Mdn = 27.00) reported significantly 
darker skin tones than Black African Caribbean respondents (Mdn = 29.00) did, U = 
3542.00, z = -3.20, p = .001 (2-tailed). however, the effect size was small, r = -.220.  
As predicted in hypothesis 5, Black African respondents (Mdn = 29.00) were 
significantly darker skinned than mixed Black respondents were (Mdn = 25.00), U = 
960.50, z = 4.99, p = .001. However, the effect size was much larger, r = .40 than it 
was between Black African and Black African Caribbean respondents, r = -.22. The 
difference in skin tone between Black African Caribbean respondents (Mdn = 27.00) 
and mixed Black respondents (Mdn = 25.00) was significant, U = 2343.00, z = 3.34, p 
= .001; however, the effect size was small, r = .26 was small. 
As predicted in hypothesis 6, Black African respondents (Mdn = 2.00) earned 
significantly less money annually than either Black African Caribbean respondents 
(Mdn = 2.00), U = 3592.000, z = -3.07, p = .002, or mixed Black respondents (Mdn = 
3.00), U = 1248.000, z = -3.68, p = .0005. The difference in effect size was greater 
between Black African and mixed Black respondents, r = .32, than it was between 
Black Caribbean and mixed Black respondents, r = -.26.   
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6.13 Examination of the outcome data for significant when the sample is 
differentiated according to gender 
 
 Table 36 shows the median scores for each of the outcome variables in 
questionnaire 3. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that there were no significant 
differences in outcome measures within the sample population when differentiated 
according to gender; except for ORSCRIS2, H (1) = 5.12, p = .024, and self-
depreciation, H (1) = 6.99, p = .009.  
As predicted by hypothesis 7, Mann-Whitney tests indicated that Black male 
respondents (Mdn = 2.94) reported significantly more mental representations of self in 
relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments about self than 
Black female respondents did (Mdn = 2.40), U = 6649.50, z = -1.101, p = .024; 
however, the effect size was small, r = -.15.  
As predicted by hypothesis 8, Mann-Whitney tests indicated that Black male 
respondents (Mdn = 9.69) reported significantly more self-depreciation than Black 
female respondents did (Mdn = 9.91), U = 6622.50, z = -2.626, p = .009; however, the 












ORSCRIS1 ORSCRIS2 ORSCRIS3 ORSCRIS4 RBIDS1 RBIDS2 SD DESII 
 
Black males 





2.94 3.52 4.75 .73 .13 9.69 12.31 
 
Black females 
(N = 112) 
 
3.00 2.40 3.50 5.00 .65 0.00 9.81 10.43 
Note:  
Scores for ORSCRIS1-4 ranged from 1-7.  
Score for racialised body image disturbance (RBID) ranged from 0-7.  
Scores for dissociative experiences (DESII) ranged from range from 1-100.  
Scores of self-depreciation (SD) ranged from 0-15 
Score for self-application (SA) ranged from 0-15. 
ORSCRIS1 – mental representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory race-related comments about others. 
ORSCRIS2– mental representations of self in relation with people who make derogatory race-related comments about self 
ORSCRIS3– mental representations of self in relation with people who make positive race-related comments about others 
ORSCRIS4 – mental representations of self in relation with people who valued racial difference 
RBIDS1 – Perceived concern and preoccupation with the Black body (RBIDS) 
RBIDS2 – Effect of perceived concern and preoccupation with the Black body on future social interaction 





6.14 Examination of the outcome data for significant differences when 




Table 37 shows the median scores for each of the outcome variables in 
questionnaire 3. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that there were no significant 
differences in outcome measures within the sample population when differentiated 
according to ethnicity; except to mental representations of self in relation with people 
who valued each other’s racial identity (ORSCRIS4), H (1) = 6.64, p = .036, and 
effects of perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body, H (1) 
= 6.44, p = .040.  
As predicted in hypothesis 9, Mann-Whitney tests indicated that, Black African 
respondents (Mdn = 21.00) reported significantly more mental representations of self 
in relation with people who valued their racial identity than Black African Caribbean 
respondents did (Mdn = 19.00), U (205) = 3825.00, z = -2.57, p = .01; however, the 
effect size was small, r = .180.  
As predicted in hypothesis 10, Mann-Whitney tests indicated that, Black 
African Caribbean respondents (Mdn = .67) reported significantly more effects of 
perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body than mixed Black 
respondents did (Mdn = .71), U (183) = 3397.00, z = -2.11, p = .01; however, the 
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2.47 3.13 4.71 .71 .12 9.6 9.2 12.1 
 
Note: Scores for ORSCRIS1-4 ranged from 1-7.  
Score for racialised body image disturbance (RBID) ranged from 0-7.  
Scores for dissociative experiences (DESII) ranged from range from 1-10.  











Percentage of response to each item on the Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DES 




f ≤ 20% f ≥ 20% 
1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or 
subway and suddenly realising that they don’t remember 
 
81.6% 18.2% 
2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone 
talk, and they suddenly realise that they did not hear part or all of 
what was said. 
 
68.0% 32.0% 
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and 
having no idea how they got there 
 
91.6% 8.4% 
4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in 
clothes that they do not remember buying. 
 
94.8% 5.2% 
5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their 
belongings that they do not remember buying 
 
94.8% 5.2% 
6. Some people sometimes find that people that they do not know who 




7. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they 
are standing next to themselves or watching themselves do something, 
and they see themselves as if they were looking at another person 
 
82.8% 17.4. % 




9. Some people find that they have no memory of some important events 
in their lives (for example, a wedding, or graduation). 
 
87.0% 4.0% 
10. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they 
do not think that they have lied. 
 
93.2% 6.8% 




12. Some people have the experience of feeling that other persons, 
objects, and the world around them are not real. 
 
91.7% 8.3% 
13. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that their body 





14. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past 
event so vividly that they feel as if they were reliving that event. 
 
79.7% 20.3% 
15. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether the 
things that they remember happening did happen or whether they 
just dreamed them. 
 
87.4% 18.6% 
16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but 
finding it strange and unfamiliar. 
 
87.0% 13.0% 
17. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie, 
they become so absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other 
events happening around them 
 
81.8% 18.2% 
18. Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a 




19. Some people find that they sometimes can ignore pain. 
 
79.6% 20.4% 
20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, 
thinking of nothing, and are not aware of the passage of time 
 
80.7% 19.3% 
21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone, they talk aloud 
to themselves.  
   
76.6% 23.8% 
22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently 
compared with another situation that they feel almost as if they were two 
different people.  
 
70.8% 29.2% 
23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to 
do things with amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be 
difficult for them (for example, sports, work, social situations, etc.). 
 
74.0% 26.0% 
24. Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they 
have done something or have just thought about doing that thing (for 
example, not knowing whether they have just mailed a letter or have just 
thought about mailing it 
 
76.6% 23.4% 
25. Some people find evidence that they have done things that they do not 
remember doing.  
 
85.9% 14.1% 
26. Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes among their 
belongings that they must have done but cannot remember doing. Indicate 
what percentage of the time this happens to you 
 
90.6% 9.4% 
27. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head 
that tell them to do things or comment on things that they are doing.  
 
90.6% 9.4% 
28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world 




6.16 Exploratory Factor Analysis of Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(DESII) 
 
The ‘Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DESII)’ was comprised of 28 items, 
and devised to measure the dissociation on three dimensions: amnesic dissociation, 
imaginative involvement, and Depersonalisation/derealisation (Carlson & Putnam, 
1993). Twenty-eight items were subjected to Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) with 
direct oblimin rotation using SPSS 15.0. Prior to performing PAF, the suitability for 
factor analysis was assessed, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy was 0.933, exceeding the value of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1974), and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance supporting the factorability 
of the correlation matrix, χ
2 
(378) 4,796.60,  p = 0.001. In Table 39, four factors 
possessed Eigenvalues exceeding one, but only one factor accounted at least ≥ 9% of 
the variance. This single factor, (i.e., dissociation), accounted 45.27 % of the variance. 
All items producing coefficients of at least 0.3 and intercorrelations ranged from 0.34 















Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 























2 2.20 7.86 53.13 1.76 6.27 50.07 
3 1.35 4.83 57.96   .86 3.06 53.14 

















Scree plot for Putnam & Bernstein’sa (1986) 

















Carlson and Putnam’s (1993) 3-factor structure was not replicated. From 
Cattell’s Scree (1966) test for DESII in Figure 10, it was decided to retain two 
components for further investigation. This solution was further supported by the 
results of Monte Carlo (PAF) Parallel Analysis, which suggested that, two 
components, (i.e., depersonalisation, and imaginative involvement), with Eigenvalues 
exceeding the corresponding criterion Eigenvalues values of randomly generated data 
of the same size, should be retained (Lautenschlager, 1989; Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 
2007; Watkins, 2000). When simulating standard random samples that parallel the 
observed data in sample size and number of variables in Table 40, two Eigenvalue 
were bigger than the mean of those obtained from the uncorrelated random data were 






Comparison of Eigenvalues from principal components analysis (PCA) and 




Actual Eigenvalues from 
PAF 
 










  2.20 1.56 Accept 
   1.35 1.49 Reject 
   1.12 1.42 Reject 
     .99 1.36 Reject 
 
Note: Decision to accept or reject the criterion was based on the value of the estimated 




6.17 Correlations between demographic variables using Kendal's-tau: 
 
In samples where the test for normalcy has been violated, Kendall’s tau 
statistic could be used to examine the correlations between the variables in the sample 
(Howell, 1997). Table 41 shows the correlations been demographic variables. Dummy 
variables were used to facilitate this process (see Table 3, p. 149). Significant positive 
correlations were observed between age, and marital status (τ = .28, p = .001), and 
academic achievement (τ = .13, p = .007), and annual income (τ = .30, p = .001). 
Significant negative correlations were observed between age and marital status (τ = -
.28, p = .001). Significant negative correlations were observed between marital status 






























1. Age ------- -.06 -.28** -.07 .13** .30** .03 -.02 .06 
2. Gender ------- ------- .06 -.06 .11* .05 -.04 -.13* -.21** 
3. Marital Status ------- ------- ------- -.02 -.02 -.26** .06 .01 -.01 
4. Ethnicity ------- ------- ------- ------- .03 -.01 -.08 .08 -.06 
5. Academic 
Achievement 
------- ------- ------- ------- 
 
------- 
.12* .06 -.08 .00 
6. Annual Income ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -.03 .04 -.05 
7. Friends ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .01 .00 
8. Skin tone ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .06 
 
Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
          **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 





6.18 Correlations between demographic variables while controlling for 
 outcome variables 
 
Using dummy variables (Table 3, p. 178) to represent the order within the 
demographic variables, Table 42 shows significant positive correlations with the 
sample population while controlling all outcome variables. As predicted in hypothesis 
3, significant direct correlations were observed were revealed between age, and marital 
status (τ = .33, p = .001), and annual income (τ = .40, p = .001), but the effects sizes 
were larger. Older Black respondents were married, earned more annually, and held 









Summary of correlations between demographic variables when controlling 





















1. Age ------- -.10 -.33** -.06 .12 .39** .04 .07 
 
2. Gender 




------- ------- ------- -.02 .04 .26** .07 -.02 
 
4. Ethnicity 








------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .05 -.11 
 
7. Ethnicity of 
Friends  
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------ .05 
 
8. Skin tone 




Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
          ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 





6.19 Correlations between outcome measures within the sample 
population using Kendal's-tau: 
 
Table 43 shows the correlations between the outcome measures. As predicted 
in hypothesis 11, significant positive correlations were found between mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-based 
comments about others (ORSCRIS1), and perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS) (τ = .18, p = .001), and self-depreciation (RSES) (τ 
= .09, p = .045), and reported frequency of dissociative experiences (τ = .17, p < .001). 
As predicted in hypothesis 12, significant positive correlations between mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-based 
comments about self (ORSCRIS2), and perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS1) (τ = .24, p = .001), the effect of perceived 
concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future social interaction 
(RBIDS2) (τ = .25, p = .001), self-depreciation (RSES) (τ = .15, p = .001), and 
reported frequency of dissociative experiences (τ = .21, p = .001. 
Contrary to hypothesis 13, small positive correlations between mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-based comments 
about others (ORSCRIS3), and the effect of perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS) (τ = .122, p = .011), self-depreciation (τ = .171, p < 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. ORSCRIS1 1.000 .445** .209** -.011 .177** .045 .089* .167** 
2. ORSCRIS2 ------- 1.000 .236** -.058 .251** .232* .149** .207** 
3. ORSCRIS3 ------- ------- 1.000 .043 .122* .051 .171** .181** 
4. ORSCRIS4 ------- ------- ------- 1.000 -.011 .074 .005 .014 
5. Perceived concern ------- ------- ------- ------- 1.000 306** .070 .161** 
6. Effect of 
perceived concern 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 1.000 .043 .034 
7. Self-depreciation ------- ------- ------ ------- ------- ------ 1.000 .315** 
8. DES  ------- ------ ------ ------- ------- ------- ------- 1.000 
Note:  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  





6.20 Correlations between Outcome measures while controlling for 
demographic variables 
 
Table 44 shows the correlations between outcome variables whilst controlling 
the demographic variables. As predicted in Hypothesis 14, significant positive 
correlations between mental representations of self in relation with people who made 
derogatory race-related comments about others (ORSCRIS1), and perceived concern 
and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body (τ = .18, p < .001), and the reported 
frequency of dissociative experiences (τ = .23, p < .001).  
As predicted in hypothesis 15, significant positive correlations were observed 
between mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory 
race-related comments about self (ORSCRIS2), and perceived concern and 
preoccupation with aspects of the Black body (RBID) (τ = .29, p < .001), perceived 
effects of concern and preoccupation on future social interaction (RBIDS) (τ = .19, p < 
.004), Self-depreciation (τ = .13, p < .038), and the reported frequency of dissociative 
experiences (τ = .20, p < .001).  
Contrary to hypothesis 16, the small positive correlations between mental 
representations of self in relation with people who made positive race-based comments 
about others (ORSCRIS3), and self-depreciation (τ = .20, p < .001), and the reported 







Summary of correlations between outcome measures when controlling 




1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 
1. ORSCRIS1 ------- .525** .284** -.023 .177**  .013 .107 .226** 
2. ORSCRIS2 ------- ------- .270** -.072 .290** .185** .133* .203** 
3. ORSCRIS3 ------- ------- ------- .124 .106 .055 .203** .206** 
4. ORSCRIS4 ------- ------- ------- ------- .024 -.078 .024 .013 
5. Perceived concern ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .368** .078 .192** 
6. Effect of 
perceived concern 
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- .082 .207** 
8. Self-depreciation ------ ------- ------ ------- ------- ------ ------ .309** 
9. Dissociative 
experiences  
------ ------ ------ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 






6.21 Examination of data using Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 
Table 45 shows the outcome of hierarchical multiple regression analysis in the 
sample population. As predicted in hypothesis 17, the overall model was significant, F 
7, 254) = 9.70, p = .001, and accounted for 19.3% of the variation in the reported 
frequency of dissociative experiences. Three measures contributed significantly to the 
variation in the reported frequency of dissociative experiences in Black respondents. 
These were self-depreciation, β = .30, t = 5.20 p = .001, mental representations of self 
in relation with people who made positive race-related comments about self 
(ORSCRIS3), β = .14, t = 2.25, p = .025, and effects of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body on future social interaction (RBIDS), β = .16, t = 
2.58, p = .011. None of the other measures contributed significantly to the variation in 










Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model predicts the reported frequency of 





B Se B β 
  
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS1) 
 
.07 .05 .09 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made derogatory race-related 
comments about self (ORSCRIS2) 
 
.10 .02 .15 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who made positive race-related 
comments about other people (ORSCRIS3) 
 
.05 .05 .14* 
 
Mental representations of self in relation with 
people who were as accepting of their racial 
identity as they were of others (ORSCRIS4) 
 
.03 .04 .03 
 
Perceived concern and preoccupation with 
aspects of the Black body (RBIDS1) 
 
.04 .04 .07 
 
Effect of perceived concern and preoccupation 
with aspects of the Black body (RBIDS2) 
 
.58 .22 .16* 




 = .193 
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 






6.22 A Path Analysis of the proposed theoretical model using SEM 
 
‘Path analysis’ may be defined as an examination of a series of hypotheses by 
looking at the magnitude of both observed and latent (unobserved) direct and indirect 
effects on each other with the purpose of explaining the observed effects (Raykov & 
Marcoulides, 2000). Path analysis using structural equation modelling is used here to 
provided confirmatory analysis of the proposed theoretical model. Figure 11 shows a 
structural diagram modelling the potential interrelations between a particular set of 



































The structural diagram above specifies the relation between contextual, 
personal, personality, (i.e., object and object relation and social cognitive elements), 
and resultant behaviour, (i.e., perceived concern, and the reported frequency of 
dissociative experiences). It was hypothesised that personal factors, (i.e., age, gender, 
marital status, academic achievement, annual income, and skin tone will interact with 
contextual factors, (e.g., perceived racism), resulting in relational race-based schema 
factors, racialised body image disturbance, low self-esteem, and dissociative 
experiences. The measurement model in Figure 12 specifies both the observed 
variables and latent factors as yet unknown will be estimated. Figure 12 shows a path 
diagram describing the proposed relationship between those variables that were found 



































A = Age    G = ORSCRIS1  K = PRBC 
B = Gender    H = ORSCRIS2  L = EPRBC 
C = Marital Status   I = ORSCRIS3  M = DES 
D = Academic Achievement  J = ORSCRIS4  N = ↓SES  
E = Annual Income                 






















A B D C 
Resultant 
Factors 
G H M K L E I J 
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If it was assumed that none of the factors were correlated with each other and 
that each factor affected each other positively, negatively, or not at all, then a non-
recursive model is indicated. The proposed model as illustrated in Figure 13, however, 
was found to be recursive because it was hypothesised that factors indicative of 
perceived relational race-based schemas, racialised body image disturbance, self-
depreciation, predict dissociative experiences which could then be measured, (i.e., 
exogenous factors → categories of race-related schemas → racialised body image 
disturbance → self-depreciation), unidirectionally. There no significant between the 
proposed theoretical model and the observed model. All these factors affected the 
reported frequency of dissociative experiences, unidirectionally.  
The measured factors were, therefore, indicative of important in explaining the 
dependent variable, but not exhaustive. Latent variables may be defined as 
hypothetical or theoretical variables (constructs) that are not or cannot be observed 
directly and deemed critical in determining that the validity of the proposed theoretical 
model. Path analysis is determined whether there was a logical explanation for the 
observed relationship between a series of independent variables according to the 









Path diagram of Non-Recursive Model testing  








LISREL 8.8 was used for confirmatory analysis of the proposed theoretical 
analysis. Missing values were assumed to occur at random, and therefore, error evenly 
distributed across the model. Figure 13 shows a path diagram of the proposed non-
recursive model, analysed. Model identification required a comparison to be made 
between the estimated expected variance-covariance matrix and the model observed 
variance-covariance matrix obtained from the empirical data. If the difference between 
the implied and observed models is negligible, the model is said to ‘fit’ the data 
reasonably well, (i.e., the distance between the matrices must not be significant). It 
was hypothesised that, when mentally represented, race-related incidents conspire to 
cause to perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body and its 
effect on the future social interaction (RBIDS), low self-esteem, and the reported 
frequency of dissociative experiences. While path analysis cannot be used to establish 
cause per se, it can be used to infer causal relationships between measured variables 
within reason. Which category of mental representation would reveal was not 
predetermined. Table 46 shows the correlation matrix of the variables correlated with 
the reported frequency of dissociation experiences. Only those variables found 
correlated with the frequency of dissociative experiences significantly were added for 










































1. Age 1.00 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------ ------ ------ ------ 
 
2. Annual Income 
           
.30** 
1.00 ------- ------- ------- ------- ------ ------- ------- ------- 
 
3. ORSCRIS1 
-.04 .08 1..00 ------- ------- ------- ------ ------ -------- ------- 
 
4. ORSCRIS2 
.01 -.18** .45** 1.00 ------- ------- ------ ------ -------- ------- 
 
5. ORSCRIS3 
-.06 -.04 .21** .24** 1.00 ------- ------ ------ ------- ------- 
 
6. ORSCRIS4 
-.05 -04 -.01 0.06 .04 1.00 ------ ------ ------- ------- 
 
7. PRBC 
-.09 -.15 .17** .25** .12 -.01 1.00 ------ ------- ------- 
 
8. Effects of PRBC 
.03 .15** .05 .23 .07 .01 .44 1.00 ------- ------- 
9. Low self esteem .13** .14** .09* .15* .17 .01 .07 .09 1.00 ------- 
10. DES .14** .21** .17* .20** .18 .01 .16 .08 -.30 1.00 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
            * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 







The author used LISREL 8.8 to analyse the data in Table 47. The goodness-of-
fit statistic, χ
2
 (257) = 27.15, DF = 29, p = .56 was found using a maximum likelihood 
method; indicating that, the observed model was not significantly different from the 
expected model, (i.e., GFI = .98; .96 adjusted). As the chi-square test is dependent on 
assumptions of normality, therefore other fit criteria were examined (Raykov & 
Marcoulides, 2000). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00; Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
= .92; Root Mean Square Residual =.06, and Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) = .05. SEM indicated that, low age (β = .05), low annual 
income (β = .09), ORSCRIS1 (β = .08), ORSCRIS2 (β = .15), ORSCRIS3 (β = .18), 
ORSCRIS4 (β = .01), PRBC = β = .04), and self-depreciation (β = .35) were found to 
have a direct effect on the reported frequency of dissociative experiences. If, the 
unexplained variance in the error/disturbance term is (0.79), and the last term in the 
Psi or variance-covariance matrix is squared, then 1.00 - 0.62 = .38. Therefore, its 
predictors accounted for 0.38 or 38% of the variance in the frequency of dissociative 
experiences reported in this non-clinical sample of the Black population in the UK. 







Code used to test Non-Recursive Model Analysis 
 
DA NI=12 NO=256 MA=TM 
TI Predictors of Dissociative Experiencias        




 .301  1.000  
-.038  -.079     1.000 
 .011  -.180       .445      1.000  
-.058  -.037       .209        .236      1.000  
-.053  -.040     -.011       -.058        .043       1.000 
-.090  -.152       .177        .251        .122      -.011        1.000  
-.029  -.149       .045        .232        .065      -.004          .443        1.000 
 .131    .144     -.089      -.149       -.171      -.005         -.070        -.088        1.000 
-.135   -.206      .167        .207        .181       .014          .161           .078       -.315     1.000 
  
MO NY=10 NE=10 TE=SY, FI LY=FU, FI PS=SY, FI BE=FU, FI 
FR TE 1 1 TE 2 2 TE 3 3 TE 4 4 TE 5 5 TE 6 6 TE 7 7 TE 8 8 TE 9 9 TE 10 10  
EQ TE 1 1 TE 2 2 TE 3 3 TE 4 4 TE 5 5 TE 6 6 TE 7 7 TE 8 8 TE 9 9 TE 10 10  
ST 1.00 LY 1 1 LY 2 2 LY 3 3 LY 4 4 LY 5 5 LY 6 6 LY 7 7 LY 8 8 LY 9 9 LY 10 10  
ST 1.00 PS 1 1 PS 2 2 PS 3 3 PS 4 4 PS 5 5 PS 6 6 PS 7 7 PS 8 8 PS 9 9 PS 10 10  
FR PS 10 10 
FR PS 9 1 PS 9 2 PS 9 4 PS 9 5 PS 8 2 PS 8 4 PS 8 7 PS 7 2 PS 7 3 PS 7 4 PS 7 5 PS 5 2 PS 5 3  
PS 4 2 PS 4 3 PS 2 1  
FR BE 10 1 BE 10 2 BE 10 3 BE 10 4 BE 10 5 BE 10 6 BE 10 8 BE 10 9 
am 









Black people of African and Caribbean descent, (i.e., Black people) have been 
migrating to the UK for centuries (Gilroy, 19920. Migration on mass did not occur 
until the 1950s for Black Caribbean people and 1960s for Black African people. The 
vast majority of Black people tend to live in inner-city areas where it is relatively easy 
to find work, (i.e., the major conurbations of London, Manchester, Leeds, and 
Birmingham). Over 78% of Black  people of African descent, and 61% of Black  
people of African Caribbean descent, however, live in London UK (ONS, 2004). 
Although most Black people manage to lead healthy, active lives, and contribute to 
society, some Black people continue to be overrepresented in the mental health care 
system in the UK, diagnosed with Schizophrenia, and compelled to take antipsychotic 
treatments (Commission for Healthcare, Audit & Inspection (UK), 2005; The Health 
and Social Care Information Centre (UK), 2008, 2011, 2013). The reasons ‘why’ this 
might the case remain unclear, but Black people detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983/2007 often give racism as the cause of the health and financial difficulties 
(Gilvarry et al., 1999; Cooper et al., 2008). Perceived racism race-based rejection or 
stereotype threat may so undermine racial/ethnic identity that mental illness ensues 
(Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Douglas, 2009; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002; 
Sánchez-Huclés, 1998; Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005; van Laar, 2000). ‘Institutional 
racism’ may merely recreates and reinforces the beliefs, oppressed, racialised, Black 
people may already hold (Bhugra et al., 1996; Fernando et al., 2013), and confounding 
any relationship those so oppressed may have in relation those from whom they seek 
help and support (Jarvis, 2008; Sashidharan, 1990, 1993).  
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In examining the relationship between perceived racism and schizophrenia, it 
was necessary to go ‘to the thing itself’, (i.e., the Blackness). Hence, it was argued that 
Black people are ‘thrown’ into a social world that may appear hostile all the time to 
some Black people, but not necessarily all Black people (Thompson, 1988: Weiner, 
1986, 2000). At the core of Black people’s experiencing, (i.e., the Noema), is the 
Black body. It is the Black body that signifies that which should be set apart without 
making independent as I have previously argued (De Maynard, 2006), and it is the 
Black body that appears to attract hostility within the context of race-related incidents 
(Landrine & Klonoff, 1996). Black African Caribbean people have been residing in 
the UK longer than Black African people have, and therefore, may have become so 
sensitised to race-related discrimination that they anxiously expected it when any race-
related comment is made (Branscombe et al., 1999; Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002). 
Even where positive race-related comments made about the Black body, doubt as for 
the reasons for mentioning those aspects of the Black body often stigmatised in 
relation could precipitate a desire to separate them out from waking consciousness 
(Hajnis et al., 1994). In relation with others, Black people may assume a different 
ethnic/racial identity where their Blackness does not exist for them in relation with 
others, psychologically. Black female respondents, however, may be so used to 
receiving positive race-related comments about their Black bodies, that they may only 
become concerned and preoccupied with their Black bodies in situations where 
derogatory race-related comments are made about others. On the other hand, 
possessing darker skin tones than either ethnic African Caribbean or mixed Black 
people in general, Black African people may have greater opportunity to attribute 
derogatory race-based comments to the disposition of others than either Black 
Caribbean or mixed Black people.  
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Although Black African people attained better academic achievement in this 
sample, they were still less likely to reap the benefits in the workplace as African 
Caribbean people did (Alleyne, 2004). This may be a failure of ‘bridging social 
capital’ in Black African people; in so much as, ‘bonding social capital’ is not enough 
to ensure social mobility (Dwyer et al., 2006). Such disadvantages may be reinforced 
in relation with other members of the community, where inspite of Black African 
people’s reported higher academic achievement (Census, 2011), Black African people 
do not appear to have triumphed on the economic and social battlefields of life 
(Leverenz, 1989). Clearly, educational achievement as a means to social mobility and 
the way out of poverty is not as straightforward or clear-cut as some people would 
have people think (Dwyer, al. 2006; Campbell, 2013). ‘Whom you know’ seems 
equally important as ‘what you know’, and some Black communities appear to be 
‘more equal than others’, apparently.  Those who had been in the UK long enough to 
determine that social forces limit personal agency despite ability and effort seem to 
perceive racism more readily in external, stable, uncontrollable situations than those 
who do not (van Laar, 2000; Weiner, 1986, 2000). Hence, the experience of being 
Black in the UK may not be the same for all those so stigmatised. Some Black people 
appear to be somehow “Blacker” or more stigmatised than other Black people are, but 
health, economic, education, and social care policy fails to reflect this in the health, 
education and social services it provides to Black people. 
Black people may find some peace and support immersed, in groups of people 
who share their defining features (Sellers et al., 1997; Stafford et al., 2010), but 
solidarity in reference group orientation may not resolve the age-old issue of how best 
to be in the world as a stigmatised person (Bécares et al., 2014; MacDonald & Leary, 
2005). Existentially, Black people must grapple with the realisation that they too must 
suffer, struggle, subject to chance, and involve themselves inexorably in guilt like 
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everyone else, but in the end, we must all die (Jaspers, 1951). When applied to 
‘assortative mating’, Rushton’s (2005) ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’ dictates that, 
people choose to be in relation with those who are similar, firstly in socio-
demographic variables such as age, ethnicity and academic level, then in opinions and 
attitudes, and cognitive ability, and lastly on personality and physical traits. Clearly, 
the existential givens alone do not confer within-group identity and status, and the 
converse of Rushton’s (2005) Genetic Similarity theory is true where wealth is a 
critical factor. To act in ‘good faith’ therefore requires the acknowledgement, 
accommodation, and acceptance of those aspects of our appearance that others may 
find, objectionable or socially undesirable. For those Black people so stigmatised in 
relation, there may no escape or avoidance, physically. Where perceived social 
disadvantage and deprivation persist, some Black people as scientists may look for a 
cause and judge that the cause lies externally them in stable uncontrollable situations. 
Black people must therefore either come to accept that some people will stigmatise 
them in relation, and treat them adversely, or work out how best to be interrelation 
with those that appear to threaten their existence.   
Although ethnicity, ‘race’, ‘racism’, and ‘racial identity’ have no basis in 
biological fact, they remain socio-political constructs often used to devalue the 
common attributes of one social grouping in relation with others (Bradby, 2012; 
Howarth, 2006; Mayr, 2002; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Racism, real or imagined, 
however, remains a common experience for ethnic minority people in the UK (DCLG, 
2007, 2008; HORDSD, 2003, 2004, 2006). The sense of race-based rejection and 
inferiority often felt in relation with those who do not possess those aspects of the 
Black body often stigmatised in relation  is reflected the unequal distribution of wealth 
and other resources, and perpetuates social, educational, economic, and health 
inequality seems, intergenerationally (Berthoud, 1999, 2000, 2002; Elevation 
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Networks Trust, 2012). Racial stereotypes seem to remain salient where they continue 
to determine the extent to which Black people are able to maintain useful social 
relations with those who could be able to help and support them within the context of 
their everyday lives (Crocker & Major, 1989; Campbell & McClean, 2002). 
In relation with the mental health system in the UK, Black people’s sense race-
related persecution or cultural mistrust (Newbigging & McKeown, 2007), may have 
given clinicians the impression that paranoia, prevails (Comb et al., 2006; Freeman et 
al., 2005; McNeilly et al., 1996; Spauwen et al., 2006). In the absence of an 
identifiable causal link between organic dysfunction, however, and the relationship 
between perceived racism and common mental disorders, migration, pregnancy and 
birth complications, social deprivation and disadvantage, and poor academic 
performance in Black people, should be explored further (Bhui, 2002; McKenzie, 
2006; Cantor-Graae, 2007). Interestingly Black people detained under the Mental 
Health Act 1983/2007 often give racism as the cause of their health and financial 
difficulties as I  and others have previously argued (Gilvarry et al., 1999; De Maynard, 
2008; Cooper et al., 2008). It is important, however, to be clear as to what is meant by 
‘racism’ and how apparent how race-related incidents might impact on the mental 
health of Black people in the UK (Bryant-Davies & Ocampo, 2005; Carter & Forsyth, 
2007; Dupont-Joshua, 1994; 1996; Lightsey & Barnes Jr., 2007; Sanchez-Huclés, 
1998; Crosier, 2005; Paradies, 2006; Jernigan & Henderson, 2011; Sashidharan et al., 
2014).  
In context, most Black people can be said to assume a racial/ethnic identity that 
combines both an individual distinctiveness and ethnic group orientation group 
(Brewer, 1977, 1991). Movement about this continuum of distinctiveness or group 
orientation seems dependent on the context within which Black people find 
themselves (Castelli & Tomerelli, 2007; Krippner, 1997). Where a given 
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society/community casts as the value apportioned to the Black body in relation, Black 
racial/ethnic identity confusion and disconnection may ensue. Most English 
dictionaries define racism as the belief that all members of a given ‘race’ possess 
characteristics, abilities, or qualities specific to that ‘race’, with the specific purpose of 
deeming such qualities inferior, or indeed superior, in relation with another ‘race’. 
Such definitions, therefore, contain two elements: 1) distinguishing characteristics, and 
2) a power differential. A broad nose, dark skin, tight curly hair, full lips, etc., (Hajnis 
et al., 1994), are physical characteristics that have come to distinguish Black people 
from other ethnic groups, and those possessing such distinguishing features are often 
stigmatised in relation with those who do not possess them (Pinel, 1999; Howarth, 
2002, 2006; Castelli, De Amicis & Sherman, 2007). Those so stigmatised often can 
often feel discredited, powerless, (Crocker & Major, 1989; Steele & Aronson, 1995; 
Steele, 1997), and perhaps even downright wretched in relation with those who do not 
possess them.  
Even where there are no obvious physical differences, derogatory race-related 
remarks may still be made about an individual’s religion, the clothes she or he wears, 
or the food she or he eats, etc., and this can be equally distressing (Bhui, 2000). 
Perceived threat in specific situations (specific), and the anxious expectation of threat 
in all situations (global), may determine the extent to which an individual may or may 
not interact with others and the world-around (Abramson et al., 1978; Bentall et al., 
1994, 2001; Branscombe et al., 1999; Martin & Penn, 2001; Seligman, 1972; Weiner, 
2000; van Laar, 2000). In anxiety-provoking situations, cognitive inhibition of the 
threat may weaken in those prone to dissociation and dissociative experiences 
(Dorahy, 2007). From a social learning perspective, Black people are motivated to 
attend, retain, reproduce behaviour observed in the surroundings, and in their co-
construction of everyday experience attribute cause and effect (Bandura, 1977, 1989; 
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Gergen, 1971, 1985; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tajfel, 1981). 
Where Black people feel they have some control over past outcomes, they may 
attribute negative experiences to inherent characteristics of an anxiety-provoking agent 
(Bentall et al., 1994, 2001). However, where negatives experiences, but Black people 
do not appear to be passive recipients of observed or behaviour acquired from 
experience. Where Black people lack the personal and social capital to active co-
construct experience positively (Cote & Healey, 2001; Dwyer, Moddo, Gurchathen, 
Shah, & Thapar-Bjorket, 2006; Reynolds, 2004) cognitive inhibition of perceived 
threat may be insufficient or seem pointless, leaving them prone to dissociation and 
dissociative experiences in anxiety-provoking situations (Abramson et al., 1978). 
When negatively primed in race-related situations, such individuals may report 
heightened threat-induced anxiety indicative of a breakdown in inhibitory functioning 
and the fragmentation of Black identity (Dorahy, 2006). 
Utsey (1998) and Cross (1971, 1991) argued that racism is an everyday 
stressor for Black people, and Lau and Hoare (2012) and DfES (2002a, 2002b) found 
that perceived was a common experience for young Black people in the UK. It is not, 
however simply the perceived derogation of the Black body alone per se that causes 
the emotional distress (Hesse-Biber, 2004; Klonoff et al., 1999; Miller, 2001), it is the 
consequences. The anxious expectation of perceived racism and its effects for future 
social interaction may so undermine racial/ethnic identity that mental ill health ensues 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 2005; Carter & Forsyth, 2007; 
Crocker et al., 1991; Douglas, 2009; Jernigan & Henderson, 2011; Sánchez-Huclés, 
1998). When mentally represented, such threat-provoking experiences may not be so 
readily inhibiting especially, in young Black people. Cross (1971, 1978), and Thomas 
(1971) proposed a model of ‘Nigrescence’ in which they posited that, Blackness or 
reference group orientation or social identity, was essentially the same as 
254 
 
personal/individual ethnic identity, and that if Black people accepted their own 
Blackness, they would lead healthy, active lives, and contribute to the wider society. 
Cross (1991) revised this original model in line with the prevailing social 
categorization theory, however, and proposed that Blackness or reference group 
orientation or social identity bears little reflection on personal/individual identity or , 
(uniqueness). Helms (1984) operationalised ‘Cross and Thomas’ ‘Model of 
Nigrescence’’ (1971) to reflect the change in racial identity attitudes along a 
continuum from a mental state where the Black person is aware of racism as 
something that happens to other people to one where the Black person is as accepting 
of his or her own racial identity and those of others. Reliance on racial identity 
attitudes, however, gives no indication as to the underlying mental representations that 
might be indicative of the subjective experiences of racism. 
Some Black people may find it difficult to accommodate and accept their 
racial/ethnic identity where stigmatised in relation with a world around that seems 
hostile all the time (Thompson, 1988, Pinel 1999; Howarth, 2002), and resort to 
psychological defence mechanisms like dissociation in an attempt to better cope with 
perceived racism. In shifting the blame for perceived to an external, unstable, or 
specific factor, Black people may protect and/or enhance their self-esteem (Crocker & 
Major, 1989; Forsyth, 1987; Weiner, 1985). Where Black people may perceive that 
stigmatisation is not personal and/or peculiar to him or her, but indicative of a general 
attitude to all Black people as members of a designated, marginalised, out-group 
marginalisation seems inevitable (Tajfel, 1969, 1970, 1981). Perceived racism may not 
necessarily result in low self-esteem (Charles, 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). In 
this thesis, perceived racism was associated with low self-esteem. Further, ethnic pride 
and ethnic group orientation did not protect against the negative effect of perceived 
racism on self-esteem (Bosqui et al., 2014). Racial/ethnic identity or ethnic reference 
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group orientation cannot be separated-out or dissociated from the context in which 
perceived racism occurs as Croker & Major, 1989 and Crocker et al.,1991 suggest 
because at the core of Black identity and reference group orientation is the Black body. 
The Black body must exist in all conditions. Fundamental to both individual identity 
and social identity is the preexistence of Black body. In turning to the other in relation, 
I previously argued that some Black people may be reduced to being an object for the 
other (De Maynard, 2006), and in so doing, the other is immediately objectified, in 
return (Sartre, 1943/1956). Where ethnic group orientation is deemed unimportant, or 
where Black people are indifferent or harbour negative beliefs and feelings towards 
their Black bodies, racialised body image disturbance may be indicated (Veale, 2004). 
Where stigma consciousness coincides with the effect of perceived concern and 
preoccupation with the Black body may have on future social interaction, race-based 
rejection sensitivity may give way to Black identity fragmentation. The Black person 
sensitised to perceived racism appears to attempt to dissociate or separate out those 
aspects of his or her Black identity from the apparent meaning attributed to the pre-
existence of the Black body. Therefore, a new model of racial Identity development is 
proposed.  
My racial/ethnic identity development model operationalised ‘Cross and 
Thomas’ (1971) ‘Nigrescence’ from an ‘object relations and social cognition 
perspective’. In processing race-related information, Black people construct relational 
race-based schemas with which Black people can then use to make sense of 
new/different race-related experiences. The Black body is at the centre of the 
experiencing. Race-based relational cognitions are conceived as a function of object 
relations and signify something about ‘how’ the Black body might be mentally 
represented in relation with others in given social situations. It was hypothesised that 
as Black people detained under the Mental Health Act 1983/2007 often give racism as 
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the cause of their emotional distress and social dysfunction, there should be evidence 
of the relationship between relational race-based schemas and the frequency of 
reported dissociative experiences within the wider Black community. Black people 
mentally represent race-related experiences, as relational schemas of perceived racism, 
which, when primed or reactivated  in contexts where stereotype threat or social 
betrayal seems imminent (Freyd et al., 2001), might be so traumatic that dissociative 
experiences indicative of dopamine dysregulation, ensue (Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, 
2005; Lightsey & Barnes Jr., 2007; Sánchez-Huclés, 1998; Selten et al., 2013). 
Dissociation may be defined as, the psychological process whereby the 
normally integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the 
environment become disconnected (DSM-IV, 2000), and characterised by ‘distinct 
changes in a person's sense of identity, memory, or consciousness’ (Davison & Neale, 
1994, p. 178), which are essentially culture-bound (Krippner, 1997). Dissociative 
experiences may range from simply daydreaming, or losing oneself in a book or film, 
to more extreme dissociative experiences, (e.g., depersonalisation, derealisation, 
imaginative involvement, automatised actions, numbing of emotional responses, 
memory loss, or fugue states). Dissociative experiences, however, concur or indeed 
overlap with, symptoms of schizophrenia-like paranoia, delusions, hallucinations, or 
disorganised thought, speech and/or behaviour (Gainer, 1994; Kluft, 1987; Moskowitz 
et al., 2008). Despite the difficulty differentiating between the symptomatology of 
dissociative disorders and schizophrenia (Gainer, 1994), Black people of African and 
Caribbean descent (Black people) however, continue to be diagnosed with 
Schizophrenia, and over-represented within the mental health care system in the UK 
(Commission for Healthcare, Audit and Inspection, 2005; Care Quality Commission & 
National Mental Health Development Unit, 2010).  
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Race-related incidents are common experiences for Black people in the UK 
(Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), 2007, 2008). Black 
people detained under the Mental Health Act 1983/2007 often give racism as the cause 
of their mental health difficulties (Gilvarry et al., 1999). The symptomatology of 
dissociative identity disorders and schizophrenia spectrum disorders remain difficult to 
differentiate (Gainer, 1994). Therefore, there should be some evidence of the 
relationship between race-based relational schemas and the frequency of reported 
dissociative experiences within a nonclinical sample of the Black population in the 
UK. Two new scales: My ‘Object Relations and Social Cognition Scale (ORSCRIS)’ 
and my Racialised Body Image Scale (RBIDS)’, operationalised race-related schemas 
and their latent effect on social interact, and their construct validity was tested using 
Landrine & Klonoff’s (1996) ‘Schedule of Racist Events (SRE)’, and Mendoza-
Denton et al.’s (2002) ‘Race-based Rejection Sensitivity Scale (RBRS)’, respectively. 
Race-related comments need not be derogatory in nature to induce dissociative 
experiences in Black people in general. Such race-related dissociation could occur in 
Black people, even if others simply mentioned those Black physical features emotions 
and behaviours often associated with Black people, (e.g., broad nose, dark skin, tight 
curly hair, full lips, etc. (Hajnis et al., 1994)).   
In study 1, the construct validity of the two new scales, ORSCRIS and RBIDS, 
was tested against the Landrine & Klonoff’s (1996) ‘Schedule of Racist Experiences 
(SRE)’. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EPA) of SRE indicated that SRE had two 
dimensions: (1) ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, and (2) ‘Appraised Chronic 
Racist Events (SRE)’. Contrary to expectation, neither reported perceived concerns 
and preoccupations with aspects of the Black body, or the effect of perceived concern 
and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body on future social interaction, 
positively correlated with or contributed significantly to reported ‘Appraised Acute 
258 
 
Racist Events (SRE)’, and ‘Appraised Chronic Racist Events (SRE)’ in Black people 
overall, (i.e., p < ns). This may be due to Black people believing that appraised acute 
and chronic racist events have nothing whatsoever to do with perceived concerns or 
preoccupations with the Black body and vice versa.  
Convergent and divergent validity was found, however, between the subscales 
of ORSCRIS, and ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’. As expected, significant 
positive correlations were found between ‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE)’, and 
mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-
related comments about others (ORSCRIS1) and mental representations of self in 
relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments about self 
(ORSCRIS2). Negative effects of perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of 
the Black body on future social interaction (RBIDS), and mental representations of 
self in relation with people who made derogatory race-related comments about self 
(ORSCRIS2), however, contributed significantly to the variance in reported 
‘Appraised Acute Racist Events (SRE). Therefore, in the absence of the effect of 
concern and preoccupation with  aspects of the Black body on future social interaction, 
primed derogatory race-based relational schema were more important in appraising 
new/different acute racist events than race-based comments about the Black body 
(Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009; Mussweiler, Ruter & Epstude, 2004). 
No significant difference between the mean for ‘Race-based Rejection 
Sensitivity (RBRS)’ (M = 12.25) reported in Mendoza-Denton et al. (2002), and that 
found in this study (M = 12.05), p < ns, and as those who participated were also taken 
from a nonclinical population of Black people, no significant difference in RBRS had 
been predicted. It was, however, interesting to note that, age, mental representations of 
self in relation with people who made positive race-related comments about self, and 
the effect of perceived concern of other people were key predictors of race-based 
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rejection sensitivity in a sample population of Black people in the UK, overall. This 
implied that the appraisal of racist events was based on the effect of simply 
mentioning distinguishing characteristics that have come to define Black people in the 
UK, fundamentally. These mental representations of self in relation with people who 
made positive race-related comments about self, and the effect of perceived concern 
and preoccupation on future social interaction of other people may be sufficient to 
induce race-based rejection sensitivity; particularly, in older Black people when so 
primed. Where Black people are unable to inhibit the unwanted race-based thoughts, 
feeling, minimalizing perceived racism or Black group orientation may prove 
insufficient, and dissociative experiences are observed. 
Consistent with Jablonski & Chaplin (2000) Black male respondents reported 
possessing darker skin tones than Black female respondents, did. Further, Black 
African respondents reported significantly darker skin tones than the Black African 
Caribbean and ethnic mixed Black respondents, did. This difference may be due to the 
absence of as much miscegenation in Black African respondents, especially if they 
have recently migrated to the UK. These differences, however, were not expected to 
have any effect on the reported frequency of dissociative experiences. Consistent with 
Hughes & Hertel (1990), and Keith & Herring (1991), those who reported possessing 
darker skin tones also reported earning significantly less annual income than those 
who reported lighter skin tone despite reporting significantly higher academic 
achievement than either Black Caribbean or ethnic mixed Black respondents. 
Although academic achievement was significantly correlated with annual income for 
Black African respondents, this was not the case for the Black Caribbean or mixed 
Black respondents. This implies that academic achievement does not determine annual 
income in the Black Caribbean and mixed Black people as it might do for Black 
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African people, and supports the view that  experience of being Black in the UK, is not 
the same for all Black people. 
As Black African respondents reported significantly darker skin tones and 
lower annual incomes than either Black African Caribbean or mixed Black 
respondents, in-between subjects tests might be expected to reveal that Black African 
respondents reported significantly more derogatory race-related schemas than the 
Black African Caribbean or mixed Black respondents, did. This was, in fact, the case 
and mental representations of self in relation with people who made derogatory race-
related comments about self and self-depreciation contributed to the reported 
frequency of dissociative experiences in Black African respondent. Despite the 
difference in derogatory race-related experiences reported, however, Black African 
respondents were significantly more accepting of their racial identity than either Black 
Caribbean or mixed Black respondents, did. This may be because those Black African 
people who participated were happy in their own skin and/or better able to suppress 
unwanted race-related thoughts and feelings than either Black Caribbean or mixed 
Black respondents, were. Further tests, however, need to be carried out to determine 
whether the suppression of unwanted  race-related thoughts are significantly correlated 
with, and contribute to, perceived relational race-related schema (ORSCRIS), but 
again it would appear being Black people in the UK is not the same for all so 
designated Black people. 
As predicted in study 3, significant positive correlations were observed 
variation in the mental representations, some Black people held about themselves in 
relationships with people who made derogatory race-related comments about self, 
perceived race-related concerns, the effects of perceived concern and preoccupation on 
future social interaction, and self-depreciation and dissociative experiences in the 
sample population, overall. When primed and activated, mental representations 
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indicative of the subjective experience of racism may so undermine racial/ethnic or 
social identity that mental ill health, ensues. When mentally represented, however, the 
relational race-based experience need not be derogatory in order to exert a negative 
effect. Black female respondents may be used to other people commenting on their 
physicality. However, Black males may find such attention alarming if not 
unwarranted. This is salient in Black people overall, because  mental representations 
of self in relation to people who make positive race-related comments about self, and 
the effect of perceived race-related concern and preoccupation with aspects of the 
Black body on future social interaction, contributed significantly to the variance in the 
reported race-based rejection sensitivity, and the reported frequency of dissociative 
experiences. Hence, simply mentioning aspects of the Black body such as skin tone 
(Russell et al., 1993), hair texture (O’Kawaza-Rey, Robinson & Ward, 1986), 
thickness of the lips of Black people (Hajnis et al., 1994), may reactivate relational 
race-based relational schemas (Croker & Major 1989; Story, 1998; Howarth, 2002), 
resulting in excessive wariness, identity insecurity and confusion, lack of confidence, 
frustration, and the desire ‘fix’ the appearance (De Souza, 2005; Lonzozou, et al., 
2010).  
The difference in which mental representations of race-related schema 
contributed the reported frequency of dissociative experiences and the fact that any 
mental representations of race-related schema contributed at all testifies the fact 
racism, and racial discrimination does not affect all Black people in the same. 
Dissociative experiences (M = 11.49, SD = 7.52) were not reported at a frequency 
dissimilar to that which might be expected in the general population (M = 7.8) 
(Carlson & Putnam, 1993; Waller et al., 1995). The average mean frequency of 
reported dissociative experiences was, however, significantly differed from that 
reported by Douglas (2009) from a general population of African American students, 
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(i.e. M = 20.94, SD = 15.50), t = 4.55, p < .001. This may have been due to the 
difference in age between the UK sample and USA sample; given that, younger people 
are expected to report higher frequencies of dissociative experiences than older 
persons, are (Carlson, 1993). Multicollinearity, exaggerated R
2
 values, and overly 
narrow confidence intervals are valid criticisms that have been raised about the use of 
multiple regression to determine significant predictors of a predetermined outcome 
measure using the same data (Altman & Anderson, 1989). Hence, the author exercised 
caution as to the reliability of the findings following multiple linear regression 
analysis. Hierarchical multiple linear regression (HLR) analysis, however, was a 
useful way of determining what contribution each significant factor made to the 
variance in the reported frequency of dissociative experiences in a representative 
sample of the Black population (Hocking, 1976). Path analysis using structural 
equation modelling revealed that, youth (β = -0.06), low annual income (β = 0.13), 
ORSCRIS1 (β = 0.07), ORSCRIS2 (β = 0.09), ORSCRIS3 (β = 0.09), and low self-
esteem (β = 0.25), significantly contributed to 38% of the reported frequency of 
dissociative experiences in Black people in the UK overall. This finding implies that 
the confirming the proposed theoretical model is unidimensional and not circular as 
originally proposed.  
These findings were consistent, with the view that perceived racism does not 
merely challenge Black identity, but threaten to Black identity to the point of 
annihilation in those susceptible and sensitised to it (Osborne, 2006, 2007). When a 
susceptible Black person, sensitised to perceived racism, projects him or herself into 
the future, perceived effects of perceived racism on future interactions may compound 
any felt self-depreciation reflexive of the fragmentation of Black self-identity (Bryant 
& Ocampo, 2005; Sánchez-Huclés, 1998; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). The 
category of mental representation, however, differed according to gender and 
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ethnicity. Those Black people, who have accepted the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aspects of their 
ethnic/racial identity and their environment, were less likely to experience racialised 
body image disturbance, self-depreciation, and dissociative experiences, and react 
emotionally to perceived racism than those Black people who did not. Hence, where 
the symptomatology of dissociative disorders, schizotypy, and schizophrenia are 
difficult to differentiate (Ettinger et al., 2014), determining whether susceptible Black 
people sensitised to perceived racism, seems critical. ‘Social failure/defeat’ in 
response to the accumulative and chronic exposure to perceived racism could so 
fragment Black identity and their environment that mental ill health ensues (Selten & 
Cantor Graae, 2005; Selten et al., 2013), however, race-based relational schema do not 
need to be derogatory to exert their effect. 
 
7.1 Implications 
Racial discrimination is a common experience for Black people in the UK but 
appraised and managed differently accordingly personal attributes and accessible 
social capital (Berjot & Gillet, 2011). Whilst Black people are predisposed to enhance 
their personal and group identity, self-appreciation becomes particularly difficult in 
situations where Black people perceived to be threatened. Racial discrimination is 
stressful because it threatens ethnic identity. Black people may be no more likely to 
experience social adversity than their White counterparts are, but they are more likely 
to attribute social adversity to perceived racism in external, stable, uncontrollable 
situations (Gilvarry et al., 1999; van Laar, 2000). Adversity whether race-related or 
not is stressful raises cortisol levels and induces and state alert and readiness for fight 
or flight. Over time, the accumulative and chronic effect of stress and raised cortisol 
levels mediated via the amygdala’s influence over the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal 
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(HPA) axis (Selten & Cantor-Graae, 2005). Black people stressed and subjected to 
excessive levels of cortisol during critical periods of hippocampal growth and 
development, however, may fail to regulate their emotional responses. Prefrontal 
cortex failure to control the amygdala results in an increase in emotional responsivity 
to perceived racism if on an appraisal the race-related event is determined to be benign 
or non-threatening, and an increase in mesolimbic dopamine associated with deficits in 
executive functions and a decrease in problem-solving ability (Selten et al., 2013). 
Human development of Black identity in the UK may not only be challenged at 
critical periods of hippocampal growth and development, but accumulative and 
chronic dopamine dysregulation induced by race-related stress may sensitise 
susceptible Black to stereotype threat and hypervigilance (Combs et al., 2006; Payne, 
2001; Steele, 1997). Excessive wariness may be evident in early childhood the time 
Black people have reached adulthood, simply mentioning those aspects of the Black 
body often stigmatised in relation with others, may give way to the reactivation of 
negative self-schema and coping strategies formed earlier in life (Story, 1998). 
Whether the appraisal of new/different race-related events/situations takes place within 
the context of newer/better strategies for coping with the stress perceived racism 
seems to critical if the stress of perceived racism in those susceptible Black people so 
sensitised is not to consume the individual (Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002). In this 
thesis, the category of mental representation, which undermined within group Black 
identity, differed according to gender and ethnicity. Hence, the term ‘Black’ as a social 
group category is problematic. Where dissociative disorders cannot be ruled out as 
possible confounders in those diagnosed with schizophrenia, health and social care 
professionals should consider whether the presenting symptoms are indeed indicative 
of activated race-related schema. If the presenting symptoms appear to be associated 
265 
 
with race-related trauma, health and social care professionals may need to determine 
whether the appraisal of race-related intrusion needs adjustment and if so ‘how’ in 
relation with the Black people. 
 
7.2 Study Limitations and recommendations for future research 
The data used in this thesis was collected from a single web-based 
questionnaire over the internet, and only those with internet access and interest in the 
study were likely to participate. The effort required in persuading Black to participate 
in the study was extraordinary. This may be due to operationalising perceived racism 
as perceived concern and preoccupation with aspects of the Black body mentally 
represented as relational race-based schemata, concern as to what the information 
would be used for, and what information gained from research has been used in the 
past. Respondents did not answer all the parts of the questionnaire. Hence the samples 
for studies 1 and 2 were smaller than expected.  
Although measures for equality of variance, skewness, kurtosis, and power 
were within tolerable limits, normality was not achieved for any of the variables. 
Caution was, therefore, exercised when interpreting the results. Using non-parametric 
tests, however, revealed a relationship between mental representations of relational 
race-related schemata and the onset of dissociative experience in those Black people 
the sample for whom perceived racism was salient. Theoretically driven hierarchical 
multiple regression revealed surprising results which made it necessary to reject the 
null hypothesis outright, (i.e., that race-based schema, racialised body image 
disturbance, and self-depreciation would be no significant effect on the reported 
frequency of dissociative experiences, p < .05). Path analysis and structural equation 
modelling, however, confirmed the unidirectional flow of the proposed theoretical 
model, (i.e., towards dissociative experiences). Future studies should attempt to 
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replicate the study in more representative clinical, and non-clinical, samples of the 
Black people, and look at the conceptual relation between race-based rejection 
sensitivity and dissociative experiences given that exactly the same factors contributed 
to the variance in RBRS and DESII in Black people, overall, and there may be within 
group difference yet unidentified.   
Accumulative and chronic perceived racism does not appear to be as stressful 
to all Black people, equally (Briere, 2006). Black people who have been sensitised to 
perceived racism may be more likely to appraise race-related events/situations and 
activate coping strategies in ambiguous, unstable, uncontrollable contexts (Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2002; Crocker & Major, 1989; Bandura, 1986). Coping, however, does 
not appear to moderate the effects of perceived racism on identity security and/or 
future social interaction (Barnes & Lightsey Jr, 2005). Future studies should look at 
repeating this study with a different sample, and the threats and challenges to Black 
identity development to determine whether anything can be done to strengthen Black 
identity throughout life. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 Black people of African and Caribbean descent in the UK are 3.3 times more 
likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983/2007 for the assessment and 
treatment of schizophrenia than they White counterparts are. Consequently, they are 
overrepresented in the mental health care system in the UK. The reasons ‘why’ remain 
elusive. However, Black men have often given perceived racism as the cause of their 
presenting health and financial difficulties (Cooper et al., 2008; Chakraborty et al., 
2009; Gilvarry et al., 1999). In my earlier  qualitative study designed to reveal events 
that might be relevant to the process of becoming mentally ill in a small sample of 
Black men, I found that relative failure in academic achievement, and securing paid 
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work, were important experiences in the process of becoming mentally ill (De 
Maynard, 2005, 2008). Black men believed that the reasons for their relative academic 
and socioeconomic failure and subsequent detention under the Mental Health Act 
1983/2007 for the treatment and/or assessment of schizophrenia were indeed, located 
externally in ambiguous, uncontrollable situations (Allen, 2009, van Laar, 2000). 
There have been few studies, however, to determine how causation might be inferred 
from the interaction between the accumulative and chronic stress of perceived racism 
and reported the frequency of dissociative experiences in Black people susceptible to 
psychosis and sensitised to perceived racism. 
The stress of accumulative and chronic race-related stress that undermines 
personal agency and confidence cannot so readily be dismissed as ‘paranoid’ or 
delusional’ where evidence of biases in teachers’ assessments of Black children cannot 
explain the relative difference in household income observed (Gillian, 2009). 
Teachers’ negative biases about the ability of Black students (Campbell, 2013), and 
selective inclusive policies (Black-Hawkins, 2010), creates and sustains attainment 
gaps between Black children and others ensuring that Black people are unable to 
compete on the socioeconomic battlefield of life equally (Crozer, 2005; Leverenz, 
1989). The intergenerational experience of social disadvantaged and deprivation is 
inevitable in too many Black families (The Black Training & Enterprise Group, 2014). 
When the accumulative and chronic academic and socioeconomic failure is pitted 
against the parental, personal, and societal expectation that Black students should 
succeed in education and workplace, at developmentally important periods when the 
hippocampus is developing and maturing, the outcome cannot be conducive to health 
and well-being (Benner & Mistry, 2007; Zhang et al., 2011; Selten et al., 2013).  
Increased stress hormones such as cortisol may interfere with normal 
neurobiological development at these critical periods of infancy and adolescence. 
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During childhood, the hippocampus carries out crucial working memory functions 
whilst the prefrontal cortex is developing. In adolescence, the prefrontal cortex reaches 
maturity, and the hippocampus attempts to offload this cognitive responsibility on to 
the prefrontal cortex. As the neurotransmitter ‘Dopamine’ influences the relative 
salience of information that might potentially enter awareness, the fear of perceived 
race-related academic and subsequent socioeconomic failure/defeat may be given 
higher salience tending towards a reduction in hippocampal volumes, and excessive 
pruning of neural pathway in the prefrontal cortex and a reduction in learning and 
attention.  
Excessive dopamine prohibits prefrontal cortex maturation thus preventing the 
offload of executive duties by the hippocampus and control of the emotional 
responsivity of the amygdala. The negative feedback mechanism controlling the 
Hypothalamic–Pituitary–Adrenal (HPA) axis is, therefore, impeded resulting in further 
stress-induced damage to the hippocampus and increased sensitivity to environmental 
stimuli reduced attention, learning, and control of thought, feeling and action (Broome 
et al., 2008). The responsibility for success in education and the workplace cannot rest 
solely with Black young people especially where racism is endemic to UK society and 
academic and socioeconomic success has been determined for them by the age of 
seven years (Campbell, 2013). The stress of striving to compete equally on a 
socioeconomic battlefield of life where the odds of success are so heavily weighted 
against Black people must take its toll somewhere (Krippner, 1997; Leverenz, 1998). 
Derogatory or not, the stress of accumulative and chronic perceived race-related 
academic and subsequent socioeconomic failure or defeat may so threaten Black 
identity in susceptible Black people and sensitised to perceived racism that 
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Appendix A – Demographic Variables 
 
Part 1 - Please tell me a little about you 
 
It would be very helpful if you complete these questions as they could give us a profile 
of who took part in this study. If you feel uncomfortable with any of them, then please 
leave the question blank. 
 
 
01. Your gender (please tick the appropriate box):       Male          female 
 
02. How old are you? (Please write in your age in closest year) __________ 
 
03. What is marital status? (Please tick the appropriate box):   
               
Married  





04. How would describe your ethnicity?  
 
Black or Black British:  
     
African  
African Caribbean  
Any other Black background  
 
 
05. Which is the highest level of academic qualification you have reached? (Please 
tick the appropriate box):     
 
No qualifications  
GCSE,  









06. What is your accessible annual income? (Please tick the appropriate box):   
 
0 - £10,000  
£10,001 - £20,000  
£20,001 - £30,000  
£30,001 - £50,000  
£50,001 - £80,000  
£80,001-120,000  
Over £120,000  
 
07. Do you spend the most time during the day with your white friends, or with your 
Black and Asian friends?  
 
Asian friends  
White friends  
Black African friends  
Black Caribbean friends  
Arab or Middle Eastern friends  
mixed Black African and Caribbean friends  
mixed Black African and white friends  
mixed Black African and Asian friends  
mixed Black African and Arab or Middle Eastern friends   
mixed Black African Caribbean and white friends  
mixed Black African, Caribbean and Asian friends  
Mixed Black African Caribbean and Arab or Middle Eastern  
Equal time with friends of all different ethnic groups  
Some other combination; please specify  
 
08. Which of these skin tones below, best resembles your own on an unexposed part of 
your body? …………………… 
 
  Appendix B –  
This is a reproduction of the Von Luschan’s 
chromatic scale made by anthropologist Felix 
von Luschan. It was self-made from scratch 
with the paint program in the likeness of the 
chart originally printed in Voelker, Rassen, 
Sprachen. The skin colors used were copied 
from the original chart box per box using the 
paint program’s dropper tool.—Dark 
Tichondrias 23:59, 27 August 2006 (UTC) 
I, the creator of this work, 
hereby release it into the public domain. This 
applies worldwide. In case this is not legally 
possible, I grant any entity the right to use this 
work for any purpose, without any 
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Appendix B - Information Sheet (Dissociative Experiences) 
 
Dissociation in Black people of African and African Caribbean 
Descent in the UK 
 
Dear Participant, 
I would like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a research study conducted 
to examine the relationship between racism and the mental health of Black people of African 
and African Caribbean descent in the UK We would like to invite you to take part in a 
research study. Before you decide you need to understand, why the research is being done and 
what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to determine whether there is any relation between mental 
representations that might underpin the subjective experience of racism, and dissociative 
experiences in Black people of African and African Caribbean descent (Black people) in the 
UK. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
I have invited you, as because you are because most Black people experience racism within 
the context of their everyday lives, and Black people continue to be overrepresented within the 
mental health system. However, we know very little about how Black may process race-
related information, psychologically. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part. Participation is voluntary. If you at all unhappy with any part 
of the study, you can simply navigate away from the website. You do not have to answer all 
the items in the questionnaire. You can leave any you do not want to answer, blank and move 
onto an item that you do want to answer. You can withdraw from the study at any time.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
All you have to do is answer ALL the items on the questionnaire, in your own time, to the best 
of your ability, using the drop down menus provided, and submit the questionnaire using the 
submit button at the end of the questionnaire. The questionnaire should take 15 minutes to 
complete. If you do not want to respond to any of the items, please leave it blank. There is no 




What will happen to the information? 
When you hit the submit button, your responses will be automatically sent to the research 
investigator anonymously. The information will be held in the ‘VADM Centre for Ethnic 
Minority Mental Health’ databases until the end of the study. The study will end when I have a 
representative sample of respondents. None of the information with shared with a third party 
without your expressed prior permission, and you can be assured confidentiality will be 
maintained throughout.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results will be analysed, and the aggregated findings will be disseminated in peer-
reviewed journals and at a conference. At the end of the study, you will be able to request a 
summary of the findings from the researcher. You will not be identifiable in the paper or the 
summary. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
You may feel upset or distressed by some of the questionnaires asked, or need clarity before 
responding. If you are unsure, want clarification or are distressed please contact me at 
02086744500 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise that the study will you, but the information I get from the study will help 
improve our understanding of the effects racism may have on the mental health of Black 
people in the UK. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? Who is organising and funding the Study? 
The study has been reviewed by the National Research Ethics Committee and is being 
organised and funded by the researcher, Vernon A. De Maynard (VADM Centre for Ethnic 





Appendix C - Information Sheet (Race-based Rejection Sensitivity) 
 
Dissociation in Black people of African and African Caribbean 





I would like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a research study conducted 
to examine the relationship between racism and the mental health of Black people of African 
and African Caribbean descent in the UK We would like to invite you to take part in a 
research study. Before you decide you need to understand, why the research is being done and 
what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to determine whether there is any relation between mental 
representations that might underpin the subjective experience of racism, and dissociative 
experiences in Black people of African and African Caribbean descent (Black people) in the 
UK. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
I have invited you, as because you are because most Black people experience racism within 
the context of their everyday lives, and Black people continue to be overrepresented within the 
mental health system. However, we know very little about how Black may process race-
related information, psychologically. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part. Participation is voluntary. If you at all unhappy with any part 
of the study, you can simply navigate away from the website. You do not have to answer all 
the items in the questionnaire. You can leave any you do not want to answer, blank and move 
onto an item that you do want to answer. You can withdraw from the study at any time.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
All you have to do is answer ALL the items on the questionnaire, in your own time, to the best 
of your ability, using the drop down menus provided, and submit the questionnaire using the 
submit button at the end of the questionnaire. The questionnaire should take 15 minutes to 
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complete. If you do not want to respond to any of the items, please leave it blank. There is no 
time limit, but please do not think about the questions for too long.  
 
What will happen to the information? 
When you hit the submit button, your responses will be automatically sent to the research 
investigator anonymously. The information will be held in the ‘VADM Centre for Ethnic 
Minority Mental Health’ databases until the end of the study. The study will end when I have a 
representative sample of respondents. None of the information with shared with a third party 
without your expressed prior permission, and you can be assured confidentiality will be 
maintained throughout.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results will be analysed, and the aggregated findings will be disseminated in peer-
reviewed journals and at a conference. At the end of the study, you will be able to request a 
summary of the findings from the researcher. You will not be identifiable in the paper or the 
summary. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
You may feel upset or distressed with some of the questionnaires asked, or need clarity before 
responding. If you are unsure, want clarification or are distressed please contact me: 
0208768744500 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise that the study will you, but the information I get from the study will help 
improve our understanding of the effects racism may have on the mental health of Black 
people in the UK. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? Who is organising and funding the Study? 
The study has been reviewed by the National Research Ethics Committee and is being 
organised and funded by the researcher, Vernon A. De Maynard (VADM Centre for Ethnic 




Appendix D - Information Sheet (Schedule of Race-related Events) 
 
Dissociation in Black people of African and African Caribbean 
Descent in the UK 
 
Dear Participant, 
I would like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a research study conducted 
to examine the relationship between racism and the mental health of Black people of African 
and African Caribbean descent in the UK We would like to invite you to take part in a 
research study. Before you decide you need to understand, why the research is being done and 
what it would involve for you. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. 
Talk to others about the study if you wish. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to determine whether there is any relation between mental 
representations that might underpin the subjective experience of racism, and dissociative 
experiences in Black people of African and African Caribbean descent (black people) in the 
UK. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
I have invited you, as because you are because most Black people experience racism within 
the context of their everyday lives, and Black people continue to be overrepresented within the 
mental health system. However, we know very little about how Black may process race-
related information, psychologically. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to take part. Participation is voluntary. If you at all unhappy with any part 
of the study, you can simply navigate away from the website. You do not have to answer all 
the items in the questionnaire. You can leave any you do not want to answer, blank and move 
onto an item that you do want to answer. You can withdraw from the study at any time.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
All you have to do is answer ALL the items on the questionnaire, in your own time, to the best 
of your ability, using the drop down menus provided, and submit the questionnaire using the 
submit button at the end of the questionnaire. The questionnaire should take 15 minutes to 
complete. If you do not want to respond to any of the items, please leave it blank. There is no 
time limit, but please do not think about the questions for too long.  
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What will happen to the information? 
When you hit the submit button, your responses will be automatically sent to the research 
investigator anonymously. The information will be held in the VADM Centre for Ethnic 
Minority Mental Health databases until the end of the study. The study will end when I have a 
representative sample of respondents. None of the information with shared with a third party 
without your expressed prior permission, and you can be assured confidentiality will be 
maintained throughout.  
 
What will happen to the results? 
The results will be analysed, and the aggregated findings will be disseminated in peer-
reviewed journals and at a conference. At the end of the study, you will be able to request a 
summary of the findings from the researcher. You will not be identifiable in the paper or the 
summary. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
You may feel upset or distressed with some of the questionnaires asked, or need clarity before 
responding. If you are unsure, want clarification or are distressed please contact me: 
0208744500 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
I cannot promise that the study will you, but the information I get from the study will help 
improve our understanding of the effects racism may have on the mental health of Black 
people in the UK. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? Who is Organising and funding the Study? 
The study has been reviewed by the National Research Ethics Committee and is being 
organised and funded by the Researcher, Vernon A. De Maynard (VADM Centre for Ethnic 




Appendix E – Consent Form 
 
Dissociation in Black people of African and African Caribbean 
descent in the UK 
 
Study Centre: VADM Centre for Ethnic Minority Mental Health 
 
Chief Investigator: Vernon A. De Maynard 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Please tick  
and initial the box below 
 
1. I confirm that I have read the information sheet dated 
22.09.2011 for the above-named study and have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions, and have 
these questions answered satisfactorily. 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am 
free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reasons, 
without my rights being affected. 
 




……………………………………  ………………………  Date: …………… 
Name of Person taking part in study   Signature 
 
This is to certify that, ………………………………. (print name) has understood the 
information given about the above-named study, and she or he is/is not (delete as 
appropriate) willing to participate in the said study. He or she understands that the 
researcher will treat with the strictest confidentiality all information collected. He has 
been given the opportunity to ask questions about the above-named study and knows 
that he is free to withdraw his or her consent at any time.  
 
          
.…………………….………………………      Date: …………… 







Appendix F – Race-based Rejection Sensitivity (RBRS) (validated) 
Each of the items below describes new situations that people encounter. Some people are 
concerned about these new situations, and others are not. Please imagine yourself in each 
situation and circle the number that best indicates how you would feel. 
 
 
1. Imagine that you are in class one day and the boss, teacher or professor asks a 
particularly difficult question. A few people, including you, raise their hands to answer 
the question. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that the boss, teacher or professor might not choose 
you because of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
 
b) I would expect that the boss, teacher or professor might not choose me because of my race/ 
ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
 
2. Imagine that you are in a pharmacy, trying to pick out a few items. While you are 
looking at the different brands, you notice one of the store clerks glancing your way. 
 
a) How concerned /anxious would you be that the clerk might be looking at you because of 
your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that the clerk might continue to look at me because of my race/ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
3. Imagine you have just completed a job interview over the telephone. You are in good 
spirits because the interviewer seemed enthusiastic about your application. Several days 
later, you complete a second interview in person. Your interviewer informs you that they 
will let you know about their decision soon. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that you might not be hired because of your 
race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that I might not be hired because of my race/ethnicity.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
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4. It is late at night, and you are driving down a country road you are not familiar with. 
Luckily, there is a 24-hour 7-11 just ahead, so you stop there and head up to the counter 
to ask the young woman for directions. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that she might not help you because of your race/ 
ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that the woman might not help me because of my race/ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
5. Imagine that a new school counsellor is selecting students for a summer scholarship 
fund that you really want. The counsellor has only one scholarship left, and you are one 
of the several students that are eligible for this scholarship. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that the counsellor might not choose you because of 
your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that he or she might not select me because of my race/ethnicity.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
6. Imagine you have just finished shopping, and you are leaving the store carrying 
several bags. It's closing time, and several people are filing out of the store at once. 
Suddenly, the alarm begins to sound, and a security guard comes over to investigate. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that the store detective or guard might stop 
you because of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that the guard might stop me because of my race/ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
7. Imagine you are riding the bus one day. The bus is full except for two seats, one of 




a) How concerned/anxious would you be that she might avoid sitting next to you 
because of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
 
b) I would expect that she might not sit next to me because of my race/ethnicity 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
8. Imagine that you are in a restaurant, trying to get the attention of your waitress. A lot 
of other people are trying to get her attention as well. 
 
1) How concerned/anxious would you be that she might not attend you right away 
because of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
2) I would expect that she might not attend to me right away because of my race/ethnicity 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  Very likely 
 
9. Imagine you are driving down the street, and there is a police barricade just ahead. 
The police officers are randomly pulling people over to check drivers’ licenses and 
registrations. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that an officer might pull you over because of 
your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that the officers might stop me because of my race/ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unlikely  very likely 
 
10. Imagine that it is the second day of your new class. The teacher assigned a writing 
sample yesterday and today the teacher announces that she has finished correcting the 
papers. You wait for your paper to be returned. 
 
a) How concerned/anxious would you be that you might receive a lower grade than 
others might because of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect to receive a lower grade than others because of my race/ethnicity did. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
very unlikely  Very likely 
 
11. Imagine that you are standing in line for the ATM machine, and you notice the 




a) How concerned/anxious would you be that she might be suspicious of you because 
of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very unconcerned  Very concerned 
 
b) I would expect that she might be suspicious of me because of my race/ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
very unlikely  very likely 
 
12. Imagine you are at a payphone on a street corner. You have to make a call, but you 
do not have change. You decide to go into a store and ask for change for your bill.  
 
1) How concerned/anxious would you be that the cashier might not give you change 
because of your race/ethnicity? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
very unconcerned  very concerned 
 
2) I would expect that the cashier might not give me change because of my race/ethnicity. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 




Appendix G - Landrine & Klonoff |(1996) Schedule of Racist Events 
(validated) 
 
This questionnaire consists of 18 statements about experience racism within the 
context of your daily life. We are interested in the prevalence of racist incidents in 
your daily life, and how stressful that may have been for you. Using the drop down 
menu, please indicate how often the unfairness in each statement happened to you, and 
how stressful it was. 
 
1. How many times have you been treated unfairly by teachers and professors because    
you are Black in the past year?  
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
2. How many times have you been treated unfairly by your employers, bosses, and 
supervisors because you are Black in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 

















3. How many times have you been treated unfairly by your co-workers, fellow 
students, and colleagues, because you are Black in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
4. How many times have you been treated unfairly by people in service jobs (store 
clears, waiters, bartenders, bank tellers and others) because you are Black in the 
past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




Allot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
5. How many times have you been treated unfairly by strangers because you are Black 
in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 






How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
6. How many times have you been treated unfairly by people in helping jobs (doctors, 
nurses, psychiatrist, case workers, dentists, school counsellors, therapists, social 
workers, and others because you are Black in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
7. How many times have you been treated unfairly by neighbours because you are 
Black, in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 

















8. How many times have you been treated unfairly by institutions (schools, 
universities, law firms, the police, the courts, social services, benefits agencies and 
others), because you are Black in the past year?  
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
 
9. How many times have you been treated unfairly by people that you thought were 
your friends because you are Black in the past year?  
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
 
10. How many times have you been accused or suspected of doing something wrong 
(such as stealing, cheating, not doing your share of the work or breaking the law) 
because you are Black in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
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How stressful was it 
 











      
 
11. How many times have people misunderstood your intentions and motives because 
you are Black in the past year?  
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A  lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
 
12. How many times did you want to tell someone off for being racist, but did not say 
anything in the past year?  
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 

















13. How many times have you been angry about something racist that was done to you 
in the past year?  
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
14. How many times were you forced to take drastic steps (such as filing a grievance, 
filing a lawsuit, quitting your job, moving away, and other actions) to deal with some 
racist thing that was done to you in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
 
15. How many times have you been called a racist name like "nigger"“, coon", "jungle 
bunny", or other names in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 






How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
16. How many times have you gotten into an argument or a fight about something 
racist what was done to somebody else in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 











      
 
 
17. How many times have you been made fun of, picked on pushed, shoved, hit, or 
threatened with harm because you are Black in the past year? 
 
Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 















18. How different would your life be now if you HAD NOT BEEN treated in a racist 




Never Once in a 
while (less 
than 10% 




A lot (26-49% of 
the time) 
Most of the 
time (50-70% 
of the time)  
ALL of the 
time (more 
than 70% 
of the time) 
      
 
How stressful was it? 
 
















Appendix H – Berstein & Putnam’s (1986) Dissociative Experiences 
Scale II (validated) 
 
This questionnaire consists of 28 questions about experiences that you may have in 
your daily life. We are interested in how often you have these experiences. It is 
important, however, that your answers show how often these experiences happen to 
you when you are not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To answer the 
questions, please determine to what degree the experience described in the question 
applies to you and indicate the percentage of the time you have the experience: 
 
0%- 
(Never)   










1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or subway 
and suddenly realising that they do not remember to indicate what has happened 




2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they 
suddenly realise that they did not hear part or all of what was said. Indicate what 
percentage of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no 
idea how they got there. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
0%- 
(Never)   
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4.  Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that 




(Never)   






         
 
5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings 
that they do not remember buying. Indicate what percentage of the time this 
happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
6. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not 
know; do you call them by another name, or insist that they have met them before. 
Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
7.  Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are 
standing next to themselves or watching themselves do something, and they 
actually see themselves as if they were looking at another person. Indicate what 
percentage of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
8.   Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognise friends or family 
members. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   
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9.   Some people find that they have no memory of some important events in their 
lives (for example, a wedding or graduation). Indicate what percentage of the time 
this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
10.   Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not 
think that they have lied. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to 
you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
11.   Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognising 
themselves. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
12.   Some people have the experience of feeling that other people, objects and the 
world around them are not real. Indicate what percentage of the time this 
happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
13.   Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that their body does not 
seem to belong to them. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to 
you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   










14.   Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so 
vividly that they feel as if they were reliving that event. Indicate what percentage 
of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
15.   Some people have the experience of not being sure whether the things that they 
remember happening really did happen or whether they just dreamed them. 
Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
16.   Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it 
strange and unfamiliar. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you.
  
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
17.  Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie, they become 
so absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other events happening around 
them. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
18.  Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or 
daydream that it feels as though it were really happening to them. Indicate what 
percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   
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19.   Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. Indicate what 
percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
20.   Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of 
nothing, and are not aware of the passage of time. Indicate what percentage of 
the time this happens to you. 
 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
21.   Some people sometimes find that when they are alone, they talk out loud to 
themselves. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
22.   Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with 
another situation that they feel almost as if they were two different people. 
Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
23.    Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things 
with amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for 
example, sports, work, social situations, etc.). Indicate what percentage of the 
time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   










24.     Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done 
something or have just thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing 
whether they have just mailed a letter or have just thought about mailing it). 
Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
25.   Some people find evidence that they have done things that they do not 
remember doing. Indicate what percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
26.   Some people sometimes find writings, drawings or notes among their belongings 
that they must have done but cannot remember doing. Indicate what percentage 
of the time this happens to you. 
 
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
27.     Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell 
them to do things or comment on things that they are doing. Indicate what 
percentage of the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
 
28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so 
that people and objects appear far away or unclear. Indicate what percentage of 
the time this happens to you. 
   
0%- 
(Never)   






         
376 
 
Appendix I: - Rosenberg’s (1965) Self Esteem Scale (validated) 
 
Please answer each question as honestly as possible by circling one of the four 
possible responses. ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS.  
 
 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
    
 
 
2. At times, I think I am no good at all 
 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
    
 
3.  I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
    
 
4. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.  
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
     
 
5. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
        
 
6. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.  
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
      
 
7.  I take a positive attitude towards myself. 
377 
 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
       
 
8. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.  
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
        
   
9. I wish I could have more respect for myself  
 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      
            
 
10. I certainly feel useless at times. 
Strongly Agree Agree     Disagree        Strongly Disagree      




Appendix J –My Object Relations and Social Cognition of Racial 
Identity Scale (not-validated) 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire assesses concerns about physical appearance. Please 
read each question carefully and tick the answer that best describes your own personal 
experience. Also, write in answers where indicated. 
 
 
1) When I close my eyes and think about my experiences, most of the images that 
come to mind show me with: 
 
a) People who make racist comments about other people from my racial background, 










agree Strongly agree 
       
 
b) People who make insulting remarks about other people from my racial background, 










agree Strongly agree 
       
 
c) People who never mention the colour of my skin, hair texture, or the thickness of 










agree Strongly agree 
       
 
d) People like to socialise with me, but I know they would not want me to have a 










agree Strongly agree 
       
379 
 
2) When I close my eyes and think about my experiences, most of the images that 
come to mind show me with: 
   









agree Strongly agree 
       
 
b) People who tell me how much they do not like the darkness of my skin colour, the 
shape of my lips, or the texture of my hair 









agree Strongly agree 
       
 
c) People who make racist jokes and usually direct them at me 









agree Strongly agree 
       
 
d) People who say insulting things about my skin colour, shape of my nose, or the 
thickness of my lips, and do not seem to care if it makes me feel unwanted and 
unhappy 









agree Strongly agree 




3) When I close my eyes and think about my experiences, most of the images that 
come to mind show me with: 
 











Agree Strongly agree 
       
 
b) People who often make more positive remarks about my Black skin, the shape of 
my nose, the texture of my hair texture, or thickness of my lips, than they do about 










Agree Strongly agree 
       
 
c) People who often make more positive remarks about my Black skin, the shape of 
my nose, the texture of my hair texture, or thickness of my lips, than they do about 
people from other racial backgrounds 









Agree Strongly agree 
       
 
d) People who made you feel more valued as a Black person at the expense of people 
from other racial backgrounds 









Agree Strongly agree 




4) When I close my eyes and think about my experiences, most of the images that 
come to mind show me with: 
 









Agree Strongly agree 
       
 










Agree Strongly agree 
       
 
c) People who often make positive statements about the physical bodies of people from 










Agree Strongly agree 
       
 










Agree Strongly agree 













Appendix K – ‘Body Image Disturbance Questionnaire’ 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire assesses concerns about physical appearance. Please read 
each question carefully and circle the answer that best describes your experience. Also, write 
in answers where indicated. 
 
1. Are you concerned about the appearance of some part of your body, which you consider especially unattractive? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
concerned 
Somewhat concerned Moderately 
concerned 
Very Concerned Extremely concerned 
2. What do you think these concerns are? What specifically bothers them about the appearance of these body parts? 
 
3. If, you are at least somewhat concerned, do these concerns preoccupy you? That is, you think about them a lot, 
and they are hard to stop thinking about? (Circle the best answer) 
1 2 3 4 5 






Very preoccupied Extremely preoccupied 
 
4. What effect has your preoccupation with your appearance had on your life? Please describe): 
 
5. Has your physical “defect” often caused you a lot of distress, torment or pain? How much? (Circle best answer) 
1 2 3 4 5 









6. Has your physical “defect” caused you impairment in social occupational or other important areas of 
functioning? How much? (Circle the best answer) 
1 2 3 4 5 











7. Has your physical “defect” significantly interfered with your social life? How Much? (Circle the best answer) 
Never Occasionally Moderately often Often Very often 
8. Has your physical “defect” significantly interfered with your schoolwork, your job or your ability to function in 
your role? How Much? (Circle the best answer) 
Never Occasionally Moderately often Often Very often 
9. Do you ever avoid things because of your physical “defect”? how often? 
Never Occasionally Moderately Often Vern often 
Reprinted with kind permission from Dr Cash, T.F., Phillips, K.A., Santos, M.T. & Hrabosky, J.I., (2004). 
Measuring “Negative body image”. Validation of the Body Image Disturbance Questionnaire in a nonclinical 




Appendix L - Modified Body Image Disturbance Scale (not-validated) 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire assesses concerns about physical appearance. Please read 
each question carefully and circle the answer that best describes your experience. Also, write 
in answers where indicated. 
 
1. Do other people appear concerned about the appearance of some part of your physical body, which they consider especially 
unattractive? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all 
concerned 
Somewhat concerned Moderately concerned Very Concerned Extremely concerned 
2. What do you think these concerns are? What specifically bothers them about the appearance of these body parts? 
3. If, you are at least somewhat concerned, do these concerns preoccupy you? That is, you think about them a lot, and they are 
hard to stop thinking about? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all 
preoccupied 
Somewhat preoccupied Moderately preoccupied Very preoccupied Extremely preoccupied 
 
4. What effect has your preoccupation with your appearance had on your life? Please describe): 
 
5. Has does preoccupation with your appearance often caused you a lot of distress, torment or pain, and if so how much? (Circle 
best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
No distress Mild, and not 
too disturbing 
Moderate and 






6. Has your preoccupation with your appearance caused you impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning, and if so, how much? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
No limitation Mild interference, but 
overall performance not 
impaired 
Moderate definite 





7. Has your preoccupation with your appearance significantly interfered with your social life, and if so how much? (Circle the best 
answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Never occasionally Moderately often Often Very often 
8. Has your preoccupation with your appearance significantly interfered with your schoolwork, your job, or your ability to 
function in your role, and if so, how much? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Never Occasionally Moderately often Often Very often 
9. Do you ever avoid things because of your preoccupation with your appearance, and if so how often? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Never Occasionally Moderately Often Vern often 
Modified with kind permission from Dr Cash, T.F., Phillips, K.A., Santos, M.T. & Hrabosky, J.I. (2004). 
‘Measuring “Negative body image”. Validation of the Body Image Disturbance Questionnaire in a nonclinical 
population’. Body Image International Journal of Research, 1, 363-37.
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Appendix M – My Racialised Body Image Disturbance Scale 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire assesses concerns about physical appearance. Please read each question 
carefully and circle the answer that best describes your experience. Also, write in answers where indicated. 
 
1. Do other people appear concerned about the appearance of some part of your physical body, which they consider especially 
unattractive? 
0 1 2 3 4 




Moderately concerned Very Concerned Extremely concerned 
2. Are these concerns related to (tick all that apply):  
   Skin tone                                                Hair texture                 
   Shape of your body                                Other (please describe): …………………………. 
                                                                                        
3. If, you are at least somewhat concerned, do these concerns preoccupy you? That is, you think about them a lot, and they are hard to stop 
thinking about? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 




Moderately preoccupied Very preoccupied Extremely preoccupied 
 
4. What effect has your preoccupation with your appearance had on your life? (Please tick all that apply): 
a) Excessive wariness of others                                                                    
b) Identity insecurity and confusion                                                              
c) Fear of damage due to skin or hair treatment                                              
d) Desire to fit these aspects of yourself                   
e) Frustration                                       
f) Lack of confidence                          
g) Interfered with your life chances                                                            
5. Has does preoccupation with your appearance often caused you a lot of distress, torment or pain, and if so how much? (Circle best 
answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
No distress Mild, and not 
too disturbing 
Moderate and 






6. Has your preoccupation with your appearance caused you impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning, 
and if so, how much? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 





interference, but still 
manageable 
Severe causes substantial 
impairment 
Extreme 
7. Has your preoccupation with your appearance significantly interfered with your social life, and if so how much? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Never Occasionally Moderately often Often Very often 
8. Has your preoccupation with your appearance significantly interfered with your schoolwork, your job, or your ability to function in your 
role, and if so, how much? (Circle the best answer) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Never Occasionally Moderately often Often Very often 
9. Do you ever avoid things because of your preoccupation with your appearance, and if so how often? 
0 1 2 3 4 
Never Occasionally Moderately Often Vern often 
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Appendix N – Permission for use of Dissociative Experiences Scale 
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This is fine. All you would need to do is cite the original article on the Body Image 
Disturbance Questionnaire (BIDQ) and specify how you adapted it with my permission. 
  




Thomas F. Cash, PhD.  
University Professor  
Department of Psychology 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529 
Phone: (757) 683-4439 
Fax: (757) 683-5087 
web site: www.body-images.com 
............................................................... 
Editor-in-Chief, Body Image:  
An International Journal of Research 
www.elsevier.com/locate/bodyimage 
.......................................................... 
----- Original Message -----  
From: De Maynard, Vernon Augustus  
To: Body-Images@cox.net  
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2007 5:05 AM 
Subject: re permissions 
 
  
Dear Dr T. Cash, 
  
A year ago, you gave me permission to use/republish you BIDQ scale. Thank you. I have since 
found the need to modify it such that it measures what I want it to measure, (i.e., rather than asking 
people what others them about their own physical appearance, the modified scale asks individuals 
what they think bothers other people about their own physical appearance). I would most appreciate 




Vernon A. De Maynard, AKC, BSc (Hons.), BA (Hons.), MSc, MBACP (Accred.) 
Research Asst/PhD Student 
 
This email message may be confidential and is intended only for the use of the individual(s) 
to whom it is addressed. It may contain information, which is or may be confidential, non-
public, or legally privileged. Please do not disseminate or distribute this message other than 
to its intended recipient without permission of the author. You should not copy it or use it 
for any purpose nor disclose its contents to any other person. If you have received this 
message in error, please notify me by email immediately and delete the original message and 
alEmail has been scanned for spam and viruses by Altman Technologies' email management service 
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